Overview of Infrastructure Charging, part 4, IMPROVERAIL Project Deliverable 9, “Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems” by Dominique Bouf et al.
Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
Page 1 of 194 
 




Contract number:  GRD1/2000/25635 SI2.316088 
Project full title:   IMPROVEd tools for RAILway capacity and access management 
Project acronym:  IMPROVERAIL 
Duration:    24 Months 
Project Co-ordinator:  TIS.PT, Consultores em Transportes, Inovação e Sistemas, s.a. 
Contractors: 
TIS.PT                PT 
INTF                 PT 
REFER                 PT 
ERASMUS                NL 
RIB                 NL 
ICSTM                 UK 
FIT                   I 
MINTRA                 I 
FS                  I 
NTUA                 GR 
CTC                BG 
INCERTRANS              RO 
EPFL                 CH 
SBB-CFF-FFS              CH 
SMA                CH 
TUB                D 
LET                FR 
CNRS                FR 
TOI                 NO 
NMTC                NO 
COMPETITIVE AND SUSTAINABLE GROWTH 
(GROWTH) PROGRAMME 
Deliverable 9  
Improved Data Background to Support Current and 
Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
IMPR VERAILDeliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
Page 2 of 194 
 
1  Report summary fiche 
1.1  Authors 
This deliverable (D9) of the IMPROVERAIL project was produced by: 
 
TOI    Institute of Transport Economics      N 
TIS    TIS.pt            PT 
TUB    Technische Universität Berlin      D 
LET    Université Lumière Lyon        F 
NTUA    National Technical University of Athens    GR 
INCERTRANS  Transport Research Institute – INCERTRANS  RO 
ERASMUS  Erasmus University Rotterdam      NL 
SMA    SMA und Partner AG        CH 
RIB    NS Railinfrabeheer        NL 
 
 
TIS.pt has led the IMPROVERAIL consortium and been the quality controller of this document. The 
responsible partner for this deliverable and Work Package 7 has been Institute of Transport Economics 
(TOI).  Task leaders have been LET, TOI and TUB.  
 
1.2  Quality control information 
Status:    Deliverable 
Distribution:  IMPROVERAIL partners, European Commission 
Availability:   Public  
Quality control:  TIS.PT 
 
 Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
Page 3 of 194 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1  REPORT SUMMARY FICHE................................................................................................. 2 
1.1  AUTHORS.......................................................................................................................................2 
1.2  QUALITY CONTROL INFORMATION.............................................................................................2 
1.3  INDEX OF FIGURES.......................................................................................................................6 
1.5  INDEX OF TABLES.........................................................................................................................7 
2  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY....................................................................................................... 8 
2.1  GENERAL RESULTS......................................................................................................................8 
2.1.1  Objectives for a new charging methodology...........................................................................8 
2.1.2  Charging principles...............................................................................................................10 
2.2  DATA REQUIREMENTS...............................................................................................................14 
3  INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................. 17 
3.1  OBJECTIVES................................................................................................................................17 
3.2  STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT...................................................................................................17 
3.3  THE ROLE OF SLOT ALLOCATION IN INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGING PROCEDURES........18 
3.4  THE IMPACT OF EU DIRECTIVES ON RAILWAY INFRASTRUCTURE MANAGEMENT AND 
CHARGING............................................................................................................................................19 
3.4.1  Glossary................................................................................................................................19 
3.4.2  Railway Infrastructure‘s Organisational Framework..............................................................20 
3.4.3  The “Railway Package”.........................................................................................................22 
4  OVERVIEW OF INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGING............................................................. 26 
4.1  BACKGROUND.............................................................................................................................26 
4.2  THE THEORY OF RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGES............................................................26 
4.2.1  Objectives of railway infrastructure charging ........................................................................26 
4.2.2  The economics of railways....................................................................................................28 
4.2.3  Applicable Pricing Principles.................................................................................................29 
4.3  REVIEW OF RAILWAY INFRASTRUCTURE CHARGING PRACTICES IN EUROPE.................34 
4.3.1  Overview...............................................................................................................................34 
4.3.2  Charging Practices in Member States...................................................................................34 
4.3.3  Charging Practices in Accession Countries..........................................................................46 
4.3.4  Charging Practices in Other European Countries.................................................................49 
4.3.5  Charging Practices in USA....................................................................................................51 
5  OVERVIEW OF SLOT ALLOCATION PROCEDURES....................................................... 54 
5.1  OBJECTIVES OF SLOT ALLOCATION........................................................................................54 
5.2  DISCUSSION ON MECHANISMS FOR EFFICIENT SLOT PRICING IN RAILWAYS ..................54 
5.2.1  Properties of the railway system...........................................................................................54 
5.2.2  Track allocation.....................................................................................................................56 
5.2.3  Connection between slot allocation and pricing of access to track.......................................57 
5.2.4  Different ways of allocate track capacity between operators................................................58 
5.2.5  Some different auction methods...........................................................................................59 
5.2.6  A Model for Slot Allocation....................................................................................................60 
5.2.7  How to reveal the operators’ true WTPs for slots..................................................................60 
5.2.8  Dealing with complementarities in the bidding process.........................................................62 
5.2.9  Designing the timetable.........................................................................................................63 
5.3  CURRENT PRACTICE IN SLOT ALLOCATION ...........................................................................64 
5.3.1  Theoretical considerations regarding allocation of capacity in railway systems.......................64 
5.3.2  Supply Side – Review of current and best practices for slot allocation/ pricing procedures.....67 
5.3.3  Report on Member States Practices........................................................................................68 Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
Page 4 of 194 
5.3.4  International slot allocation in railways: RailNetEurope.........................................................74 
5.4  SUPPLY  SIDE  –  SLOT  ALLOCATION  AND  PRICING  PROCEDURES  FROM  THE 
INFRASTRUCTURE MANAGER’S POINT OF VIEW............................................................................78 
5.4.1  Implementation Drivers for the Infrastructure Managers.......................................................78 
5.4.2  Expected Drawbacks in Implementing Charging and Capacity Allocation Policies...............80 
5.5  A  COMPARISON  BETWEEN  SLOT  ALLOCATION  PROCEDURES  IN  RAILWAYS  AND 
AVIATION...............................................................................................................................................82 
5.5.1  Lessons to Learn ..................................................................................................................82 
5.5.2  Slot Allocation in the Aviation industry..................................................................................83 
5.5.3  Lesson learnt on slot allocation procedures from the air transport sector?...........................88 
5.5.4     Managing the relationship between IM and RU in the scope of Slot Allocation ....................90 
6  CHARGING PROCEDURES – POTENTIALS AND PITFALLS.......................................... 92 
6.1  COMPLEX ISSUES REGARDING CHARGING PROCEDURES..................................................92 
6.1.1  Peak vs. off-peak prices........................................................................................................92 
6.1.2  Handling of quality diversification..........................................................................................92 
6.1.3  Handling of delays and risk of delays....................................................................................94 
6.1.4  Handling of additional trains to scheduled trains asking for slot............................................95 
6.2  TIMETABLING AND SLOT ALLOCATION: EXAMPLES FROM GERMANY AND UK..................96 
6.3  INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC: HARMONISATION OF CHARGES.................................................99 
6.4  SERVICE QUALITY AND PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION ........................................................100 
6.5  POSSIBLE OBSTACLES FOR CREATING AN EFFICIENT RAILWAY MARKET......................101 
6.5.1  Barriers to entry ..................................................................................................................101 
6.5.2  Modelling Financing an operator’s investments to enter the railway market..........................102 
6.5.3  Market imperfections...........................................................................................................105 
6.5.4  Priority rules in solving path conflicts..................................................................................106 
6.6  PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF TRACK ALLOCATION RULES.........................................108 
6.6.1  Current Practice.....................................................................................................................108 
6.6.2 Needed Rules for Track Allocation..........................................................................................108 
7  DATA REQUIREMENTS................................................................................................... 111 
7.1 IDENTIFICATION OF RELEVANT COST CATEGORIES  111 
7.1.1 Overview.................................................................................................................................111 
7.1.2 Regulatory environment..........................................................................................................117 
7.1.3 Operators’ share of infrastructure investment costs – additional cost recovery......................119 
7.1.4 International traffic...................................................................................................................120 
7.2 DATA ASSESSMENT ....................................................................................................................121 
7.3 IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS FOR SLOT ALLOCATION............................................................124 
7.3.1 Example of a possible slot allocation regime..........................................................................124 
7.3.2 Description of other methodologies.........................................................................................127 
7.3.3  Data requirements as a function of Slot Allocation Regimes..................................................128 
7.3.4   Implementation Options in Cross Border Contexts...............................................................128 
7.4 CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP AND HARMONISATION OF CHARGES.................................129 
7.4.1 Service level agreements........................................................................................................129 
7.4.2  Contract Types.......................................................................................................................131 
7.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HARMONISATION OF CHARGES..................................................142 
7.5.1  How can data requirements and information systems be harmonised at EU level?...........143 
7.5.2  What are the specific data needs related to international traffic?........................................145 
7.5.3  Data reliability and data validity...........................................................................................145 
8  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS ................................................................. 149 
9  REFERENCES.................................................................................................................. 156 
APPENDIX 1: CASE STUDY: GREAT BRITAIN, RAILTRACK ............................................... 160 Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
Page 5 of 194 
A1.1 CASE STUDY: RAILTRACK / NETWORKRAIL...........................................................................160 
A1.1.1 Privatising the Railways........................................................................................................160 
A1.1.2 Development of Rail Regulation...........................................................................................163 
A1.1.3 Conclusion............................................................................................................................179 
APPENDIX 2 EU RAILWAY LEGISLATION AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION............................. 182 
A2.1 EU RAILWAY LEGISLATION AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION.......................................................182 
 Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
Page 6 of 194 
 
1.3  Index of figures 
 
Figure 1: Connection between capacity management and operators'  demand..........................................18 
Figure 3: An example of conflicting train departures on single-track section with two-way traffic...............56 
Figure 4: International train paths offered through RailNetEurope..............................................................75 
Figure 6: Example of international timetable (source: www.freightfreeways.com)......................................76 
Figure 7: Technical requirements for international path (source: www.freightfreeways.com).....................77 
Figure 8: Current path allocation process in Germany................................................................................97 
Figure 9: Allocation Criteria in Great Britain and Germany.........................................................................98 
Figure 10: : Restoration and deterioration processes...............................................................................115 
Figure 11: Degradation and restoration processes of railways infrastructure with a load-dependent wearing
.........................................................................................................................................................116 
Figure 12: Three dimensions of maintenance and renewal......................................................................135 
Figure 13: Structure of the privatised rail..................................................................................................163 
Figure 14: Calculation of revenue requirement [ORR 2001].....................................................................165 
Figure 15: Charging Structure of DB Netz................................................................................................192 
 Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
Page 7 of 194 
 
1.5  Index of tables 
  
Table 1:  Time series of Dutch charging components.................................................................................42 
Table 2: Dutch charging components.........................................................................................................42 
Table 3: Infrastructure charges, Norway.....................................................................................................49 
Table 4 - Structure of SBB’s/BLS’s Charging System.................................................................................51 
Table 5:  Summary of slot allocation practices throughout Europe......................................67 
Table 6: Strengths and weaknesses of slot allocation................................................................................91 
Table 7: Set of variables for model for barriers of entry............................................................................102 
Table 8: National comparison of cost categories used.............................................................................123 
Table 9: Data requirements from different slot allocation regimes............................................................128 
Table 10: The quality matrix......................................................................................................................133 
Table 11: Punctuality agreement in the Netherlands................................................................................138 
Table 12: Charges/ rewards for punctuality (PIP) in 1000GB£**...............................................................140 
Table 13: Example of transactions between operator and infrastructure manager on different levels of 
punctuality........................................................................................................................................141 
Table 14: Data requirements from different slot allocation regimes..........................................................143 
Table 15: Comparison of National cost categories used for charging principles.......................................146 
Table 16: Department of Transport’s view of benefits and problems with privatisation (1988).................161 
Table 17: Distribution of responsibilities between ORR and OPRAF........................................................164 
Table 18: BAH’s conclusion on cost variability..........................................................................................171 
Table 19: BAH; variable charges..............................................................................................................172 
Table 20: Data requirements by Directive 2001/14...................................................................................184 
Table 21: Structure of ÖBB' s charging system.........................................................................................190 
Table 22: Gross load coeffisient of SNCB ................................................................................................190 
Table 23: Structure of SNCB' s charging system for lines.........................................................................191 
Table 24: Structure of DB Netz'  charging system.....................................................................................193 
Table 25: Structure of SBB’s/BLS’s Charging System..............................................................................194 
 
 Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
Page 8 of 194 
 
2  Executive summary 
2.1  General results 
2.1.1  Objectives for a new charging methodology 
The  recent  efforts  undertaken  by  the  European  commission  towards  the  implementation  of  Railway 
reforms have paved the way for drastic changes in the way railways are managed. A new vision for railway 
underlies this reform, which appears as a result of the continuous declining performance on a transport 
sector traditionally steered by public service concerns, loosing ground for other more flexible transport 
concepts such as those practised on the road.   
This new approach is understood as crucial not only for the survival of the railway sector but also for its 
possible growth potential. Increased environmental concern associated especially with road transport has 
increased the motivation for improving railway sector’s performance. This provides a unique chance for 
the successful renovation of railway, should it be able to cope with key market requirements not only in the 
traditional passengers segment but also and particularly, in freight traffic segments. 
This  new  reality  will  have  an  impact  on  passengers,  shippers,  and  train  operators  as  well  as  the 
infrastructure managers. The infrastructure managers in Europe are therefore facing a whole new set of 
challenges and opportunities, but also face serious risks and obstacles.  
The step envisaging the separation between provision of train services and the infrastructure management 
has provided the basics for a new business concept among operators and for new strategic decisions to 
be made regarding the provision of railway infrastructure for a new millennium. Creating a cleft between 
the  passengers,  shippers  and  other  end-users  and  the  infrastructure  manager  creates  a  need  for 
feedback between operators and infrastructure managers in order to ensure a rational production.  
This cleft suggests that implementing a market structure that creates feedback in the form of financial 
flows is a good tool for a healthy railway production. Such a system should take into account the: 
 
·  Welfare of end-users. The provision of railway services should meet the end-users demands.  
·  Cost structures. Both internal and external costs should be reflected in the market. Cost efficient 
production should be a concern in all parts of the production line. 
·  Differences in companies’ cost structures. Relative differences in productivity among competing 
firms should lead to a situation where the most competitive firm wins contracts and is given 
opportunities to expand and evolve its production. 
·  Intermodal  competition.  The  railway  market  should  face  the  same  external  conditions  as 
competing modes of transport 
·  Flexibility needed for adapting new traffic into the railway framework 
·  Non-discrimination of operators, freight -companies and passengers  
·  Clear information flows between operators and infrastructure managers to secure that decisions 
are made that are rational taking the whole railway system into account 
 
Infrastructure charging is naturally advocated as an important tool to help fulfilling such requirements.  
Work Package 7 has identified six different motivations for charging: 
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i.  Favour the best possible use of the network  
Favour the best possible use of the network from the standpoint of the management of priorities in 
operation (routes/slots) and economic efficiency criteria (economic surplus for example) and non-
discrimination. The efficient tariff that reaches an optimal use of infrastructure is the additional cost 
that the use of infrastructure per additional unit of transport imposes on society. It is the short run 
marginal cost. Such cost is attributed, in absence of scarcity of capacities, to the wear and tear of the 
tracks, the consumption of electricity for the traction, the costs of signal additional, the costs of 
management and administration additional (if truly marginal), congestion traffic (delays), accidents, 
noise, pollution and other externalities. 
 
ii.  Cover all or part of the operating and maintenance costs of the rail network. 
This coverage may be achieved globally or conversely for each section of the network, and this may 
be in an identical or in a differentiated fashion. Fixing the price at the short run (or long run) marginal 
cost is sometimes insufficient to cover all the costs. In this case, the fees can be established in 
accordance  to  the  Ramsey  principle  or  to  the  multi-part  tariff.  These  fees  system  can  however 
introduce some distortions. 
 
iii.  Reflect the level of service provided to the carrier 
Which is a reference to the quality of service provided 
 
iv.  Contribute to the costs of the developing the rail network making investment self-financing 
Allows new investment in this sector. 
 
v.  Encourage the use of the rail transport in intermodal competition 
Because of insufficient harmonisation of the conditions of intermodal competition (external costs, 
social costs), the fees system of rail infrastructure has to take into account the fees concerning the 
others concurrent transport services. A particular problem is the pricing of the road infrastructure, 
because the users of this infrastructure directly pay only a part of the costs assigned to their use. A 
solution consists to offer compensation to the users of the mode that implies low costs. 
 
vi.  Contribute to the balanced regional development 
Through improving the accessibility of disadvantaged areas, for reasons of equity and solidarity.  
 
It should be noticed that the appropriateness of each of these motivations should be carefully analysed.  
Furthermore, whereas public IMs might be less proactive in terms of market development, these might 
further suffer from political control, possibly preventing a suitable rationale regarding efficient pricing. The 
demand for governmental surveillance and control should therefore deserve some thoughts, with the aim 
of fostering the efficiency of the infrastructure management. On the other hand, commercially oriented IMs 
may raise other obstacles for efficient provision of railway services. 
The socio-economic success of any approaches on charging will depend on the efficiency of regulation 
and on the degree of competition between Railway Undertakers (RU).  
Moreover, regulation has not only to ensure the discrimination-free access to path capacity at earlier 
stages of implementation but also the right incentives to the IM to realise static, qualitative and dynamic 
(investment) efficiency.  Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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Also the concept of train paths related to capacity allocation is a critical factor in the provision of track 
access service. This is, on most corridors, a scarce commodity in regard to departure times, arrival times 
and transit times. Existing timetables favour the established rail operators with multiple train paths at times 
that suit their business and with preferential transits that minimise the number of crossing delays. New 
operators are left with train paths that do not meet commercial or operational needs, but still costing the 
same, sometimes even more than those of the major operators.  
This places new entrants in disadvantageous positions in relation to existing rail operators, in particular if 
we think about one of the most promising market segments for rail represented by freight. Hence there is a 
clear and real need to rationalise train paths allocation along with suitable charging mechanisms, in order 
to provide a level playing field between the railway undertakers while promoting the railway as a true 
alternative to road concerning freight.  
The quality of the infrastructure is also critical in valuation of the service being provided. The track 
condition is a key factor, as there are large sections of track that cannot accept the top speed of high-
speed trains. These substandard track sections reduce the ability of the traffic planner to maximize the 
efficiency of train paths. This causes sub optimal transits and increases the operational costs of the 
railway undertaker. 
Also the information systems must be developed coherently on a cross-border perspective, in order to 
provide real time information concerning trains running and must be accessible to the rail operators. 
Currently, a  number  of different  systems  are  used  in different  states. There  would  be  benefits  from 
deciding on a single system and ensuring that the system provides the operational and commercial 
requirements for both the track authority/company and operators. 
Charges should be set for each corridor to encourage fair competition with road and aviation. Rates 
should be published and held for a minimum 12-month period. The current practice in some states, of 
negotiating  with  individual  operators  on  the  annual  fee  and/  or  the  usage  fee,  provides  an  area  of 
uncertainty for rail operators regarding the equity of the result. Large annual fees on some track sections 
create barriers to entry for new operators. The rates and fees must be uniform, transparent and 
reflect the quality of train path provided.  
The network authority/ company IM should be required to provide a range of services at a level consistent 
with rates, transit times and quality of ride competitive with road. Documentation of agreements should be 
standardised to incorporate uniform elements for all rail operators.  
The agreements will need to address the levels of performance of both parties. The issues of termination, 
insurance and cost retrieval need to be reviewed and brought up to commercial grounds. Requests for 
train paths and negotiations for agreements should be given time frames and standard procedures and 
documentation introduced to facilitate this process.  
All in all, charging procedures should give the right incentives for total railway production, competition 
between operators and between railway transport and road and aviation transport. The following chapter 
shows how this can be achieved. 
Finally, International traffic which is heavily dependent on national charging schemes, priority rules and 
bureaucracy should be supported by common principles and clear charging systems ensuring 
transparency, predictability and non-discrimination. SRMC-pricing in all countries is a relatively easy 
methodology that will meet these demands. Financial mark-ups to cover parts of investment costs to the 
infrastructure charges create a sub-optimal situation at a national level. In international traffic, the 
disadvantages of such systems are even more visible.  Each national IM will have few incentives and will 
often miss the ability to see the impact of reducing international operators’ surplus.  
 
2.1.2  Charging principles 
The core pricing principles discussed in this document together with consideration on the concept of slot 
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The short run marginal cost (SRMC) principle, measures the cost of increasing output when we regard the 
capital stock as fixed. Applied to rail infrastructure, the SRMC measures the cost of accommodating an 
additional train to the existing rail network. 
The long run marginal cost (LRMC) measures the cost of increasing output when all inputs can be varied. 
Applied to rail infrastructure, it measures the cost of accommodating an additional train service over a time 
period when the capacity of the network can be increased or decreased, that is: the capital stock can be 
changed. Sometimes, another cost-measure is used: Long run average incremental cost (LRAIC), which is 
the average cost of accommodating trains over a time period. This is related to LRMC but diverges on the 
fact that LRAIC is an average measure related to an increase in the number of trains.  
Although  largely  depending  upon  an  effective  information  system,  setting  prices  equal  to  short  run 
marginal cost should encourage the most efficient use of the network. SRMC-pricing gives the operators 
the right prices to take into account the total costs that their services impose on society.  If different SRMC 
are calculated for different train paths, SRMC-pricing will also secure the correct allocation of train services 
at the different paths. However, and besides the fact that these pricing principles may not be sufficient to 
distribute slots optimally between competing operators, other possible reasons to not follow the SRMC 
principle do exist: 
 
1. Departures from SRMC-pricing for competing modes of transport. In this case it may be necessary 
to set the prices according to second-best pricing principles. The theory of second-best pricing says that 
prices should be adjusted in all relevant markets so that no substitution is caused by the deviation from 
SRMC in any competing market. Thus the relative prices are correct. 
2. Public funding constraints. Obligations to raise a certain amount of money in order to finance the 
investments will in general demand prices above SRMC. LRMC-pricing is one such principle. 
3. Official policies on rapid growth in the investment rate. In order to arrange for rapid growth in the 
railway sector, the public authorities may increase profitability in the sector by low or no charging or even 
some kind of subsidies. 
4.  Stabilisation  of  charges.  Changes  in  the  underlying  cost  elements  are  only  implemented  at  a 
particular pace. In order to ensure some stability in the conditions of competition in the train operating 
market, there might be a need to gradually adjust the charges. This is just temporary deviations from 
SRMC-pricing. 
 
There are probably situations where all of these arguments can justify departures from SRMC-pricing. But 
it should be clear that such a choice would lead to a sub optimal situation in terms of efficiency. Ramsey 
pricing is a way of minimize the deviance from optimal prices.  
Charging the use of infrastructure must be considered as a way to provide the right incentives to operators 
when choosing their activity level. All use of rolling stock induces tear and wear, not only on the rolling 
stock itself, but on the infrastructure that is used. These costs should be clear for the operators through 
the charges that they must pay for their activity. 
 
Work  Package  7  in  the  IMPROVERAIL  project  recommends  the  following  guidelines  for 
infrastructure charging, slot allocation and harmonisation of charges: 
 
·  Infrastructure charging principles based on short run marginal pricing (SRMC). This method means 
that trains are charged per kilometre for the access to the railways. These charges should equal the 
costs borne by the infrastructure manager, by the other operators as well as by the rest of the society, 
in relation to the train’s activity. Thus, external effects like accident costs and environmental costs are 
included. SRMC-pricing does not include investment costs. Cost elements that are included are tear Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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and wear (maintenance) of the infrastructure, other marginal costs of provision of infrastructure, delay 
costs/  congestion costs, environmental costs (pollution and noise) and accident costs.  
·  These cost elements may vary both with type of rolling stock and for different parts of the 
railway network. 
·  National valuations of these cost elements vary. Variations in valuation between countries are not 
regarded as a problem. Different charging practices in different states, is on the other hand a problem. 
This might lead to sub-optimal incentives of routing of trains etc.  Charges may vary but charging 
principles should not. 
·  There is a real risk for too low activity and investments of all types if infrastructure charges are 
introduced. Using SRMC ensures that the traffic that is excluded is not socially profitable. 
·  There are some motivations for departing from SRMC. One is “second-best pricing”, and is derived 
directly from economic theory: “If prices in one specific market are different from price equal to (social) 
marginal cost, it is optimal to adjust prices for alternative goods so that the relative price ratios are 
kept equal to the optimal situation. In practice: If road transport or aviation transport pay only 50% of 
their total social marginal cost, so should the railways, in order to avoid a bias in favour of road and 
aviation. It can be argued that political biases in favour of railways might lead to subsidies of railways 
hidden in “second-best” arguments. The obvious solution to this is to let all modes of transport pay for 
their social marginal costs, thus making second best optimum equal to first-best. 
·  Another argument is the need for a capital cost coverage factor from the operators for the funding 
of  infrastructure.  This  argument  is  reasonable  in  terms  of  allocation,  but  may  lead  to  system 
inefficiency. The optimal capital cost coverage factor is therefore zero. If some contributions are 
essential, a lump-sum transfer is recommendable. Charging a “per-kilometre” contribution margin 
leads to less railway activity than what is optimal. Also competition might suffer if profitability of 
operators is affected. Politicians who see railways as a tool to increase the efficiency of the European 
transport system should therefore take note of this. 
·  Tear and wear of infrastructure caused by rolling stock should be calculated at a desirable level of 
accuracy. This is a major element of SRMC. There will always be a great number of variables that 
affect these costs, and there will always be some inaccuracy and uncertainty in the calculations. The 
effort that is spent on these calculations are justified if the value of fine-tuning the methodology is 
equal or above the costs of estimation. Varying charges for different train-types if the underlying cost 
structure is different is recommendable. A top-down approach with a limited number of parameters 
seems sufficient in most cases 
·  System costs as congestion costs and scarcity costs are difficult to assess and to charge for. The 
best way to calculate these costs is in well functioning auctioning systems. Probably the worst way 
of measuring these costs is by a dysfunctional auctioning system. Therefore, recommendations for 
methodology for calculations of these costs can only be done for a given railway system, assessing 
the level of competition, the ability to control cooperation etc. and the level of these costs. Some 
networks do not have very much congestion, while others are severely congested. Complexity of 
calculation methodology should reflect the potential benefits of these calculations.  
·  In regimes where well functioning auctioning system is unlikely, the congestion costs can be partly 
taken care of by either one or more mark-ups for congested areas in time and space, or cost-
benefit analysis of different alternative timetabling solutions. The latter may be sufficient in very small 
networks only. 
·  External effects like environmental costs and accident costs should be based on calculations that 
ensure that costs induced by different modes of transport in each country are treated in the same 
manner. Otherwise the relative prices of the different transport modes are altered. The methodology 
of assessing these costs is developed continuously.  Regular revisions of charges based on new 
information on the valuation of these costs are probably necessary. 
·  The way that the national railway systems are organised affects the way that charges are set and 
collected. The regulative environment of the IM is greatly affecting the way that charges are set Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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in order to secure the social optimum. Infrastructure charging is easier to implement in a regulatory 
environment where the IM does not need to be economically viable. An IM that can take the social 
optimum into account will be able to set the correct charges without much governmental control.   
·  When the IM is a self-financing entity running on commercial terms, the government must set the 
correct charges. Otherwise the IM will maximise own profit or revenues instead of securing the 
optimal railway activity. Thus the need for governmental control and surveillance of the railway 
sector increases when the IM is separated from public control. Even the detailed calculations of 
maintenance costs need then to be revised in order to secure that the costs are not exaggerated. 
·  A profit-maximising IM is especially difficult to handle in a situation where the IM or one or more 
operators get public transfers. Then, the system must be controlled in detail in order to avoid 
monopolistic behaviour from the IM.   
·  Slot  allocation  procedures  mean  everything  from  a  round  table  designing  the  timetable  to  an 
advanced auctioning system for slots, bundles of slots etc. This deliverable explains opportunities that 
lies  in  auctioning  procedures,  but  also  describes  many  of  the  problems  and  pitfalls  that  such 
methodologies induce. A hasty introduction of such systems is therefore not recommended, because 
the efficiency of the timetabling procedures might be seen reduced instead of increased. 
·  Auctioning systems for residual slots may be a first step towards an auctioning system for the 
majority of slots in the future. 
·  Such  advanced  system  is  likely  to  function  only  in  situations  with  mature  competitive  railway 
markets. Such a market should have multiple operators that are able to deliver the same type of 
services. In addition public transfers to railway units should be clearly visible. For example public 
transfers to bidders may destroy the competition altogether: Such contestants should stand on equal 
terms, so that the bids reflect their underlying and potential productivity and not their access to public 
money. 
·  Harmonization of charges should be secured by introducing the same charging methodology in all 
states. If costs are varying between states, charges should also vary between states.  The charges of 
each line at all times of the day should be available for all parties upon request. Websites is a good 
alternative for letting international train operators gain immediate access in order to plan, register and 
price  a  specific  train  route.  Transparency  is  thus  a  keyword  in  order  to  arrange  for  increased 
international traffic. 
·  Some procedures for slot allocation and infrastructure charging are presented. The procedures are 
meant as examples of how some problems can be taken care of within a relatively simple system, and 
not as ready-to-implement systems. The European railways are far too different and multi-faceted in 
terms of financial, political, economic and historical characteristics that one charging procedure will 
function everywhere.   
·  Fair and non-discriminatory charging is an absolute demand in order to develop competition in the 
railway operating market in the years to come 
·  There  are  good  reasons  for  attempting  to  harmonize  national  jurisdiction  and  regulatory 
environments. 
·  Opening up for, and experiencing more cross-border traffic, passenger traffic as well as freight, will 
give us more information for what obstacles and problems are encountered in the different regulatory 
environments. 
·  The market will therefore reveal costs and preferences, so that in near future we will have more 
information for choosing among different regimes. 
·  There is a risk of inefficient rerouting of trains caused by different national charging practices. Only 
when the different charges are based on real internal and external costs in all countries, the market 
will act optimally. Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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·  The key word is not harmonisation alone, but transparency: prices setting must be clear. Through 
a  more  developed  international  railway  market  with  transparent  regulation,  financial  flows  and 
charging principles, the way that charging principles should be harmonised will be clearer. 
·  There is a risk for welfare redistributions between countries, where countries near the hubs in 
central-Europe may pay for wear and tear of traffic that are to the benefits for countries positioned 
further out of the centre. This is an argument against lump-sum pricing and in favour of kilometre-
dependent charging. 
·  Charging principles must be complex enough to include the most important train types etc, but simple 
enough not to make the business decisions for the operators unnecessary complex. 
·  New entrants may face troubles to provide a feasible and competitive set of slots to their clients. The 
risk that existing operators use market power to take the best slots in order to avoid competition is 
real. 
·  Slots sold to competing operators, should be sold in some way that reflects the Willingness To Pay 
(WTP) of the operators. 
·  Public Service Obligations (PSOs) and stability for end-users suggests that the timetables must be 
set for a reasonable period of time - at least one year.  
·  On the other hand, too long timetabling periods will reduce the pace of reformation in the railway 
sector. 
·  Slots can include quality variables, where WTP should reveal the market preferences and valuation 
·  RailNet Europe is a promising tool in order to provide help to international traffic. Such an organ 
might be vital in providing transparency  
·  Infrastructure charging and slot allocation procedures can be performed within all present regulatory 
regimes. The way that the IM is functioning will strongly affect how the market will perform.  
·  Auctioning systems based on market mechanisms will not necessarily lead to better performance of 
the railway system. These methodologies demand transparent public transfers to railways as well 
as a real competitive market for railway services. 
 
 
2.2  Data Requirements 
In order to apply charging methodologies based on the effective knowledge of the costs associated to 
Infrastructure Management, it is necessary to have information systems available. Some systems are 
standard accounting systems, some are simulation systems and some are based on more or less regular 
studies carried out by accountants and consultants (cf. Appendix 1 as an example).  
In addition to that, IMs are obliged to publish the key data based on their infrastructure management 
systems.  Currently, most IMs are either using or in the process of implementing integrated information 
systems. Notably among these, it is SAP R/3 (and follow-ups) for internal data management, which could 
enable to build a common platform for effective data exchanges. However, the very different definitions of 
cost categories used in practise make it uneasy to get a harmonised input into cost data sources.  
Such  information  systems  allow  keeping  track  on  costs and  the  identification  of  relevant  categories, 
including its allocation to activity levels to develop historic information in support of, e.g. maintenance and 
renewal decisions. Also the allocation of overhead costs currently follows different principles, which is an 
obstacle for the true assignment of costs. Again, it is necessary to reduce these costs to the minimum 
aggregation level in order to keep tight control over the costs which are driven by level of activity in order 
to fairly reflect those variations in the pricing principle applied, in particular regarding SRMC.   
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Different charging regimes are possible and different possibilities are presented in this report. To this end, 
we have seen that charging procedures depends (at least) on the following factors: 
 
·  Target function of the IM 
·  Connection between the government/ public authorities and the IM 
·  Connection between the government/ public authorities and the operator(s), and especially the 
successor of the previous integrated railway company 
·  Financial flows of public money to IMs and to operators in form of PSOs  
 
This Deliverable 9 concludes on short run marginal cost pricing (SRMC) as the right basis for infrastructure 
charges, consisting of the following main elements: 
 
·  Wear and tear – Induced need for maintenance caused by a specific train using the infrastructure 
·  Marginal costs related to signalling surveillance etc – Extra costs of railway system administration 
should be included if these are truly marginal.  
·  Accident costs – One more train on track increases the accident risk for passengers, employees and 
third parties. These costs should be included 
·  Environmental costs – Emissions and noise pollution are the main elements in this cost category 
·  Congestion costs – Each train added to a given network will rise, to an increasing extent, the 
expected delays in the railway system. This is an externality posed by the operator to the others and 
should be internalised by a correct internalisation scheme. 
 
Congestion costs have been found to be a rather difficult cost type to measure. We do recommend, as a 
start  to  use  simple  matrices  where  mark-ups  varying  with  urbanity  and  time  of  day,  shows  the 
infrastructure  charge  of  using  the  infrastructure  at  a  special  place  at  a  certain  time  (slot).  As  an 
introduction, auctions for residual slots could be introduced. 
 
Data requirements for short run marginal cost pricing 
Work package 5 and work package 6 of IMPROVERAIL as well as several other research projects shows 
details  on  SRMC-elements.  This  deliverable  shows  instead  which  options  exist,  and  produces 
recommendations for the European railways for the coming years.  
Calculation of these cost elements needs detailed country-specific information of cost structures related to 
maintenance, accident risks and valuation of (avoidance) of such incidents. We recommend using country-
specific cost values.  Different wage levels, valuations, investment level and type lead to differences in 
SRMC.  As a whole, the railway market may suffer if IMs are free to exploit market dominance to gain 
revenues from infrastructure charging.  The responsible authorities must be able to apply suitable control 
on IMs, ensuring that the rules agreed upon are not undermined, notably those related to international and 
cross border traffic. 
 
International traffic and SRMC 
Whenever SRMC principle is not applied, the non-discrimination of railway operators must still be secured. 
In an international environment also the non-discrimination of IMs must be secured.  This applies also to 
cross border contexts, since along any given corridor if one IM charges above SRMC, other IMs may Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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suffer a relative disadvantage. Prices above SRMC can be charged by demanding a contribution margin 
or by keeping the SRMC unnecessary high.  
There is therefore a need for international surveillance of the IMs, to secure that market dominance is not 
subject to abuses.  
Indeed, international traffic makes charging more complex. IMs can assume three different roles in the 
process of providing paths for international rail carriages:  
·  Origin IM,  
·  Transit country IM  
·  Destination country IM.  
 
SRMC-based railway charges should be allocated to each of these IMs according to the SRMC-charges 
that apply for the different routes.  Marginal congestion costs should of course also be included, and as a 
first adaptation, a mark-up matrix for city-areas and rush hours is recommended.  
Again, the goal to make these costs visible for the operators before the actual journey is performed is vital 
for the transparency of the railway market.  
 
Needs for a new regulatory environment to ensure fair charging practices internationally 
In order to meet the demands stated in this section, two new international organs may be necessary. First, 
an unit that can perform surveillance over the charges set in all European countries should be able to 
reveal discriminatory behaviour or profit-seeking behaviour among infrastructure managers. This organ 
should be continuously active in order to avoid that discriminatory or other harmful behaviour can persist. 
This organ should also keep an eye on timetabling procedures and other track allocation procedures, to 
ensure that these are performed within the prevailing regulatory framework. 
 
Another organ may also be implemented: An Information organ keeping track of all charging procedures, 
track allocation procedures etc as well as the operators’ data needed for assessing charges and be 
granted access to a specific piece of track.   
These two organs are further described in section 7.5. 
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3  Introduction 
3.1  Objectives 
In contrast to road infrastructure, the physical inflexibility of railway vehicles makes it impossible to deal 
with track capacity shortages by way of queues dissolved in real time. Conversely, decisions about how to 
run trains are taken well before a service departs, and these timetabling decisions are typically valid for a 
considerable period of time, in Europe normally from one semester to one year. One task of the IM is 
therefore to decide which operators that have the right to run services over its infrastructure and on which 
departure times [Nilsson, 2000]. In return for the right to run services, each operator pays fees according 
to  a  pre-specified  charging  structure.  European  Commission  (1998)  provides  a  plan  for  how  the 
Commission envisages the future of this system. The concentration of EU’s policy is indeed on the open 
access; the purpose being to open up for the benefits of competition also within this traditionally closed 
market. Obviously, there is a need of establishing practicable ways to charge for scarce capacity and to 
allocate this capacity among the different users. 
The principle of track access charging is easy to understand. For railways, the infrastructure is limited in 
each section to serve one or a few vehicles at the same time. The access to a sequence of sections of the 
infrastructure at a specific sequence of points in time is called a slot or a path. These two terms are used 
as synonyms in this deliverable. The operators have a different willingness to pay for different slots, 
varying with the underlying demand function of the passengers and the characteristics of the operators. 
For traffic running according to a timetable, real time pricing is impossible. The slot pricing must be done in 
advance during the setting of the timetable and must be based on demand-supply relationship. Supply is 
closely related to how the infrastructure is divided in blocks. Making the blocks shorter, possibly by 
improved control and signalling installations, which may reduce the distance between consecutive trains, 
can increase supply. Demand is derived from the underlying demand for passenger and freight transport. 
Generally, demand is varying strongly over the day, and this will make the value of different slots very 
different.   
Given all these constraints, how should Infrastructure Managers deal effectively with this kind of problems, 
targeting  economical  optimisation  based  on  an  in-depth  knowledge  of  cost  elements  related  to 
infrastructure provision?   
The central aims of this deliverable 9 is precisely to show that track capacity in the European railways may 
be allocated using economical tools for ensuring fair and efficient distribution, keeping a link to Data 
Requirements in terms of available elements of cost. 
 
3.2  Structure of the Report  
Chapter 1 - Technical information of the deliverable.  
Chapter 2 - Summarises main findings of the research undertaken in Work Package 7 and presented in 
this deliverable.  
Chapter 3 – Addresses an introduction to the topic, and a brief description of some of the main problems 
and issues that this report concerns. The chapter also includes the background to the railway revolution in 
Europe by describing the most important directives from the European Commission affecting the railways 
directly. 
Chapter 4 - Is dedicated to describing infrastructure charging in theory and practice.  
Chapters 5 and 6 – Here, slot allocation procedures are given a comprehensive discussion using theory 
and practices from railways as well as from the aviation sector.   
Chapter 6 - Discusses problems underlying the introduction of infrastructure charging of different types, 
and possible ways of solving them are given.  
Chapter 7 - Is dedicated to show a framework for charging of railways, where the need for harmonisation 
of national charges is emphasised.   
Chapter 8 - Closes this deliverable, by developing key conclusions and producing recommendations Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
Page 18 of 194 
 
3.3  The Role of Slot Allocation in Infrastructure Charging Procedures 
Figure 1 illustrates how both pricing principles and track allocation may be seen as complementary 
elements playing a crucial role in the relationship between the infrastructure manager and the railway 
undertakers or operators.  
According to the suggested scheme, while the infrastructure manager is responsible for the track capacity, 
a separate body sets the allocation rules. 
 
Figure 1: Connection between capacity management and operators' demand 
 
 
As  indicated  in  figure  1,  a  division  between  slot  allocation  rules  and  external  cost  pricing  rules  is 
considered as a basic condition for a successful discussion of slot allocation procedures. 
The separation between railway infrastructure charges principles, (including the pricing principles of 
being granted access to the infrastructure) and slot allocation pricing principles (including which are the 
specific parts that relates to the price of being granted access to the track at a special section of the track 
at a particular time) should be made clear. 
In the case of a monopolistic railway system, the latter pricing principle is needless, but in the case of a 
multi-operator railway system, a fair and efficient slot allocation procedure becomes absolutely necessary.  
Such separation is upheld throughout this paper. Environmental costs, accident costs, tear and wear of 
the infrastructure as well as delay costs are related to the first type of charging. The slot allocation charges 
are set to distribute the network capacity among operators, when there is more than one operator seeking 
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3.4  The Impact of EU  Directives  on  Railway Infrastructure  Management 
and Charging 
3.4.1  Glossary  
In order to deal with track capacity allocation problem properly, basic definitions must be set down. Below 
are summarised some of the most common used terms regarding track capacity allocation. 
 
"Basic Interval" timetable  The sequence of trains with identical characteristics, running 
at constant intervals up to two hours.  
Capacity  The  potential  to  schedule  train  paths  requested  for  an 
element of infrastructure for a certain period; in other words it 
is  the  total  of  the  train-paths,  constituting  the  global 
potentiality of use of certain parts of railway infrastructure.  
Capacity allocation  The  allocation  of  infrastructure  railway  capacity  by  the 
entrusted Body.  
Charge  The price to be paid by TOCs for use of each path. 
Contract for the railway  The legal act granting each TOC  the use of railway  
Corridors  Major railway lines on a geographical route 
Cross links   A national or international train-path connecting two existing 
corridors. 
"Headway interconnection system"  Correspondence  train-sequence  with  identical  waiting-time 
between basic interval trains.  
Infrastructure Manager (IM)  Any public body or undertaking responsible in particular for 
establishing and maintaining railway infrastructure, as well as 
for operating the control and safety systems, 
Interchange-station  Border station where transit operations are carried out. 
International Grouping  Any  association  of  at  least  two  railway  undertakings 
established  in  different  Member  States  for  the  purpose  of 
providing  international  transport  services  between  Member 
States. 
Licence/Entitling act  Licence,  issued  by  the  competent  national  body  in 
compliance with Dir. 2001/13/CE 
Operator(s)  Train-operating company (-ies), TOC(s) 
Path  The infrastructure capacity needed to run a train between two 
places over a given time-period; Also referred to as a slot. 
PSO  Public service obligation, The Government or other public unit 
purchases services that else would not be offered.   
Railway Undertaking (R.U.)  Any private or public undertaking whose main business is to 
provide rail transport services for goods and/or passengers Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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with  a  requirement  that  the  undertaking  should  ensure 
traction. Also designated as “Operator”, “TOC” 
Reservation fee   The price to be paid by the R.U. for the reservation of train 
paths  in  compliance  with  the  criteria  and  operating 
procedures for capacity allocation 
Safety Certificate  The  document  certifying  the  R.U.' s  compliance  with 
circulation safety standards as required by CE Directives. 
Slot  The infrastructure capacity needed to run a train between two 
places over a given time-period; Also referred to as a path. 
   
Timetable   The  data  defining  all  planned  train  and  rolling-stock 
movements,  which  will  take  place  on  the  relevant 
infrastructure during the period for which it is in force. 
TOC  Train-operating company, operator 
   
3.4.2  Railway Infrastructure‘s Organisational Framework 
The European directives 91/440, 95/18, 95/19, have defined current responsibilities of the infrastructure 
manager. The directives 2001/12, 2001/13, 2001/14 and further amendments have been defining the 
future responsibilities of the infrastructure manager. In addition to these general European standards, 
national regulations form the basis for the national railway systems.  
In this context, European directives are gradually becoming more and more specific and thereby flattening 
discrepancies in terms of regulations and practices in Member States.  
The  directive  91/440/EEC  defined  the  infrastructure  manager  as  “any  public  body  or  undertaking 
responsible in particular for establishing and maintaining railway infrastructure, as well as for operating the 
control and safety systems”. The directive 95/19/EEC adopts the same definition for the infrastructure 
manager. 
The directive 95/18/EEC defined the licensing authority as “the body charged by a Member State with 
the issue of licenses”. Nevertheless, this directive does not specify that the licensing authority is the 
infrastructure manager. 
Moreover the directive 95/19/EEC considers also the existence of an allocation body defined as “the 
authority  and/or  infrastructure  manager  designated  by  the  Member  States  for  the  allocation  of 
infrastructure capacity”.  But, in other words, the infrastructure manager is not inevitably the allocation 
body of the of railway infrastructure capacity. 
 
Organization and Accounts 
Two  possibilities  for  the  organization  of  the  infrastructure  manager  exist.  According  to  these,  the 
infrastructure  manager  can  either  be  a  distinct  division  within  a  single  railway  undertaking  or  the 
infrastructure manager can be a separate entity. 
The accounts for the management of railway operation and infrastructure and for the provision of railway 
transport services are nevertheless kept separate, while no transfer of financial aid between the two areas 
of activity are allowed.  
If the infrastructure manager is the allocation body, he shall ensure a fair and non-discriminatory allocation 
of the railway infrastructure capacity and an optimum effective use of the infrastructure. Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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From the text of the EC Directives: 
“The accounts of an infrastructure manager shall, under normal business conditions over a reasonable 
time period, at least balance income from infrastructure fees plus State contributions on the one hand and 
infrastructure expenditure on the other”. 
“The infrastructure manager may finance infrastructure development including provision or renewal of 
capital assets, and may make a return on capital employed”. 
In case of infrastructure capacity allocation in the interests of public service, decided by the State member, 
the infrastructure manager may have compensation by the State member for any financial losses. The 
infrastructure manager may therefore benefit from Member States financial aid if consistent with the tasks, 
size and financial requirements, in particular regarding new investments. 
 
Charging 
A fee for the use of the railway infrastructure is charged, payable by railway undertakings and international 
groupings using that infrastructure. The rules for determining this fee are defined by Member States after 
consulting the Infrastructure Manager. The directive 95/19/EEC add that these rules may allow for the 
marketing of the available infrastructure capacity “efficiently”. 
According to the directive 91/440/EEC, the user fee, which shall be calculated in such a way as to avoid 
any discrimination between railway undertakings, may in particular take into account the mileage, the 
composition of the train and any specific requirements in terms of such factors as speed, axle load and the 
degree or period of utilization of the infrastructure. The directive 95/19/EEC is more general and consider 
that the fees shall be fixed according to “the nature of the service, the time of the service, the market 
situation and the type and degree of wear and tear of the infrastructure”. 
Information on the determination of the fees and on modification of the infrastructure quality and capacity 
shall provide by the infrastructure manager to the State member and to the railway undertaking. 
 
Access to the Infrastructure 
The  directive  95/18/EEC  considers  the  allocation  of  license  for  railway  undertaking  defined  as 
“authorization issued by a Member State to an undertaking, by which its capacity as a railway undertaking 
is recognised”.  
The license is necessary to provide the rail transport services. However, “such a license shall not itself 
entitle the holder to access to the railway infrastructure”. A licensing authority should issue such licenses, 
which  is  designated  by  each  Member  State.  Nevertheless,  the  directive  doesn’t  specify  whether  the 
licensing authority may coincide with the Infrastructure Manager (IM) itself. 
The licensing authorities of the Member State should ensure and control, prior to the start of activities, that 
railways undertaking will be able to meet the requirements relating to good repute, financial fitness, 
professional competence and cover for its civil liability. These requirements are defined for the state 
member and for the licensing authority. If a railway undertaking can no longer meet the requirements of 
the Directive, the licensing authority shall suspend or revoke the license. 
It is interesting to note that the directive 95/19/EEC does not mention the licensing authority introduced in 
the previous directive and considers only the infrastructure manager and an “allocation body”.  
The  infrastructure  manager  concludes  with  railway  undertakings  engaged  in  international  combined 
transport  of  goods  and  international  groupings  the  necessary  administrative,  technical  and  financial 
agreements. 
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The directive 95/19/EEC gives more details on the allocation procedure compared to the directive 91/440. 
The railway undertaking submits an application or request for infrastructure capacity to the infrastructure 
manager, should this be also the allocation body.  
A decision is taken on the request as soon as possible, but no later than two months after all relevant 
information  has  been  submitted.  The  railway  undertaker has  then to  obtain  a valid  safety  certificate 
relating to “the technical and operational requirements specific to rail services and the safety requirements 
applying to staff, rolling stock and the undertaking' s internal organization”. The traffic rules are those 
“applied” by the infrastructure manager. The directive 95/19/EC indicates that the safety certificate is 
issued “by the authority designated for the purpose by the Member State”. But the infrastructure manager 
is not inevitably this authority.  
In the event of problem arising regarding allocation of infrastructure capacity or the charging of fees, the 
Member States have to implement an independent appealing body. 
 
3.4.3  The “Railway Package”   
The directives 2001/12/EEC, 2001/13/EEC and 2001/14/EEC amend respectively the Council Directives 
91/440/EEC, 95/18/EEC and 95/19/EEC. Nevertheless they are in the continuity of the first directives.  
These recent directives introduce new arrangements and provisions in the previous directives and give 
further  information  on  the  rules  and  actors.  The  directives  aim  to  prevent  the  confusion  of  the 
functions  between  the  actors  (State,  infrastructure  manager,  railway  undertakings,  regulatory 
body, applicants). In particular, the directives consider the case where the functions of the infrastructure 
manager on a network or part of a network may be allocated to different bodies or undertakings. Moreover 
they have as goal the increase of open access and the organisation of competitive market across the 
European Railway system. 
As for the previous directives, the analysis is focused on the infrastructure management. Others points 
linked to this question are also mentioned. 
In the directive 2001/12/EEC, the infrastructure manager is defined more precisely compared to the 
definition of the Directive 91/440/EEC. The infrastructure manager is “any body or undertaking responsible 
in  particular  for  establishing  and  maintaining  railway  infrastructure”.  But  the  responsibility  of  the 
management  of  infrastructure  control  and  safety  systems  by  the  infrastructure  manager  is  merely  a 
possibility and not an obligation. In other words, the EC Directive considers that a distinct body may 
undertake these activities. Moreover the infrastructure manager functions may be allocated to different 
bodies. This possibility of decomposition for the infrastructure manager is not spelt out in the previous 
directives but the latter distinguished already “infrastructure manager”, “allocation body” and “licensing 
authority”. 
The directive 2001/14/EEC introduced a new notion with “applicant”. Applicant is defined as “a licensed 
railway undertaking and/or an international grouping of railway undertakings, and, in Member States which 
provide for such a possibility, other persons and/or legal entities with public service or commercial interest 
in procuring infrastructure capacity, such as public authorities under Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69(12) 
and shippers, freight forwarders and combined transport operators, for the operation of railway service on 
their respective territories.  
 
Organization and Accounts 
An effort is demanded to ensure that separate accountings and balance sheets are kept and published, for 
business relating to the provision of transport services by railway undertakings and, also for business 
relating to the management of railway infrastructure. 
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The infrastructure manager has to balance “income from infrastructure charges, surpluses from other 
commercial activities and State funding on the one hand, and infrastructure expenditure on the other” and 
reduce the costs of provision of infrastructure and the level of access charges “with due regard to safety 
and to maintaining and improving the quality of the infrastructure service”. 
The  infrastructure  manager  has  to  draw  up  a  “business  plan  including  investment  and  financial 
programs” within the framework of general policy fixed by the State. The plan shall be designed to ensure 
optimal and efficient use and development of the infrastructure while ensuring financial balance and 
providing means for these objectives to be achieved.  
As  before,  the  infrastructure  manager  may  benefit  from Member  states  financing.  But  to  ensure the 
financial  sustainability  the  resources  of  the  Infrastructure  Manager  granted  by  the  Member  States  is 
implemented through a contractual agreement covering a period of at least three years. 
  
Charging 
As one of the key aspects addressed in this document, the directive 2001/14/EEC which is focused on 
charging aspects, has basically the same principles of charging as defined previously. The infrastructure 
charging schemes have to encourage in particular the infrastructure manager to minimise disruption and 
improve the performance of the railway network. 
While respecting the management independence, the specific charging rules are established by the state 
member or the infrastructure manager. As considered in the directive 91/440/EEC, the infrastructure 
manager determines and collects the charge for the use of infrastructure except if the infrastructure 
manager  is  not  independent  in  its  legal  form,  organization  and  decision-making  from  any  railway 
undertaking.  
The charging is relating to four packages of services described precisely by the directive 2001/14/EEC: 
the  minimum  access  package,  track  access  to  services  facilities  and  supply  of  services,  additional 
services and finally, ancillary services. 
 
·  For the minimum access package and for the track access to services facilities and supply of 
services, the principle of charging seems to be the marginal cost. Indeed, the charge is set at 
“the cost that is directly incurred as a result of operating the train service”. 
·  For the additional services and the ancillary services the principle of charging seems to be the 
full cost. In effect, if these two kind of services are provided by one supplier, the charge 
imposed for such a service shall relate to the cost of providing it, calculated on the basis of the 
actual level of use 
 
Nevertheless, the infrastructure manager may introduce additional charges and exceptions and discounts 
in the infrastructure charge. Two types of additional charges may include: 
·  Charge of scarcity for “the identifiable segment of the infrastructure during periods of congestion”.  
·  Charge for the cost of the environmental effects caused by the operation of the train. The additional 
charge, function of the magnitude of the effect caused, is conditioned by the implementation of such 
charging at a comparable level to competing modes of transport.  
 
Two exceptions for these charging principles are considered: 
·  For “specific investment projects, in the future, or that have been completed not more than 15 years 
before the entry into force of this Directive”, the charging is based on the long-term costs of such 
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·  The infrastructure manager may adopt full cost charges and not marginal cost charges, “ if the market 
can bear this”. 
Discounts are introduced in particular “for specified traffic flows”, to “encourage the development of new 
rail services” or the use of “considerably under-utilised lines”. 
 
Allocation and Access to the Infrastructure 
For the allocation of capacity in the form of a train path to applicants, the directive adopts the following 
rule: 
·  The infrastructure manager or the allocation body – if the infrastructure manager is not independent in 
its  legal  form,  organization  or  decision-making  functions of  any  railway  undertaking  -  has  to  be 
equitable and non discriminatory with all applicants concerning the allocation of capacity. 
·  The proceedings for the allocation of capacity have to be transparent. All the necessary information 
should be published in advance. 
·  The  commercial  confidentiality  of  information  provided  to  the  infrastructure  managers  and  the 
allocation bodies have to be respected.  
 
Then the implementation of these principles leads to the definition of obligation for the infrastructure 
manager. In particular the infrastructure manager or the allocation body have to produce for the applicants 
a “network statement” given details on general rules, deadlines, procedures and criteria concerning the 
charging and capacity allocation schemes.  
The  infrastructure manager or  the  allocation  body  settles  with  the  accepted  applicant  a  "framework 
agreement", which becomes a legally binding general agreement on the basis of public or private law, 
setting  out  the  rights  and  obligations  of  each  partner  in  relation  to  the  infrastructure  capacity  to  be 
allocated and the charges to be levied over a period, necessarily longer than one working timetable 
period.  
The infrastructure manager shall, as far as possible, meet all infrastructure capacity requests including 
those for train paths crossing more than one network, and shall as far as possible take account of all 
constraints on applicants, including the economic effect on their business. The infrastructure manager 
shall consult interested parties about the draft-working timetable and allow them at least one month to 
present their views. In this case, the infrastructure manager makes an effort to coordinate all requests. 
If a section of infrastructure is congested, as demand for infrastructure capacity cannot be fully satisfied 
during certain periods, the infrastructure manager should develop a "capacity enhancement plan" defined 
as a measure or series of measures with a calendar for their implementation which are proposed to 
alleviate the capacity constraints.  
In the event of dispute relating to the allocation of infrastructure capacity, a dispute resolution system shall 
be made available in order to resolve it. 
For a congested infrastructure section, some priority criteria to allocate infrastructure capacity are defined. 
These criteria are relating the importance of a service to society (public service, rail freight), relative to any 
other service. The Member State shall grant the infrastructure manager compensation corresponding to 
loss induced by theses services. 
For the open access to the network, the directive considers that all the railway undertakings shall be 
granted the access to the Trans-European Rail Freight Network defined in Article 10(a) and in Annex I. 
and to the entire rail network after the 15th of March 2008, for the purpose of operating international freight 
services. This means that the open access is not restricted to some type of railways undertakings. Only 
the international freight businesses are affected and not the passenger traffic and the cabotage. According 
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To control the open access, the directive 2001/14/EEC extols the existence of a “regulatory body”. It can 
be  the  Ministry  responsible  for  transport  matters  or  any  other  body.  This  regulatory  body  shall  be 
independent  in  its  organization,  funding  decisions,  legal  structure  and  decision-making  from  any 
infrastructure manager, charging body, allocation body or applicant.  
 
Proceedings are developed with this “regulatory body”. Any applicant can lodge a complaint with this body 
if it feels that it has been treated unjustly or, has been the subject of discrimination or has been injured in 
any other way. This regulatory body shall decide at the earliest opportunity on appropriate measures to 
correct undesirable developments in these markets. Directives 2001/12/EEC and 2001/14/EEC admit 
some  exceptions  in  the  implementation  of  this  independent  body  to  ensure  equitable  and  non-
discriminatory access to infrastructure. Ireland, United Kingdom for North Ireland, Greece as islands with a 
rail link to only one other Member State or without direct rail link to any other Member State can postpone 
this implementation for a period of five years from 15 March 2003. 
The previous directives 91/440/EEC, 95/18/EEC and 95/19/EEC were not sufficiently accurate. In their 
application at the national level in many cases, there is confusion between the railway actors, in particular 
for the infrastructure manager functions. In fact the infrastructure manager is not a body independent in its 
organization, funding decisions, legal structure and decision from railways undertakings. Moreover, the 
infrastructure managers with the support of the railway undertaking sharply limit the open access and 
competition.  In  order  to  stimulate  more  the  European  railways  system,  Directives  2001/12/EEC, 
2001/13/EEC  and  2001/14/EEC  clarify  the  principles  and  rules  for  each  actor  in  particular  for  the 
infrastructure manager. They define a lot of responsibilities for the infrastructure manager. They consider 
also  a  situation  with  not  a  monolithic  infrastructure manager  but with  different  bodies  for  the 
allocation of railway capacity, the allocation of licenses, the control of the safety, and the control of the 
implementation of the equitable and non-discriminatory charging and allocation principles.  
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4  Overview of Infrastructure Charging 
4.1  Background 
A decade ago, the implementation of the rail infrastructure-charging concept in Europe was limited to 
Sweden. European Railways were typically state-owned vertically integrated companies. The question of 
infrastructure charging was thus irrelevant for most European countries.  
Since then, the continued declining of Railway in favour of other modes, have brought this subject to light 
in  view  of  the  necessary  improvement  in  its  efficiency,  seen  today  as  a  basic  requirement  for  the 
sustainability of railway. Based upon economic theory, several documents related to this subject have 
been emphasising that introducing innovative pricing instruments may be the right approach. 
Notably among these is the Green Paper of the European Commission, published in 1995’, entitled 
“Toward Fair and Efficient Pricing” clearly stating that accidents, congestion, environmental cost and 
infrastructure maintenance costs weren’t correctly reflected in the prices underlying the use of transports 
in general.  
With a basic argument on the marginal social cost pricing, and whilst allowing non discriminatory fixed 
charged to be levied where this is not adequate for full cost recovery, the Commission has since published 
its proposals for a common transport infrastructure charging (see “Fair payment for infrastructure use: a 
phased approach to a common transport infrastructure charging framework in the EU”, 1998). “Within the 
railway package rules have been agreed for infrastructure charging which are based on marginal social 
cost, but where non-discriminatory supplements may be added to meet budgetary needs” (Nash and al., 
p.9, 2001). The Commission sees this as an important way of improving the efficiency and marketing of 
rail transport and, hence, of increasing the role of railways in Europe. 
European  Directive  91/440  introduced  the  possibility  of  infrastructure  charging  with  the  accounting 
separation between train operations and infrastructure provision.  
Therefore, explicit methods of charging for the use of rail infrastructure are needed. They are keen to see 
comparable approaches to infrastructure charging being used in all member states, to avoid the distortions 
that exist when neighbouring countries charge for the use of infrastructure on a totally different basis. 
However,  deriving  and  implementing  an  appropriate  pricing  system  poses  extreme  difficulties.  This 
deliverable will point out some guidelines for further harmonisation of national charging systems, and the 
different possibilities that lies in various systems.  
 
 
4.2  The theory of rail infrastructure charges 
4.2.1  Objectives of railway infrastructure charging 
Before explaining the economic characteristics of railway and his basic pricing principles, we must specify 
the objectives of railways infrastructure charging. 
Infrastructure charging provides a valuable instrument to the policy maker. Indeed, several objectives can 
be pursued. But since some of them are contradictory, a clear hierarchy has to be established. Otherwise, 
some forms of decay can follow: congestion and delays, over- or under-investments, poor maintenance 
and so forth. A short list of the possible objectives of railways infrastructure pricing is hereby presented 
(Quinet 1990, NERA 1998, RFF 1998, Nash and al. 1999). 
 
1.  Favour the best possible use of the rail network from the standpoints of the management of 
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example) and non-discrimination. The efficient tariff that reaches an optimal use of infrastructure 
is the additional cost that the use of infrastructure per additional unit of transport imposes on 
society. It is the short run marginal cost. These costs are attributed, in absence of scarcity of 
capacities, to the wear and tear of the tracks, the consumption of electricity for the traction, the 
costs  of  signal  additional,  the  costs  of  management  and  administration  additional  (if  truly 
marginal), congestion traffic (delays), accidents, noise, pollution and other externalities. 
2.  Cover all or part of the operating and maintenance costs of the rail network. This coverage 
may be achieved globally, or on the contrary for each section of the network, and this may be in 
identical or differentiated fashion. Setting the price at the short run marginal cost is insufficient to 
cover all costs that relates to infrastructure. In this case, the additional fees can be established in 
accordance to the Ramsey principle or to some multi-part tariff. These fee systems will introduce 
some distortions, but Ramsey-pricing will minimize the deadweight losses that the increased 
charges incur. 
 
3.  Reflect the level of service provided to the carrier; service quality. A typical quality variable 
that is in the hands of the IM is the length of the time interval for which a train can run. Increasing 
the length of this path in terms of minutes, reduces the risk for a train to be delayed because of 
other incidents on the track ,and the possibility for avoid large delays if the departure is falling a 
couple of minutes behind. 
 
4.  Contribute to the costs of developing the rail network making investment fully or partly 
self-financing  This can be done by some kind of LTIC (Long-term incremental cost-function) or 
simply by one or more additive charges to the general infrastructure charges. 
 
5.  Encourage the use of the rail transport in intermodal competition, because of the insufficient 
harmonisation of the conditions of intermodal competition (external costs, social costs). The fee 
system  of  rail  infrastructure  has  to  take  into  account  the  fees  concerning  other  competing 
transport services. A particular problem is the pricing of the road infrastructure, because the 
users of roads generally directly pay only a part of the costs assigned to their use.  
 
6.  Contribute  to  the  balanced  regional  development,  through  improving  the  accessibility  of 
disadvantaged areas, for reasons of equity and solidarity. Earmarked public transfers, or regional 
levels of charges etc will in general follow such public objectives. 
 
All of these objectives cannot be adopted simultaneously, and any pricing policy will have to reflect the 
ranking of objectives established in the compromise accepted. Each option decided upon must be able to 
be evaluated from the standpoint of efficiency on the one hand and equity on the other.  Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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4.2.2  The economics of railways 
The specific economic characteristics of the railway industry are essentially focused on three points: 
 
·  The rail sector can be described as having a natural monopoly situation 
·  Rail sector exhibits also some features of both private goods and public goods 
·  As in the rest of the transport sector, rail is submited to externalities 
 
Natural monopoly: 
Economies of scale, scope and density are caused by numerous indivisibilities, including investment and 
functional  indivisibilities  such  as  co-ordination  of  activities  between  upstream  and  downstream  of 
production (ECMT, 1998). As widely recognised, the railways sector appears to be a typical example of 
natural monopoly where the market mechanism does not lead to the best allocation of resources. 
If a single firm produces the entire industry output and the total costs of production are lower than when 
such output results from any collection of two, an industry is said to be a natural monopoly. The sub-
additivity of a representative firm’s cost function is the first step of a natural monopoly. The second one is 
the existence of long-run economies of scale. “If all prospective firms in industry have the same cost 
function, or if one firm has a uniformly better technology, then subadditivity implies that industry costs are 
minimized if only one firm is active in the market” (Sharkey, p.604, 1987).  
 
Private and public good 
Rail sector exhibits also some features of both private goods and public goods. With private goods the 
consumption possibilities of one individual depend on the quantities consumed by others, with the public 
goods the situation is different. Given the supply of the good, this type of goods referred to as non-rivalry 
in consumption. Rail infrastructure constitutes a quasi perfectly excludable good but there is, to a certain 
extent a non-rivalry in consumption. In effect, the consumption of a slot might cause a delay for other 
trains and not exclusion. It follows that, in a sense, there is an indivisible quality for rail: the degree of 
congestion, and other characteristics frequently associated to congestion: punctuality and reliability.  
 
Externalities 
Externalities like congestion, environmental costs, safety and network externalities give even more room 
for potential market failures. Together these facts can explain the role played by the national governments 




On roads, congestion usually manifests itself as volumes of traffic such that speeds are reduced below 
free-flow speed and/or queuing occurs at junctions. Congestion is one of the few examples of externalities 
where the agent causing also suffers from it (ECMT 1998). Rail congestion manifests itself in a different 
way. It is explained by the fact that rail infrastructure managers control access to the network on a planned 
basis. Nash (2001) distinguishes two effects of shortages of capacity: congestion and scarcity. 
Congestion represents the expected delays that occur through the transmission of delays from one train to 
another. These become worse at high levels of capacity utilisation. Indeed, in this situation, there is a lack 
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expected delays. Moreover if a train operator imposes with one of its trains a delay to another of its own 
trains, the external effect is, in fact purely internal. This might be a tricky point regarding congestion 
pricing.  
Scarcity represents the impossibility for an operator to obtain the desired slot in terms of departure time, 
stopping pattern or speed. Scarcity costs is the value of shifting the timetable of any train that could not be 
run as a result of lack of capacity (opportunity costs). 
The High Level Group on Transport Infrastructure Pricing identified scarcity rather than congestion as the 
dominant  consequence  of  existing  capacity  constraints  on  the  existing  rail  network  (European 
Commission, 1999).  
 
Environmental costs 




When travellers use a rail service, they expose themselves to the average accident risk for all other rail 
users. Part of the costs of accidents may be not recovered from the rail company or its insurers. The 
economic value of these consequences of additional rail use form the  marginal accident cost. The users, 
in their decision to travel by rail, internalise the risk they expose themselves to, valued as the willingness-
to-pay for safety on the part of the households which they belong; they may, or may not, also take the 
willingness-to-pay for safety on the part of their relatives and friends into account their decision. Given 




“For efficient use of infrastructure, in the absence of capacity constraints, operators willing to pay the extra 
costs they impose by their use of the infrastructure should be allowed to use it. Where there are capacity 
constraints, efficient use of the infrastructure is ensured when the capacity is allocated to the operator and 
type of traffic for which it has the most value” (Nash and al., p.3, 2001).  
This conception of efficiency is built on a specific context: the objective of improving the existing capacity 
because the hypothesis is the absence of capacity constraint. 
But as the objectives can be few and divergent (2 - 1), the specific context can change too. In this way, the 
pricing principle can differ. 
 
4.2.3  Applicable Pricing Principles 
Short Run Marginal Cost 
The Short Run Marginal Cost (SRMC) refers to the costs of additional journeys when the capital stock 
remains constant. The SRMC includes additional congestion, environmental and safety implications of 
handling more traffic with the existing infrastructure, but will exclude all capital costs of infrastructure and 
any externalities concerned with the provision of capacity. 
It is generally agreed that the Short Run Marginal Cost (hereafter SRMC) constitutes the best theoretical 
solution to the question of railways infrastructure charging (goal 1). The principle is rather simple. SRMC 
allows running all trains for which the additional costs borne by the society are inferior to the utility for the 
society. Even if the principle is simple, the question of what kind of costs have to enter in the SRMC is 
rather tricky. In particular, environmental costs and congestion costs lead to specific problems.  Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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If environmental costs are included in SRMC for railways and, for example, not or not enough for road 
trucking, this might lead to an undesirable competitive distortion, precisely causing what the decision 
maker wants to avoid: a pollution increase. Taking into account the accident costs exhibits the same 
conflicting alternative (goal 2).  
Per se, the congestion costs which can be further decomposed in delays and eviction are difficult to 
evaluate: what is the value of a delay for a particular train and what is the value of not running a train? 
Moreover, the congestion costs might be borne, at least partly by the trains of the operator causing the 
congestion. In that case the operator is bearing the congestion cost twice. The theoretical solution is to 
give back the amount of the charges that is due to delays or eviction of trains belonging to the same 
operator. But this might be the source of cumbersome calculation, sometimes rather arbitrary.  
Short-run marginal costs represent how the infrastructure costs change in the short-run when rail traffic 
levels change. The requirement for efficient pricing is to ensure that the costs borne by the user of the 
infrastructure reflect the sum of the marginal costs of the infrastructure provider, the infrastructure user 
and the others outside the transport system concerned (goal 3).  
The marginal costs to the infrastructure provider in the short run are mainly the costs of wear and tear (as 
well as any additional costs of traffic control or signalling). The marginal costs to users include the costs 
borne by the individual user taking the decision but also imposed on others users by increased congestion 
or accident risk.  
Costs  imported  on  the  outsider  of  the  transport  system  are  predominantly  external  accident  and 
environmental costs. The price relevant marginal cost is thus the sum of these marginal costs less the 
costs in any case borne by the individual user.  
The variations in infrastructure cost with traffic levels are the short-run variable charges. They comprise 
several elements like track usage charges, traction current charges, peak charges, etc (goal 1). 
The track usage charges are designed to recover the direct maintenance costs of the usage of the 
infrastructure for the wear and tear caused by individual trains running over a particular type of track. 
Indeed, if the number of trains or the weight of one or more trains increases, this can increase track wear-
and-tear, and hence the maintenance expenditures necessary to keep track quality standards at a given 
level. Their costs reflect the type of locomotive, the speed, the type and composition of the train, and the 
service pattern. They are based on prediction about the impact on short-run incremental cost of marginal 
increases in the number of trains of a given type run of the network. The traction current charges are the 
costs of electricity for traction purposes. 
An increase in the number of trains might e.g. increase signal operation costs. For example, in an old-
fashioned mechanical signal box, the number of individual lever movements will increase as the number of 
trains increases. There will be administrative costs in running additional trains. 
 
 
The long run marginal cost pricing principle (LRMC) 
The  concept  of  short  run  marginal  cost  is  often  contrasted  with  that  long  run  marginal  cost,  which 
represents the additional cost of an extra train when the infrastructure is optimally adapted to the demand 
in question. The general perception that short run marginal cost is below long run is only true in the 
presence of excess capacity; the reverse is true when capacity is scarce.  
LRMC is defined as the cost of an additional train when the infrastructure is optimally adapted to the 
demand (goal 1). Another approach, comparable to a certain extent, is simply to charge the long run 
average incremental cost of expanding capacity where the capacity is scarce (goal 4). The main difficulty 
with those approaches is to practically calculate the amount to be charged. Increasing the capacity of an 
infrastructure segment leads to the question of indivisibilities. Thus, the cost might vary considerably from 
place to place. To the contrary this charging system leads to charges more stable over time and thus 
facilitate the establishment of contracts between operators and infrastructure managers (Nash and al., 
1999). Long stable contracts may justify specific investments such as rolling stock. So, there are some Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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arguments in favour of long run marginal cost pricing, even if it would deprive the public of a valuable 
services (the services with prices between short run marginal cost and long run marginal cost). But, one of 
the major drawbacks of marginal costs (short run or long run) stems from the fact that railways are 
experiencing economies of scope, densities or scale. For that reason, marginal cost pricing doesn’t fully 
cover the costs (goal 2).  
A  solution  for  this  is  the  use  of  direct contributions  from  the  State.  However,  this may  be  seen  as 
dangerous practice, in terms of the incentives to efficiency; others fear that might prove inadequate to fund 
an appropriate level of investment. Moreover, the way to allocate the full cost of railways activity between 
services is often based on arbitrary criteria as we have seen in WP6 (Lifecycle Costs). Thus, to cover the 
non-allocated parts of the full costs some public findings might be needed. They are not given for free or, 
in other terms, there is a cost to get some public funds. So, other pricing methods might be used in order 
to adjust the level of public subsidies at the desired target level. 
Long-run marginal costs (LRMC) represent the additional costs of providing an additional unit of traffic, 
under  the  condition  that  the  level  of  infrastructure  can  be  adjusted.  We  can  distinguish  long-run 
incremental costs, where the LRICs are the additional capacity and other costs of handling an extra block 
of traffic. These LRICs can be expressed in unit terms as long-run average incremental costs that are 
equal to the LRICs averaged over the extra units of traffic handled by the additional capacity. Precisely, 
this element of access charge represents the long run cost of maintaining and renewing the railway 
infrastructure. The density of train operations over a particular part of the network is a significant factor in 
ascertaining the relative importance of this element within the total track access charge. (Cole and Holvad, 
1999). 
 
SRMC versus LRMC  
“In practice, indivisibilities and the time lags involved in adapting infrastructure to volume mean that 
differences between short and long run marginal cost are likely. This has resulted in a vigorous debate 
regarding the relative merits of short and long run marginal cost pricing (hereafter SRMC and LRMC)” 
(Nash and al., p.5, 2001). 
The long run marginal cost pricing approach can be argued for when there is a known need for specific 
infrastructure investments needed. In this case, the long run approach gives a more stable value over 
time, as e.g. the congestion charge is internalised. Linked to this is the fact that most of the European 
operators had negotiated contracts for a number of years, so they can justify specific investments in rolling 
stock or fixed equipment such as terminals. For Nash and al. (p.5, 2001), “one solution might be to charge 
long term contracts on the basis of long run marginal cost, but to sell paths on the spot market at short run 
marginal cost”. 
The short run marginal cost pricing does a favour for the commercial rail infrastructure company, which 
under  constrained  capacity  increases  their  prices  instead  of  investing  in  expansion.  At  least,  if  it  is 
regulated to charge long run marginal cost this incentive is taken away.  
 
Multi-Part Charging 
The multi part charging consists of a tariff with one fixed part and one or several variable parts, linked to 
the quantity consumed (by example train mileage).  
It is therefore possible to cover at least two objectives:  
·  Cover up variable cost near the marginal cost (goal 1), ensuring that the trains will be allowed to use 
the infrastructure to a degree commensurate to their social utility  
·  Cover up fixed cost, which is set according to a cost recovery target (goal 2).  
This should allow to better manage running trains. Still, train paths for which the “willingness to pay” is only 
slightly bigger than marginal cost have fixed costs being paid implicitly by other trains, for which the train 
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Hence, it is possible to propose a set of multi parts tariffs, with different weights for fixed and variable 
costs. When doing their options, larger operators will choose the tariff with higher fixed costs and lower 
variable cost. Conversely, smaller operators will tend to choose the tariff with low fixed cost and larger 
variable cost.  
By means of a suitable design of tariffs it will be therefore possible to make the users of the infrastructure 
pay a bigger part of the surplus than with a single charging system (Barritaud, 2001).  
Unlike that, in a single-part pricing system based on marginal costs, the condition that total cost must be 
covered can be obtained with an additional charge, incorporated into the single price. This additional 
charge may be linear, regressive or progressive for the user or be based on the operator’s willingness to 
pay (e.g. Ramsey Pricing). The charges can be differentiated according to the type of traffic; suburban 
passenger, mainline passenger, freight traffic (goal 1). Furthermore, a difference can be made according 
to the time slot, the route and punctuality requirements (goal 3).  
A two or multi-part pricing system might separate the additional charges and the marginal costs. These 
additional charges can take account of: 
·  Speeds (defined according to optimal capacity utilisation); 
·  Capacity situations on heavily used segments and at certain times (peak load pricing); 
This  additional  charge  can  be  a  fixed  time-dependent  contribution  or  might  be  linked  to  demand 
characteristics (e.g. high-speed traffic, regional traffic, combined traffic, etc.). Differentiation according to 
spatial parts of the networks is also possible. 
 
Second Best Theorem 
Efficient pricing of transport infrastructure is a necessary condition for maximising the social surplus. If the 
objective is to improve the use of the existing capacity, the short-run efficiency principle is based on given 
capacity. In the long run the efficiency condition is that investments in transport infrastructure should be 
undertaken up to the point where benefits just exceed costs (Small, 1992). 
However this result supposes inter alia that the remainder of the economy is at the optimum, i.e. prices, at 
least in the sectors of the economy related to the sector studied, are equal to the marginal costs, which is 
often not the case. 
Faced with a non-optimal situation in the other sectors, a marginal cost pricing only in one sector does not 
necessarily lead to an optimum in this sector. This established fact corresponds to the "second-best" 
theorem  (Feldman,  1997).  Precisely,  for  Lancaster  and  Lipsey  (p.12,  1956):  “Given  that  one  of  the 
Paretian optimum conditions cannot be fulfilled, then an optimum situation can be achieved only by 
departing from all the other Paretian conditions” 
This theorem of the "second-best" thus seems to singularly weaken the theoretical prescription of marginal 
cost pricing. However that does not call into question the principle of pricing in itself. There is thus a 
consensus  to  judge  that  it  is  more  efficient  to  charge  something  in  particular  for  congestion  and 
environmental externalities, rather than to charge nothing or to charge a price disconnected from the 
marginal cost (Raux and al., 2000) The second best theorem suggests that if environmental costs are only 
partly covered in car sector or in aviation, also railways shall only pay an equal part of their environmental 
costs. The important aspect is to let the travellers meet the right set of relative prices between modes. 
 
Ramsey principle 
Alternative ways of recovering more than simply the marginal cost of infrastructure use from rail operators, 
with the least possible damage to efficiency have been proposed. The standard Ramsey pricing argument 
would justify raising price above marginal cost in inverse proportion to the elasticity of demand for the 
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In the case of the public goods, this pricing principle allows collective welfare maximization under a 
budgetary constraint. The theoretical aim is to minimize the dead weight losses in all markets. This is done 
by charging more where demand is less responsive to price changes. This is called the inverse elasticity 
rule. Mathematically, the mark-up over marginal cost is proportional to the inverse of the price elasticity of 
the demand.  
Ramsey pricing provides a useful theoretical guideline. However, it requires a great deal of information. 
Both marginal cost and elasticity of demand must be quantified with a certain degree of accuracy (goal 6). 
The Ramsey rule has also been criticized for its failure to protect captive customers. Therefore, even if 
Ramsey pricing is the best way to ensure efficiency, it might turn out nasty in terms of reducing welfare 
for one or more customer groups. Moreover, as the tariff differs from the marginal cost, it is still possible 
that some services could be eliminated although their value is greater than their cost. It leaves some room 
for other kind of tariffs. 
 
Stand alone cost 
Multi-part tariffs leave ample room for negotiation. Thus, as was observed for the Ramsey rule, there is a 
possibility of market power abuse, particularly toward captive customers (Baumol, W., 1983). To prevent 
or at least limit this risk, a rule is used in USA: the Stand-Alone Constraint (SAC). This criterion is devoted 
to limit with a ceiling charge the market power of a monopolist offering infrastructure usage to any user or 
group of users (Kessides N and Willig R., 1995). The ceiling is defined as the cost (indivisibilities included) 
that the user would bear if it would be the sole user of the infrastructure. This might be considered as the 
price that a hypothetical alternate infrastructure provider could offer. Thus, it represents a surrogate for a 
hypothetical competition.  
The aim of this ceiling is clearly to limit abuse of market power. It is probably too soon to assess the 
potential benefits of this kind of limitation for Europe. However, it is already possible to observe that in 
some very constrained situations, the market power is precisely linked to big indivisibilities. One example 
of that might be the tunnels under the Alps. This might rise the question if the SAC-rule could be applied 
with benefits for the railways. 
 
Line by Line vs. Whole Network Cost Recovery 
The following question arises when setting a fixed fee either to recover partly (marginal costing) or some 
additional cost recovery: Should this cost recovery be calculated line by line, or should it be calculated for 
the whole network? In case of SRMC- pricing, the complexity of the model should be decided based on a 
cost-benefit analysis, taking the effort of providing best possible data into account. In case of some 
elements of cost recovery, linking costs according to the price of the infrastructure seems natural. Of 
course, this must be based on sound economic surveys of price elasticities, cost-benefit analysis etc.  
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4.3  Review of Railway Infrastructure Charging Practices in Europe 
4.3.1  Overview  
The  theoretical  foundations  of  the  infrastructure  charging  system  linked  to  the  objectives  previously 
mentioned were presented. Now, the review of the practice in the different countries is needed for better 
understanding the infrastructure charging system as it is currently put to practice. As mentioned in the 
preceding pages, economic theory is rather precise on the question of infrastructure charges. However, 
this does not imply that practices are homogenous or even straightforward in this field.  
A division between railway infrastructure charges, which are the pricing principles of being granted 
access to the infrastructure and slot allocation pricing principles, which are the specific part that relates 
to the price of being granted access to the track at a special section of the track at a special time, must be 
made.  
In the case of a monopoly railway system, the latter pricing principle will be needless, but in the case of 
multi-operator railway system a fair and efficient slot allocation procedure is necessary. Environmental 
costs, accident costs, tear and wear of the infrastructure as well as delay costs are related to the first type 
of charging.  
The second type of pricing, the slot allocation charges are set to distribute the track between operators, 
when there is more than one operator seeking slots in a special area at a special point in time. External 
costs will of course vary with the outcome of the slot allocation procedure.  
Evidence from slot pricing in practice can support this view, as shown next. 
 
4.3.2  Charging Practices in Member States  
Austria 
Austria changed from a dual part charging system to a linear part system in 1999. Today ÖBB charges 
two obligatory price components: 
·  one considering wear and tear with gross ton kilometres (gtkm) 
·  one charged according to train-kilometres 
ÖBB currently uses higher charges on mountain lines, thus depending on the line type/train path. 
 Austria  founded  an  association  for  the  financing  of  railway  infrastructure.  The  Schieneninfrastruktur-
Finanzierungsgesellschaft´s (SchiG) tasks are: 
·  to set the charging system, 
·  to market the track network and 
·  to contribute to the financing of line upgrading or new lines incl. signals, stations, noise reduction, 
etc. 
An improved charging system is currently under development. It is planned to be introduced in early 2003. 
The new system will maintain the two parts - one charged on the basis of train-km, the other on gtkm – but 
will differentiate the price per train-km according to various features of the train or the train path. 
Both, the price charged on train-km and the one charged on gtkm reflect marginal costs – for train 
operation and maintenance respectively. Their settling was preceded by cost studies. To the costs of train 
operation an extra charge according to the line used is added. These three components give the base 
price of a train path. 
Up to three surcharges can be added to the base price. These reflect track scarceness and willingness to 
pay, and give an incentive to use track-friendly rolling stock Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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Table 1: Structure of ÖBB´s Charging System 
Price Component  Economic Aspect  Indicator  Charged per 
… 
Price 
         
Train Operation 
 
marginal cost of 
operation 
train-km  train-km  not known yet 
Tear and Wear  marginal costs of 
maintenance 





not known yet  train-km 
High Demand 
Surcharge 
track scarceness  not known yet  train-km 
Train Category 
Surcharge 
willingness to pay   not known yet  train-km 
Tear and Wear 
Surcharge for 
certain Vehicles 
marginal costs of 
maintenance 
not known yet  train-km 
not known yet 
 
Table 1 gives an overview on the new price components. Please note, that the new charging system is still 
“under construction” and no detailed indicators or prices are known yet. 
 
Belgium 
The SNCB uses in a linear charging system with two base components – one for the use of lines, the 
other for the use of stations. Both are multiplied with various coefficients, according to train type, load or 
commercial value. 
Basic line charge 
The basic charge per km is determined for each section by multiplying a unit price with two coefficients: 
￿  C1 is a coefficient relating to the commercial significance of the section. Railway lines were ranged, 
among other things, according to the overall (passenger plus freight) yearly revenues per km.  
￿  C2 is a coefficient relating to the technical equipment on that section and thus to the investment and 
the cost of maintenance. C2 may be reviewed after infrastructure improvements have been carried 
out. 
Charge per train 
For each train taking a line section, a charge is then calculated in multiplying the basic charge for that 
section by four coefficients: 
·  C is a coefficient relating to the overall gross load of the train. It is used to take account of the wear 
caused by trains to the infrastructure (tracks, points, catenary, signal boxes…). 
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Table 2: Gross Load Coefficient of SNCB 
Category  Tonnage  Mean  Coefficient C 
1       0 – 400  200  1.2 
2   401 – 800  600  1.6 
3     801 – 1200  1000  2.0 
4   1201 – 1600  1400  2.4 
and so on  and so on  and so on  and so on 
 
·  Pt is a coefficient that depends on the quality of the service offered by the IM and in particular on 
the priority level allocated to the train in comparison with the other runs, especially in case the train 
movement is disrupted.      
·  H is the coefficient according to the time and day on which a train is running on a specific line 
section. Its purpose is to tune the infrastructure charge to time-related variations so as to increase 
the efficiency and/or to discourage customers from asking for runs that would take place during 
periods with heavy traffic (conduct of demand). 
·  T reflects the difference in duration of the journey of a train on a line section as anticipated and the 
duration of the journey according to the standard path. This coefficient is provisionally equal to 1 
(no difference taken into account). 
An overview of the price components which apply to the use of lines is given by table 3 below. 
Table 3: Structure of SNCB`s charging system for lines 
Price Component  Economic aspect  Indicator  Charged 
per… 
Price or 
Coefficient on Unit 
Price 
         
Unit Price  unit price  train-km  train-km  0,25  (1.1.2000) 




yearly revenue per line km  train-km  1,0 … 2,0 
C2  Technical 
Equipment of 
the Line 
capital costs  max. operating speed 
(amongst other indicators) 
train-km  0,75…5,0 
C  Gross Train 
Weight 
marginal wear and 
tear costs 
gtkm  train-km  1, 2…*) 
Pt  Type of Train  willingness to pay  priority in path planning and 
operation 
train-km  1,0…2,0 
H  Time of Use  track scarceness  Traffic density  train-km  1,0…2,0 
T  Relative Speed  opportunity costs  not yet implemented  train-km  not yet 
implemented 
(*) steadily increasing with train weight 
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Charge for the use of stations and terminals 
The stop at an installation (station, terminal, port) is charged separately. A differentiation exists according 
to the nature of the stop, the type of the train (passenger/freight) and number of trains that use the station 
per time, thus its commercial value or the track shortness. 
 
France 
Each year a bargaining process leads to the establishment of two amounts of money:  
a)  the total amount of access charges paid by the operator to the infrastructure manager;  
b)  the amount of money necessary for the maintenance of the infrastructure. 
This amount is calculated by SNCF (the operator) while Réseau Ferré de France (RFF) collects the fees. 
The problem is that nobody can really appreciate that what is requested does correspond to actual 
expenses on maintenance. Although this amount represents some actual expenses, it is mostly a political 
transfer of money in order to improve the situation of SNCF. There is no precise link to actual maintenance 
expenses. This might change in the coming years.   
As these flows are compensating them partially, the actual bargaining is on the difference between these 
figures. So far, this difference has always been in favour of the operator (SNCF). So each year, the 
government is  bound  to  give  to  the  infrastructure  manager,  who has  no other  revenue  than  access 
charges, a subsidy equivalent to the difference between maintenance charges and access charges. Via 
the infrastructure manager, the government is subsidizing the operator. If the new revenue for RFF doesn’t 
cover the cost, additional public subsidies are asked. 
As regards RFF, the infrastructure manager (and owner), it is principally facing investments which would 
have not been undertaken in the absence of public interest involved in the operation leading to this 
investment. 
The rule is that none of the new operations can generate more costs that revenue (the only kind of 
revenue is the access charges). It follows that a new operation is under the obligation, in order to be 
accepted by RFF, to have a cost proportionate to the future revenue it can generate. If an investment is 
too high (compared to the access charges it can generate) the difference has to be covered by the State 
or local government (Provinces, “départements”, municipalities or group of municipalities). 
At the provincial level, the new reform, which has been experimented in seven provinces (Régions), and is 
now implemented in the entire country, states that the provincial authority has to buy to the operator the 
trains services it want to set up or expand. So, for every significant change in the provincial train services, 
there is a bargaining process on the technical possibility to actually make the proposed change and on the 
consequences of this change on the expenses of the operator (SNCF). For some services, it happens that 
the provincial government actually owns the rolling stock. 
At  the  suburban  level,  concessionary  fares  are  compensated  by  the  transport  local  authority,  which 
consists of a group of municipalities.  
For the Parisian region, there is a somewhat more complex system of subsidies involving both the state 
and the different levels of local government. 
The fees collected by Réseau Ferré de France take into account the infrastructure cost, the situation on 
the  transports  markets,  the  requirements  of  the  optimal  network  use  and  the  requirements  of  the 
harmonization of the intermodal competition conditions.  
For the calculation of the fees for the use of infrastructure, “elementary sections” are defined as:   
￿  Suburban lines 
￿  Great intercity lines  
￿  High speed lines 
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For each section, the fees for the use of infrastructure is composed by three parts: 
 
￿  Lump sum payment for the access to an elementary section according to the period  
￿  Payment for the reservation of an infrastructure capacity, due independently of the actual 
use of infrastructure. It is calculated from kilometric costs according to the section type. This cost 
can be changed according to the time of use, the origin and the destination, the time between the 
demand and the use actually, the train type, the commitment on the transport delay and the use 
frequency of the demand. 
￿  Payment for the actual use of infrastructure. It is calculated from the distance, the train type 
and the tons. 
 
The lump sum payment for the access to an elementary section is calculated to take into account the 
charges of RFF. The weighting of theses three terms are fixed by orders (30 December 1997, 8 July 
1999). For the years of 1997 and 1998 years if the network weren’t to suffer any changes and if the 
number  of  trains  is  the  same  as  in  1996,  the  order  considers  that  the  level  of  fees  for  the  use  of 
infrastructure would not be higher than 5,85 billionFrancs for 1997 and 6 billion Francs for 1998 (see 
Annex 1). 
The supplementary fees for electricity is fixed to 0.105 by train-kilometres for all the type and subtype 
elementary section. 
For freight the price for reservation of an infrastructure capacity is calculated with a factor equal to 0.484. 
Tariff regulation concerning passengers: Theoretically, the operator can determine the tariffs freely, but the 
agreement of the government is required. However it must be observed that the operator has some 
influence on the government. In fact a bargaining process leads to tariffs changes from the previous year. 
It might happen however that the operator sets some new tariffs, for example for a new line, and that 
those new tariffs happen to be highly unpopular. In this case the State might intervene as a benevolent 
agent government and impose on the operator a strong recommendation to change the tariffs.  
There is no ex ante limitation of tariffs increase.  
The regional government can set up new tariffs, different than those of SNCF, under the condition that the 
adequate compensation is given to the SNCF.  
Concerning freight, the tariffs are free from government interference, decided at the national level. The 
local agencies have very little power to renegotiate the tariffs (local conditions might be very different of 
what was decided at the national level).  
 
Germany - Deutsche Bahn Netz AG (DB Netz) 
 
The infrastructure charging system of DB Netz is a linear tariff, which settles the price of a slot (track time) 
in three steps (see figure 6): 
·  Settling of a base price dependant on line categories, 
·  Multiplying of a product factor and 
·  Multiplying and/or adding additional factors (surcharges). 
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Figure 6: Charging Structure of DB Netz 
Source: DB Netz 
 
Line Categories and Product Categories 
The line categories reflect the technical standard of the line as well as its functional role in the network. 
The most important indicator for the technical standard of a line is the maximum velocity. A surcharge of 
20% is charged on highly utilized lines to manage demand 
 
Table 4: Structure of DB Netz`s charging system 
Price Component  Economic Aspect  Indicator  Charged 
per… 
Price or Coefficient 
         
Line Category  Infrastructure quality and 
willingness to pay 
max. operating speed, 
equipment and line function 
train-km  1,93 … 3,38 eur 
High Demand 
Surcharge 
track scarceness  traffic density  train-km  1,2 
Product Category  willingness to pay  priority in path planning and 
operation 
train-km  0,5 … 1,65 
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The product categories reflect the priority a path from route planning to delay management, and the 
mean velocity of the path: 
·  Express paths Fast and direct path between big metropolitan areas. This path has highest 
priority in timetable planning. 
·  Standard paths are available to all freight trains. Owing to the low priority there are few choices 
in timetable planning and therefore little flexibility for the train operator. Because of the priority of 
express (through) paths standard paths are constructed primarily between close junctions in the 
network  but  typically  connecting  standard  paths  beyond  a  certain  junction  are  available  to 
facilitate long distance. 
·  A feeder path must be connected to a standard or express path. It is provided solely for the 
distribution or collecting of wagons. 
Surcharges 
There are both additive and multiplicative surcharges: 
·  Out-of-gauge load: Trains that exceed the regular gauge may disarrange train paths on other 
tracks and cause higher planning expenses. Therefore a coefficient of 1.5 is multiplied on the line 
charge. 
·  Train Load over 1200 t:  
Lines which can bear axle-loads over of 22,5 t need a superstructure above normal German standards. 
Trains exceeding this axle-load cause extra capital and maintenance costs and are charged an extra 0,64 
Euro/train.km. 
 
The system is average cost-oriented, which implies that total costs of operating and maintaining the 
network shall be prorated to prices. Nevertheless the total costs stated by DB Netz do not include capital 
costs and depreciations of all grants and the goal to pay running costs from slot or other track renting 
revenue was not achieved in the period 1998-2000 (according to Neuhoff (2001). In contrast, DB groups 
annual report includes a profit for DB Netz in 2000. 
The federal states are responsible for planning, organisation and financing the regional rail service. Due to 
the fact that until 1993 the German state (DB & DR) has financed most of the regional rail service, the 
federal states get funds from the German state to finance the service. 
The government pays investments in new lines suggested by the government. The government with 50% 
and 50% by DB NETZ AG pays investments in the current network. For any project to be realized and its 
funding a contractual agreement between the state owned railway and the regional authority has to be 
fixed. Obligations and resources are fixed in laws or in these agreements. 
All investments the DB Netz AG will execute with state funds have to be negotiated with the government. 
Up to now this relationship causes some problems regarding application of funds and efficiency. This is a 
political explosive aspect. The distiction of what is an investment and what is maintenance is made by the 
length of a segment: it is considered as an investment if the segment where it occurs has a length of more 
than 1000 m.  
Up to now there are no marginal cost aspects in the charging system of DB Netz AG. The actual charging 
system is full cost-coverage oriented. The former track charging system was designed as a two-part-tariff, 
but the Federal Office of Fair Trade due to discriminatory elements rejected it. 
A little and static approach can be noticed due to the different allocation density the basic price is divided 
into 9 price levels an average utilisation factor of 20 % for some lines (it' s static, so it' s not real marginal 
cost). Furthermore the user has the choice of 6 product factors, considering different demand of timetable 
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The high base prices for feeder routes are reasoned by DB Netz AG by their low utilisation, the low prices 
for suburban routes respectively vice versa. For freight transport the prices are corrected by the low 
product factor for feeder lines (collecting and distributing of cars), but not for local passenger lines. 
Concerning the objective “flexible timetable and slot management” it is used for calculation of travel time, 
exact allocation time, train conflict potential. Any train path can be calculated in some seconds. 
Passenger long distance: there is a small freedom from government intervention. The railway operator 
has to ask for authorization of his tariff and his terms. The authorization of the tariff can be denied 
regarding the EU directive 1191/69 § 1. The tariff and tariff conditions have to be published as well as 
inter-company agreements between infrastructure and operations management (charging system) 
Regio: the tariff is worked out by the operator itself or by the respective public authority of the federal 
state. The respective public authorities of each federal state perform the coordination between all public 
transport enterprises of the regarded region as well as the tariff permission. Inter-company agreements 
between infrastructure and operations management: charging system of the DB Netz AG and DB Station 
& Service AG. 
Cargo: freedom from government intervention. The operator is negotiating the tariff with the customer. 
Besides there exists up to now a published tariff for some goods, but it is freely set. Inter-company 
agreements between infrastructure and operations management: charging system of DB Netz AG. 
 
 
Greece - OSE 
Up to now, the marginal cost pricing principle is not used in Greece for the calculation of infrastructure 
charges. 
Passenger traffic: OSE has no freedom to establish its own tariffs. So OSE proposes to the Government 
a tariff structure and Government reviews all tariff changes and ultimately approves or rejects. 
Cargo:  Up  to  now  OSE  is  obliged  to  propose  to  the  Government  a  basic  tariff  structure,  which 
Government accepts, or refuses. There exist the possibility of granting reductions on tariffs after relevant 
decision of the Board of Management. 
During the process of the financial improvement of the Greek Railway Undertaking special measures have 
been taken by the State. 
 
The Netherlands 
The charge for passenger traffic is based on the following formula: 
(Passenger train km. * A) + (Stops at larger stations * B1) + (Stops at smaller stations * B2)  
Where A, B1 and B2 are charges set by the Minister. 
Freight traffic charges are based on the following formula:   
Freight train km * A * M where M is a parameter that will increase during a transition period  
 
M is set at 0.3 for 2000, 0.4 for 2001, 0.5 for 2002, 0.6 for 2003, 0.7 for 2004, 0.8 for 2005, 0.9 for 2006 
and 1.0 for 2007 and all year thereafter. 
The (variable) costs that have to be covered by the charges are costs for: 
￿  Daily maintenance carried out by Railinfrabeheer1 (RIB) 
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￿  Major maintenance by RIB 
￿  Employment with RIB 
 
The Act of 25 October 1999 (Stb. 457) that introduced the charging scheme determines that 15% of these 
costs should be covered by infrastructure charges. This will increase to 100% in 2005. Consequently, the 
parameter values will rise during the period 2000 to 2005. The values applicable to passenger transport by 
NSR on the basis of the performance contract for the operation of passenger services on the main 
network are the following (where we can see the increase over the years as a larger percentage of the 
variable infrastructure costs needs to be covered): 
 
Table 1:  Time series of Dutch charging components 
Charging components (in Guilders)  A  B1  B2 
2000  0.3082  0.9746  0.2271 
2001  0.6161  1.9492  0.4541 
2002  0.9242  2.9237  0.6812 
2003  1.2322  3.8983  0.9082 
2004  1.6430  5.1977  1.2110 
2005  2.0537  6.4972  1.5137 
 
This is expected to result in payments by NSR for infrastructure usage (core network) in million guilders: 
30 (for 2000), 60 (for 2001), 90 (for 2002), 120 (for 2003), 160 (for 2004), and 200 (for 2005). For the other 
services (passengers and freight) on the Dutch rail network, yearly set parameter values apply on the 
basis of the expected level of costs and total number of train kilometres run. For the years 2000, 2001 and 
2002 these were/are the following: 
 
Table 2: Dutch charging components 
Charging components (in Guilders)  A  B1  B2 
2000  0.3082  0.9746  0.2271 
2001  0.6215  2.0749  0.4697 
2002  0.4409  1.4603  0.3340 
 
Those  interested  in  accessing  the  railway  network  should  submit  an  application  to  Railned.  Its 
independence should guarantee non-discriminatory access. 
The distribution of capacity between goods and passenger transport: a policy-based development path will 
be agreed for the distribution between goods and passenger transport as regards the volume to be fitted 
in. For goods transport, operators will partly have to request the capacity themselves and the capacity 
allocator will partly reserve capacity for short-term requests.  
Priority is given to goods transport on the rail network in the early hours. Priority for passenger transport in 
the rush-hours, while goods transport will be limited to a minimum level. 
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Exploitation subsidies for passenger transport operations have been phased out in the period from 1995 to 




The Operator Fertagus is the only railway undertaker that has been newly formed and is not a result of the 
vertical split of the previous National Railway Company. Its tariffs are valid for a specific concession and 
are established in their Concession Agreement, which was negotiated with the Government. 
The Fertagus infrastructure charge is therefore defined at its concession contract. This fee is calculated 
based on the usage tariff by train unit accordingly with various criteria defined on the Concession Contract, 
including the variations of traffic volume. 
The infrastructure charging system for most of the network where CP operates (The National Public 
Railway  Undertaker)  has  been  recently  defined,  following  interventions  by  the  IM  (REFER),  by  the 
regulator and by Government. REFER still has to receive direct financial compensations from the State.  
The Regulation (19/2000) defines the infrastructure usage fees as being calculated annually. These fees 
have to cover totally the infrastructure management costs, calculated on the basis of the technologic and 
operational most efficient conditions, in terms of quality and reliability of the railway management service.  
The usage fees will take into account the measurement in kilometres, the rolling stock material, the speed, 
the freight by axle and the time spent using the infrastructure. 
The infrastructure management costs for the estimation of the usage fees are the following: 
·  Track preservation costs; 
·  Signalling costs; 
·  Telecommunication costs associated to the command and control of the circulation; 
·  Bridges and Tunnels conservation costs; 
·  Preservation costs of the electric traction installation; 
·  Command and control costs of the circulation in the command posts, including the 
·  Centralised traffic command; 
·  Command  and  control  costs  of  the  circulation  in  the  stations  with  regulated  and  safety 
obligations, independently of being protected by distance command; 
·  The  costs  associated  with  the  staff  intervention  of  the  infrastructure  manager,  regarding 
indispensable activities for the circulation of trains; 
·  The costs of provision and preservation of the railway crossing, if it does not exceed 50% of the 
total cost of conservation, exploitation and investment; 
·  Operational costs related with the circulation control and conservation managers; 
·  Quays, Platforms and Technical buildings preservation costs. 
 
There are no reservation charges in the fee. 
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Italy 
Trenitalia after implementation of EC directives 91/440 95/18, 95/19 and after the split to other companies 
(controlled  by  FS  Holding),  is  no  longer  allowed  to  receive  public  funding,  excepted  those  paid  as 
compensation  for  public  service  obligations.  The  fares  applied  for  passenger  services  are  under 
regulation. 
According to DPR 277/98, art. 7.2, the charge should cover the direct and indirect costs, energy, direct 
general expenses and part of the indirect ones. It is calculated in order to balance the circulating costs on 
network level, and not on each single path (principle of network solidarity). 
The railway sector in Italy has been restructured very recently (2000) and, today, 17 licenses have been 
issued. Among these, one has been issued to Trenitalia Spa. (part of the former vertically integrated 
national railway company), which currently is the principal operator and the only one providing passenger 
services. 
The charging system has been fixed in a Ministerial decree (DM 43-T): it includes 2 elements: 
￿  one related to access to any of the sections,  
￿  the other related to the usage characteristics. 
 
The total access charge is the sum of the following factors:  
￿  the charges for the sections on the primary network, 
￿  the use of the complementary network, 
￿  the charges for access to nodes. 
 
The usage charges depend on train speed and weight, traffic density, time band, and the use of the main 
stations in nodes. The costs of energy are calculated on the effective usage (only for electric trains). 
According to the last version of the Network Statement (31.5.2001), which has been published on these, 
the “base” access package provided by the Infrastructure Manager to TOCs, includes all the items listed 
sub point 1 – annex II of Directive 2001/14 and electricity for traction (separately charged, according to 
individual consumption).  
As an extension of the "base" access package, the Infrastructure Manager must provide, if requested by 
TOCs and after payment of an additional charge, the following other services: 
 
￿  electricity for pre-heating/air conditioning of rolling stock; 
￿  routing of rolling stock to freight terminals (where are provided also craning services, operated with 
stationary cranes) and to those tracks equipped for refuelling, washing, inspection of carriages, etc. 
￿  extra-time train parking on a given track or railway plant; 
￿  water restocking; 
￿  train ferrying to/from Sicily and Sardinia; 
￿  train shunting and composition before/after ferrying to/from Sicily and Sardinia. 
 
According to new regulations, all these services must be charged according to costs incurred. To comply 
with the “Contratto di Programma”, the Ministry has issued the DM 44-T, which fixes a discount on the total 
charge as a compensation for extra-costs of operations  
This consists of 2 parts, one related to the state of the line, and the other to the volume of traffic (freight, 
long distance passenger, or regional service). 
 
TOTAL CHARGE = ACCESS + USAGE + (ENERGY) - DISCOUNTS 
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With regard to the newcomers (operators), they have to face all the difficulties which are typical of a capital 
intensive and technologically exclusive industrial sector, such as the lack of secondary markets for almost 
all the production factors, the presence of economies of scale, the burden of high sunk costs and so on. 
They can participate to tenders for public service contracts, both at regional and at the national level, 
according to the scale of their industrial production, and therefore have access to contributions from the 




The initial system of infrastructure charges implemented in Britain for passenger franchises relies on a two 
part tariff, which involves for allocated access right a marginal cost based solely on wear and tear and 
where appropriate electric traction costs, and a large fixed element based on avoidable costs and on an 
allocation of joint costs (Office of the Rail Regulator, 1995). In addition, the franchise agreements contain 
"performance regimes" which specify penalty payments or bonuses according to specified performance 
criteria, such as punctuality and cancellations.  
The SRA awards franchises to the TOCs for a specified period, following a competitive bidding process. 
The regulator controls and monitors track access charges paid by the TOCs to Railtrack. There is also the 
opportunity for services to be provided by non-franchised open access operators, which is controlled by 
the Regulator.  
Railtrack has a financial incentive/penalty contract with the TOCs, and this is based on meeting a target 
for permitted delay for a group of train services over a four-week period. In addition, Railtrack is liable to 
penalty  fines  from  the  Regulator  for  poor  performance  and  the  usual  incentives  of  a  public  limited 
company.  The  original  incentive  structure  had  a  number  of  difficulties:  operators  were  faced  with 
negotiating costs and benefits with a monopolist (Railtrack) leading in practice to high transaction costs 
and lengthy negotiations. This asymmetric relationship meant that there was little transparency in the 
process of setting charges for the new services that the growing railway required. The 2000 periodic 
review by the Regulator addressed this with a review of the charges focusing on: 
·  Growth in the use of the railway network, 
·  Improvements in performance – to improve number of trains on time, 
The tariffs for passenger train operating services (track access charges) paid by the TOCs to Railtrack are 
inter-company agreements, controlled and monitored by the ORR. The initial regime was set by the 
Government, but later replaced by an RPI minus*regime. The freight access charges were negotiated 
between British Rail (the pre-privatisation organisation) and the Railtrack and approved by the Regulator.   
The train crash at Hatfield in October 2000, and the consequent major repairs required across the whole 
British rail network, is estimated to have cost in the order of £580 million. This, and other debt issues, 
caused Railtrack to approach the government for funding, which it controversially used in part to pay a 
dividend to its shareholders. 
When Railtrack first floated in 1996 shares were offered at a price of £3.90 per share. The share value 
peaked in November 1998 at £17.68 and was approximately £10.40 at the start of 2001. By the close of 
the market on October 5 of 2001, the share value had fallen to a low of £2.80. The £370 million held by 
Railtrack Group were frozen at the time the company went into receivership and have been earmarked to 
pay Railtrack shareholders an estimated 70p per share in compensation.  
The tariffs for passenger train operating services (track access charges) paid by the TOCs Railtrack are 
inter-company agreements, controlled and monitored by the ORR. The initial regime was set by the 
Government, but later replaced by an RPI minus*regime. The freight access charges were negotiated 
between British Rail (the pre-privatisation organisation) and Railtrack and approved by the Regulator. 
Railtrack  produces  an  annual  Network  Management  Statement  (NMS)  outlining  the  company' s 
expenditure proposals for the maintenance, renewal and enhancement of the network. The NMS also Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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includes information on Railtrack’s expectations for the growth of passenger and freight traffic capacity 
and demand, and identifies current and potential traffic bottlenecks. This is closely scrutinised by the 
Regulator.  
Standards  are  set  by  Railway  safety,  a  whole-owned  subsidiary  of  Railtrack,  and  approved  by  Her 
majesty’s Railway Inspectorate (HMRI). 
Both Railtrack and the TOCs are public limited companies and therefore operate on commercial grounds. 
Over the past few years Railtrack has been severely criticised for both its performance in improving the 
railway infrastructure and for its safety record. In October 2001, the British government put the company 
into receivership after deciding its current level of indebtedness no longer made it financially viable as a 
commercial  organisation  without  regular  handouts  from  the  taxpayer.  The  legislation  that  created  it 
prevents the actual infrastructure being sold to pay debtors. 
Given the arbitrariness of the allocation of joint costs, the system does not necessarily provide good 
information on the relative profitability of different services. Moreover, the system has been criticised for 
the very low variable element in the charges, which give too great an incentive to fill scarce track capacity 
with lightly loaded trains. The variable charges include none elements either to allow for congestion or the 
opportunity cost of slots or for externalities such as air pollution. Moreover it gives no incentive to Railtrack 
to enhance capacity to provide for extra services, in fact, Railtrack argues that the variable element does 
not even cover wear and tear cost, so it is clearly in their interest to discourage capacity expansion from 
the point of view of efficiency, the result is that the system has no mechanism to ensure efficient use of 
scarce capacity (Nash and al., 2001). 
 
 
4.3.3  Charging Practices in Accession Countries  
Bulgaria 
Infrastructure fees are determined by the Council of Ministers (Article 10, par. 1, item 3)  
On each 1st of January a new yearly actualised fee grid comes into force. 
Improved cost and tariff policies for NC”RI” are basic prerequisites to its improved financial performance 
as a transporter of commodities in bulk and as mass carrier of commuters and intercity travellers.  
This will require: 
·  marketing NC”RI” services on the basis of costs; 
·  improving NC”RI” cost accounting systems; 
·  basing NC”RI” planning and management on actual costs, not theoretical norms; 
The planning for M&R of INFRASTRUCTURE – based on the market value of the materials, unit costs of 
spare parts, unit prices for the equipments and machines, workers salaries etc for maintenance and repair 
of the railways. 
The railways are considered to include the following elements: 
·  Rail buildings – Stations ,Duty points, storages, Trolley garages  
·  Structures - Bridges, tunnels,  
·  Track - ballast ,sleepers ,switches, etc;   
·  Catenary–cantilevers , cables, feeders;   
·  Power supply- transformer, low and high voltage elements, masts and others; 
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·  Signaling and Telecommunications,  




At CFR National Company, the tax for using the infrastructure was fixed, having a logical value and taking 
into  account  the  real  possibilities  of  the  commercial  operators,  minimum  necessity  of  expenses  for 
maintenance of railway infrastructure, data correlated with the experience of 1998-1999. 
According  to  GD  698/1999,  CFR  National  Company  provides  distribution  services  of  the  railway 
infrastructure capacity only with the condition to conclude access contracts and with the payment of a tariff 
of infrastructure use for the assigned capacities, according to the law. 
CFR National Company can negotiate the level of tariff for using the railway infrastructure with the railway 
transport operators, depending of the number of the acquired train-path, traffic section, the moment and 
period of request.  
The order (priority) granted to infrastructure is the following: 
·  High class passengers trains; 
·  Common passenger trains; 
·  Direct freight trains; 
·  Local goods trains. 
 
In order to access the Romanian infrastructure it is necessary to have the license issued by AFER. 
The Calculation methods are set by CFR–SA, which elaborates the calculation methodology for railway 
infrastructure tariff based on commercial principles, taking into account the fixed and variable costs for 
railway infrastructure use.  
The calculation methodology allows each operator to pay for the real costs of the services ordered and 
benefited effectively, by fixing separate tariffs by activity type. The calculation methodology is included in 
the activity contract through additional act. 
According to GD 698/1999,in 1999, the new licensed railway operators excepting CFR Freight and CFR 
Passengers had to pay monthly amounts which were established al percentage quotas from the achieved 
incomes for using the railway infrastructure, as it follows: 
￿  39.8% for a railway passengers operator; 
￿  32% for a railway freight operator. 
For the payment delay of the tariffs for using the railway infrastructure CFR can decide to stop the access 
services on the railway infrastructure for the operator involved in this situation. 
The tax for using the infrastructure is paid to National Company CFR for providing the basic package and 
compulsory services (for example the assistance in case of serious incidents). 
The basic package includes the following services: 
·  The right of access to the public infrastructure elements; 
·  Using  of  the  line  and  the  infrastructure  elements  necessary  for  train  traffic  and  shunting 
operations; 
·  Using of the catenary hanger and providing of the traction electric power (without the equivalent 
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·  Distribution of train-paths; 
programming, co-ordination and train traffic according to the distributed train-paths (traffic management, 
signalling and traffic safety installations, telecommunications services).  
At present the methodology for TUI (access tax) calculation is underway and it takes into account the 
following: 
·  In case of freight transport, tariff discounts are granted in order to use the infrastructure for 
operators, who require a greater number of routes.  
·  The cost of a route is higher during traffic peaks than in that with reduced traffic.  
·  Tariff reductions are applied for use of infrastructure in case of mass (bulk) transport (coal, 
cereals, coke, construction materials etc.). 
In  accordance  with  Government  Decision  no.  3/2001,  MLPTL  is  special  authority  of  central  public 
administration, with juridical personality, subordinated to Government and fulfils the following principal 
duties: 
·  Ensure to all users free access, without making any discrimination, to transport infrastructures 
which are open to public access; 
·  Elaborate and submit the rail infrastructure tariffs in order to be approved by Government,  
·  Conclude, on State’s behalf, activity contracts with: CFR National Company, national and/or 
commercial societies that perform public passenger transport. 
MLPTL in its capacity of State authority in transport field, has the following duties, which it exerts directly 
or by technical specialized bodies, subordinated public institutions and units or authorized commercial 
companies: 
·  Grant on mutual basis to foreigner users, the right to freely use transport infrastructure or to pay 
it; 
·  Issue compulsory norms to license and authorize economic agents, which perform or will perform 
transport activities or specific activities for traffic safety;  
·  Establishes conditions for granting, suspending or withdrawing of licenses and authorizations. 
 
Access to rail infrastructure is made on the basis of: 
·  Rail transport license 
·  Safety certificate 
·  Specific instructions and regulations 
·  National legislation and international conventions to which CFR National Company and transport 
operators are parties. 
 
Freight: the Government does not intervene in establishing the tariffs for freight railway transport. 
Passengers: according to the Law 89/1999, the public railway transport for passengers has social public 
service character. For these services public railway transport operators receive from the State or local 
budget,  the  differences  between  the  tariffs  established  with  the  approval  of  the  competent  public 
authorities (the State) and the real costs of transport, to which a profit quota between 3 and 5% is added.  
According to the Governmental Decision 41/1997, CFR National Company can establish provisions in 
order to reduce the tariffs or other advantages, or can give tariff reduction for commercial purposes. 
According  to  the  contract  of  access  to  the  infrastructure,  CFR  National  Company  provides  basic, 
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achieve, in due time and at technical parameters stipulated in indications for safety of rail traffic, all 
verifications, maintenance and repair operations for rolling stock in the traffic, otherwise it is punished by 
suspending or withdrawal of his license. 
 
4.3.4  Charging Practices in Other European Countries  
Norway 
Infrastructure fees shall be fixed with a basis in the principles enshrined in Directive 95/19/EEC. The fees 
shall be paid to the infrastructure manager. The fee is set by the Parliament on a yearly basis and is based 
on the marginal cost pricing principles where external costs are internalised. On the new line from Oslo 
Central  to  the  airport  there  is  an  additional  fee  (mark-up).  The  fee  is  meant  to  cover  parts  of  the 
investments costs and the government calculates it. 
The fees are determined by the Parliament on a yearly basis and should reflect long term marginal costs 
associated with use of the infrastructure. Corrections according to “second-best principle” were made for 
any deviation from marginal cost pricing for competing modes of transport. Later the pricing-principle for 
the fees is changed from long term marginal cost pricing to short-term marginal cost pricing. 
Train operating management: the PSO contracts between government and the NSB BA, is governed by 
three contracts and based on ex-ante negotiations. A main contract describes the main objectives of the 
contract relationship and also describes the contract framework and what premises it is built on. This 
contract has no specified timeframe, but either part may terminate the contract with a 6 months notice. A 
four-year framework contract specifies developments of the intended level of production and what the 
government intend to use on PSO contracts the next four-year period. A yearly contract gives a detailed 
description of the level of production and the expenditure that year. Parliamentary bills in Norway are 
based on yearly resolutions. In addition there are two separate PSO contracts concerning ticket discounts 
for students and military personnel.   
Infrastructure  management:  No  PSO.  Jernbaneverket  as  the  infrastructure  manager  get  most  of  the 
financing  through  direct  governmental  expenditure  over  the  state  budget.  Some  minor  financing  is 
provided through various small commercial engagements. Institute of Transport Economics (TØI) (Report 
472/2000) has done the last evaluation of the fee. The results given in this report was used when the 
Parliament fixed the existing fees.  The formula of Institute of Transport Economics includes costs of 
producing infrastructure services, maintenance and externality costs as pollution, noise and accident i.e. 
short run marginal costs (see annex 4). 
Because of an aim of a level playing field between modes the fee is reduced from to the principal of 
second best, as the competing modes do not pay their external costs. The benchmark modes in the 
calculations have been bus for passenger transport and truck for freight transport.    
Calculated charges (NOK) for different categories of trains pr. Gross ton km under the assumption of 
second best is: 
Table 3: Infrastructure charges, Norway 
Freight  Passenger 
El  Diesel  El  Diesel 
0,012  0,022  -0,001  -0,001 
Prices in Euro are roughly calculated by dividing the above numbers by 8. 
Out of political considerations of the infrastructure standard (both on roads and rail) in rural areas (diesel 
lines) and the importance for the forestry to be able to use train services, the diesel trains are subsidised 
by paying the same fee as the trains run on electricity. There is no infrastructure fee for passenger trains. 
All in all, including other taxes and fees (taxes on electricity, CO2, VAT etc.) the freight trains should cover 
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The “mark-up” on the Gardermo-line is estimated by expectations of the willingness of payments from the 
undertakings and is meant to cover parts of the investments costs. The “mark-up” of to day and the priority 
payment of Flytoget will over a period of 30 years cover 45 % of the investments costs of the Gardermo-
line.   
There are no reservation charges in the fees.  
For services that are not covered by PSOs, the train operators has no limitations in their calculation of 
tariffs for train services, but the Ministry shall approve the fines for passengers caught without holding a 
valid ticket. In November 1996, NSB' s former traffic division was converted to NSB BA, a company created 
by an Act of Parliament, with effect from 1.12.1996. The infrastructure manager, Jernbaneverket, was 
established  at  the  same  time.  This  change  means  that  NSB  is  no  longer  subject  to  government 
administration. NSB itself now has commercial responsibility for operating the rail system and finances 
investment  through  its  own  income  or  loans.  NSB  BA  is  owned  by  the  Ministry  of  Transport  and 
Communications  who  is  the  general  assembly.  However,  the  government  is  only  responsible  for 
contributing capital and therefore has limited responsibility (BA). After changes in the Act in May 2001, 
where the employees rights as public servants was removed, the act are now equal to the ordinary joint 
stock company regulation. 
 
 
Switzerland - Schweizerische Bundesbahn (SBB), Bern-Lötschberg-Simplon-Bahn (BLS) and other 
Railways  
The tariff of the Swiss railtrack organizations is regulated by the “Bundesamt für Verkehr“ (BAV – Federal 
Transport Administration). It consists mainly of two parts: 
·  the marginal costs of the train run (= minimal price) and 
·  a contribution margin. 
 
Additional charges are raised for various services related to railway operation; including the handling and 
storage of wagons, brake trials etc. 
Marginal Costs 
The marginal costs determine the minimal price to be paid. They are composed of three parts (see NEXT 
table): 
·  maintenance costs which on the base of gross ton km 0,0017 Euro/gtkm, 
·  train operation costs, which include trackside operating staff and are charged on the base of 
train-km            0,273 Euro/train-km , 
·  energy costs which differ according to train weight and train type (fast accelerating local trains 
have the highest price per gtkm)     0,0017 … 0,007 Euro/gtkm, 
·  (lump sums for use (stopping or passing) of a junction. Big and small junctions are differentiated. 
Whether a station is counted as a junction depends on the number of diverging lines and the 
number of switches). 
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Table 4 - Structure of SBB’s/BLS’s Charging System 
Price 
Component 
Economic Aspect  Indicator  charged 
per… 
price *) or 
coefficient 






fixed price  gtkm  0,0017 EUR 
Train Operation  marginal operation costs  fixed price  train-km  0,271 EUR 
Energy Supply  marginal energy costs  train type  gtkm  0,0017– 0,007 
EUR 
Use of a Junction  marginal staff and 
maintenance costs 
number of lines and 
switches 
dep. + arr.  2,030 /  
3,383 EUR 
         
Contribution Margin 
Contribution  willingness to pay 
capital costs 




opportunity costs  number of regular slots 
used 
train-km  1,35 / 2,71 EUR 
*) Exchange rate by 1.1.2002. 
**) The contribution in some cases is assumed by BAV. 
 
Contribution Margin 
The  contribution  margin  for  cargo  services  is  0,0052  EUR/net-ton-km  while  the  one  for  non-regular 
passenger service is 0,0027 EUR/timetable-km. 
Additionally the BLS charges an extra fee for slow trains using more than one slot (of regular speed). 
 
4.3.5  Charging Practices in USA  
The US railroad network inherited over capacity from the period of strong development of railroads to an 
extent rarely seen in Europe. But the various lines were also supplying railroad services to different 
regions. So, in order to maintain both competition between different possible routes and services in the 
various regions crossed by the different routes, a very precise and imperative regulation was set up 
(Button, 1993, Boyer 1997) . This regulation was affecting both freight rates and access charges. Railroad 
companies are generally vertically integrated, thus the question of access to the track is to be addressed 
with the possible anti competitive behaviour of the owner of the track which simultaneously runs some 
trains of other operators on it. Since the mid 70s and ending in 1980 a move toward deregulation took 
place. This deregulation caused a big restructuring with mergers and closure of under utilised lines. Now 
some residual regulations remain. In particular the supposed captive shippers are protected by the "stand 
alone cost" principle described earlier in this document. Moreover, each rate exceeding a given ceiling (in 
1997 180 % of the government calculated variable cost of movement) might be put under the examination 
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to apply this principle to the "bottleneck" problem have failed. In this problem, the shippers or the railroads 
have to use a "bottleneck" track to access a certain point, for example a power plant using coal. Until 
1998, the captive users, shippers or railroad, of this "bottleneck track" didn' t obtain the application of the 
regulation principles on the bottleneck facilities (Jahanshahi, 1998). Apart from regulation, railroads are 
free to negotiate contractual agreements for track sharing, including the main following types of contracts. 
￿  Trackage rights: one railroad uses the tracks of another on a fee-for-service basis. 
￿  Paired track agreement: when two competing railroads have parallel tracks they can integrate their 
tracks in order to increase the capacity on this pair of lines. 
￿  Joint track agreement: co-ownership of tracks by several railroads with alternate responsibility of 
maintenance and dispatching. 
￿  Joint subsidiary: a joint track agreement where a common subsidiary is set up. 
￿  Reciprocal  operating  agreement:  quite  similar  to  the  operator/infrastructure  manager  separation 
instituted by the European directives. In this case the track owner is paid on a tonnage or fee–for-
service basis. 
￿  Reciprocal switching: exchange of cars between railroads. 
￿  Detours: the track of a railroad is used by another in order to avoid service interruption 
￿  Pooling: to form a train with cars belonging to several railroads companies  
 
In  spite  of  those  various  agreements,  it  is  generally  agreed  that  there  is  no  "true"  open  access  in 
numerous market segments. It follows that the competition is to be with other transportation modes, 
particularly road haulage. 
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5  Overview of slot allocation procedures 
 
5.1  Objectives of Slot Allocation  
The main objective for rail infrastructure charges and slot allocation charges is to promote the efficient use 
of the rail network. This is related to both the level of infrastructure use, so that there are neither too few 
nor too many trains using the network, and the pattern of infrastructure use, so that scarce capacity is 
allocated efficiently between different train operators. The charges are set as to reflect the costs one 
additional train running on the tracks puts on society. 
If charges are correctly set from the point of view of social efficiency, theoretically, available infrastructure 
capacity will be efficiently allocated between train operators.  
A second objective is promoting efficient investments in rail infrastructure. Possible ways to do this is by 
rewarding infrastructure managers for improving cost efficiency, for reducing delays to train services, and 
by giving the infrastructure managers motivation and insight to expand the network where the potential 
demand is biggest. 
A  third  objective  for  railway  infrastructure  charging  is  to  decrease  the  need  for  public  funding  by 
introducing charging rules that assure cost coverage of infrastructure investments. 
In practice there will be a conflict between efficient provision of train services and the objective of financing 
the infrastructure investments, and therefore it is necessary for the policy maker to consider what are the 
most important goals to achieve.  
When are railway infrastructure charges needed? 
All provision of railway services should cover its external costs, and there will always be elements of 
external costs in the train operating services. Departures from this principle can be justified, by using 
second-best pricing principles. This will be explained later.  
When are slot allocation charges needed? 
There are ways to allocate track in time and space without slot allocation charges. Before the liberalisation 
of the railway market, the timetabling procedure was a task of the railway company, and the timetabling 
procedure did not involve any conflict with other operators. As more operators enter the market, the body 
that designs the timetable has a increasingly demanding job, trying to make a timetable that doesn’t 
discriminate operators and at the same time takes the public demands into account. It should be clear that 
all these goals become impossible to fulfil as the number of operators grows. In this situation a market for 
slots may be a good solution. 
 
5.2  Discussion on Mechanisms for Efficient Slot Pricing in Railways 
5.2.1  Properties of the railway system 
This section is dedicated to the examination of how an economically efficient allocation of track capacity 
between operators can be achieved. 
Before the separation of train and track, the national railways were able to carry out an integrated analysis 
of track allocation and costs and revenues from the operation of these trains. Revenue is of course closely 
linked to the demand side, and how well the willingness to pay is exploited. In the new regime, starting 
after  the  implementation  of  the  EU-Directive  91/440,  the  actual  allocation  is  in  the  hands  of  the 
infrastructure manager separated from the operators. The operators are left to concentrate on the cost/ 
revenue  considerations.  In  an  area  of  competition  all  operators  are  interested  in  running  the  most 
profitable routes. Other routes at other times of the day may be less lucrative, and some routes may not 
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Competition on track demands a way to allocate the railway capacity among different train providers. 
There are many ways of doing this. In order to find the best way of allocating capacity we need to consider 
the following criteria: 
 
￿  Efficiency 
￿  Fairness in allocation, equity 
￿  Financial objectives 
 
The railway system (network) in a country is divided into lines and blocks. Blocks are defined as a 
distance of the track that can be occupied by only one train. As there never can be more than one train in 
each block, the problem of timetabling is to prioritise which trains that shall be granted the right to run in 
each block at a special point in time.  
As the signalling and safety systems are improved the length of the blocks may be shorter and thus 
increasing the capacity of the track. These blocks, formerly a fixed constraint associated to the physical 
segmentation of the network have since evolved in to a more dynamic concept by which a certain length 
before and after the train is reserved for the train according to its speed allowing for increased slot 
management flexibility.  
This concept called “’moving’ blocks” has been introduced in several countries. This concept indicates that 
blocks move with the trains. This is a result of the introduction of new safety systems. 
Given these facts and rules, finding a way to translate economical rules for optimal provision of railway 
capacity and train capacity into a feasible and manageable system becomes the important issue. 
On the supply side the basic concepts are:  
 
Capacity: the capacity is a limited resource in two dimensions: time and space. The constraints are in 
practice not physical constraints, but constraints related to some security measure.  
Safety is linked to the density of trains on track, and the technology both on infrastructure and trains. 
Railway administrations distinguish between the two concepts called theoretical and practical capacity. 
The first is connected to the maximum level of traffic that can run on the track given the current state of the 
infrastructure (curvature, signalling etc), and the latter related to what is regarded as practicable given the 
existing train material, the current mixture of local slow train and high speed Inter City traffic, and current 
operational practice.  
The current opinion is that practical capacity is 75 per cent of theoretical capacity (UIC-norm). The track is 
divided into blocks, which are defined as section of the track that can be occupied by one single train at a 
time. For a single-track line this is regularly the distance from one meeting station to the next. The capacity 
of a certain line can vary by the following variables: 
·  Mixture of trains (slow and fast going trains on the same track reduces the number of trains that can be 
operated within the same time period). 
·  Technical attributes like acceleration and deceleration properties as well as the minimum time between 
trains, which depends on speed, signalling and block lengths greatly affect the capacity of the track. 
·  Station areas which functions as crossing lines for trains, but have often speed limits. Some stations 
are just served by local trains, while regional trains do not stop. This will reduce the total capacity of 
the section, compared with a section without such stations. 
The acceptable level of capacity exploitation is a function of requirements for punctuality and reliability, 
ability to normalise traffic after an incident or a delay, demands for speed, and finally influences from traffic 
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The demand for railway services can be explained by a regular demand function including income and 
prices, but varies greatly in the two dimensions time and space. Demand varies with time in at least two 
ways. The obvious one is the actual needs of the consumer.  
If the working period generally starts at 9 am, obviously the willingness to pay (WTP) for a train arriving 
9.30  is  low.  As  adaptation  to  a  new  timetable  has  some  costs  for  the  passenger,  and  most  daily 
passengers are using some kind of periodic card, the changes in demand due to changes in the timetable 
are slow. Furthermore, passengers dislike frequently changing timetables. 
Reliability, Punctuality and Quality are important concepts, which are affecting demand, and closely 
connected to the density of trains on the tracks. If the capacity limits are trespassed, the effect on the total 
traffic of a delay of one single train may be great. 
The allocation procedure will need to consider all these elements in order to find some optimal allocation 
rule. Once this allocation is done, a timetable is fixed for a certain time e.g. one or two years. The routes 
will for certain areas and time of the day be fully exploited by the operators, but for other areas and time of 
the day there may be free capacity, giving room for additional traffic. 
What has been said so far in this section does not involve economic tools. The variables can all be placed 
within a pure engineering solution. 
 
5.2.2  Track allocation 
Allocation of track access is not new, and was already an important matter when the national railways 
were the sole train operator. The national railways needed to allocate the track between different trains. 
This allocation procedure is a quite demanding task involving many objectives and considerations. 
The figure below illustrates a railway consisting of three stations and two blocks. One block between 
station a and station c and another block between station c and station b. Time is on the horizontal axis 
and distance on the vertical axis. The inclining lines indicate different trains, and the slope represents the 
speed. 
Figure 2: An example of conflicting train departures on single-track section with two-way traffic 
 
Five trains are shown in the figure above. Three leaving station “A” and two trains arriving at station “C”. 
There is just one conflict between these five departures. The train illustrated with the dashed line “3” will 
catch up with a slower train “2”, and is therefore not fitted into a feasible timetable. Besides, the fast-going 
train will meet an opposing train “4” between station c and station b. We see that train 4 stops at station c, 
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Old fashioned track allocation can be described as trying to find the best way of allocating certain train 
departures, given considerations of speed, frequency and priority. The latter is a disadvantage of the old 
engineering  system,  since  there  is  no  objective  way  to  ensure  fair  and  efficient  distribution  of  slots 
between operators with conflicting requests. 
 
5.2.3  Connection between slot allocation and pricing of access to track 
As both economically founded slot allocation and SRMC-pricing of track are techniques that have not been 
widely used and thus information about them is scarce there is a need to explicitly draw some practical 
implications of the use of these methods.  
An  orthodox  use  of  the  SRMC-pricing  principles  will  make  the  time  costs  in  the  track  system  an 
endogenous variable in the slot allocation procedure. An additional train will inflict higher time costs on 
other trains in the system, and the total SRMC-prices will not be visible before the final timetable is 
elaborated. For practical purposes this connection between time costs and slot allocation needs to be 
simplified. 
One method that can be used, is to define some categories, for which the external costs are treated as 
constant. As a few categories are needed for accident costs as well as environmental costs and time 
costs, there will exist multiple combinations of cost parameters and thus multiple levels of external cost 
payments (see WP6). It is important that the number of cost parameters do not make the slot allocation 
procedure  too  hard  to  compute.  Given  these  categories,  the  operators  as  well  as  the  infrastructure 
manager knows in advance the level of external cost pricing for any given train. 
Assuming that the infrastructure access charge is correctly set so that the external costs in the actual 
market that has been created through some kind of slot allocation procedure, all revenues from the slot 
allocation procedure will be a transfer from the railway sector to the government. This will lower the 
producer’s surplus and therefore reduce the operators’ profitability. In an auction procedure with many 
operators competing for slots, the revenues from the slot allocation procedure might be substantial. It can 
be questioned whether this is problematic or not. Higher costs for the operators will normally lead to 
reduced activity, since the demand curve is downward sloping. This reduced activity can lead to reduced 
frequency of trains but at the same time increase the average speed of the trains in case of congestion. 
So the outcome of this is uncertain. 
In standard microeconomics a transfer between the private companies and public is neutral. This idea is 
often questioned by setting a cost on tax money.  
The revenues from the slot allocation can be invested in the railways, or transferred back to the operators 
or the passengers through some subsidies. Private investments in the rail operating market depend on the 
expectation of profitability. An expensive auctioning round reducing the producers surplus dramatically, 
can effectively hinder private investors to enter the market. Barriers to entry e.g. by high investments costs 
increases the need for high profitability before potential operators are willing to enter the market (see 
discussion note for more on this topic). 
Auctioning of track access rights seems more and more reasonable as the number of operators increases. 
With just a few bidders there is a risk of speculative cooperation. If auctioning is presented in multiple 
markets where a few big companies compete against each other regularly, there is a risk of agreements 
between  the  companies  where  the  markets  are  divided  between  them,  and  thus  the  competition  is 
destroyed. Some researchers suspect this to be the case in some aviation and bus markets. Cooperation 
may also be caused by economies of density and is therefore not always a negative property of a market. 
Another reason why there tend to be few competitors in such markets, is an economy of scale. In that 
case this trend can be regarded as the result of well-functioning markets.  
In the Nordic countries, and probably for many other European countries with medium or low population 
density, a situation with multiple operators in the passenger transport market seems highly unlikely. A 
situation of one to three operators seems more plausible. It is important that the slot allocation procedure 
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lead us to questioning the feasibility of an auctioning system. Learning from these experiences, should at 
least make us more prepared for finding good and feasible solutions. 
 
5.2.4  Different ways of allocate track capacity between operators 
This section will analyse how track can be allocated between different operators by setting an access price 
on the track.  
Following the earlier works of Dupuis and Pigou, Walters (1968) is among the first to show that rationing 
access to roads (or infrastructure in general) experiencing congestion can be welfare enhancing. The 
principle of access pricing is easy to understand. In congested situations there is no way to separate 
urgent traffic (except for emergency cars and lanes for public transport), from the weekend-motorist. A 
congestion charge, making the traffic travelling during peaks of the day paying a higher price, can do just 
this. This will reduce traffic jams, and spread traffic more evenly across time. The EU-commission has 
made several reports indicating that they see this as the future solution to cope with growing congestion 
around the major European cities. 
For roads this principle is called road pricing, and can be seen as a real-time traffic control problem. The 
prices are dependent on the road and time of the day. For aviation or railroad, the number of vehicles is 
much less, and the infrastructure is limited to serve one or a few vehicles at the same time. The access to 
a specific part of the infrastructure - a block at a special point in time - is called a slot. The operators have 
a  different  willingness  to  pay  for  different  slots,  varying  with  the  underlying  demand  function  of  the 
passengers and the characteristics of the operators. For traffic running according to a timetable, real time 
pricing is impossible (as explained above). The slot pricing must be done in advance during the setting of 
the timetable.  
Supply is closely related to blocks. Supply can be increased either by making the blocks shorter e.g. by 
building new meeting stations or by making more blocks by building additional tracks, or by improved 
control and signalling installations.  
Demand is derived from the underlying demand for passenger and freight transport. Generally, demand is 
strongly varying over the day, and this will make the value of different slots very different. There might be a 
peak at 1600 in the afternoon, but at 1545 and 1615 the passengers’ total willingness to pay (WTP) might 
be lower. For freight the cost of expediting or postpone a departure will be regularly much lower as the 
value function shown in figure 4 and figure 5 is flatter. 
Complementarities in demand for track allocation might be very high. That is, the value of a slot from B to 
C is much higher if a train from A to B arrives a few minutes earlier. Both lines do not need to be run by 
the same operator, but the trains needs to be coordinated in a way so that journeys using more than one 
train have their waiting time minimised (obviously, there is a trade-off between waiting time and reliability: 
too little time between arrival and departure results in loss of connection when there is deviation from 
schedule.) The operators may also want to exclude other operators from being to close to their trains, that 
is, to reduce the risk of interference with delays that occurred to trains close to their own. If we let the 
operators bid for this time and space around their trains we will get the value of this risk incorporated in the 
market. But, it is important to be aware of the option of predatory behaviour that this possibility incurs.  
 
The original way to allocate track was by a railway company in charge of the infrastructure as well as of all 
trains using the infrastructure.  
In a market for multiple operators, the timetabling procedure needs to be done by an independent body. 
The separation of infrastructure and operators in EU-directive 91/440 is a way to arrange for such a 
timetabling body. Such a body can perhaps be a good way to allocate track in a market with very few 
competitors. Arranging for a meeting with the operators and the public authorities that specifies requests 
for certain routes at certain periods, might be sufficient to reach an agreement ending up in a timetable 
accepted by all parties. There is a risk that the timetable in such a procedure is sub-optimal and that the 
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negotiator, or the company that is most pleased by a few changes in the timetable, since such agreements 
tends to be quite conservative. 
In a multi-operator market a well-functioning market for slots seems to be the best solution. Tendering is 
widely used for many modes of transport. There are many forms of contracts that can be tendered. Some 
contracts are fixed, but other can be adjusted in many different variables. So there is no clear distinction 
between tendering and auctioning. 
Auctioning procedures have been studied in many different markets, but there is not very much actual use 
of the method. More use of auctions is expected in the future. There are some negative experiences with 
auctions. Especially in the mobile phone market, where the licenses for 3rd generation network led to 
prices far over what (now) seems to be reasonable. In the public transport there are examples of division 
of the market into sectors by the operators to reduce competition. 
Auctioning seems  to  be  the most  promising  method  in  an  advanced  market,  where  there  are  many 
parameters that can vary and many pitfalls that eliminate the advantage of this method. 
 
5.2.5  Some different auction methods 
Some  different  auction  methods  are  described  briefly  in  this  chapter.  For  the  evaluation  of  different 
methods a few concepts should be presented.  
The most important differences of auctioning procedures are 
￿  Number of auctioning rounds (single round, two rounds, .., multiple rounds) 
￿  In what order the objects are auctioned. (sequentially or simultaneously) 
Auctions with one round are often referred to as “closed bid auctions”. Tendering procedures are often in 
this form. 
Multi-round auctions open up for raising bids over the highest bid from the previous round. 
One method has been referred to as “English auction”. This is a form where the bids are stated orally in an 
auction premises, and where the bidder is free to raise his/ her bid upwards. 
Another method is often referred to as “Dutch auction”. In this procedure the seller of the object (e.g. slot) 
announces a price and the price is lowered until some buyer accepts the price. 
These methods are of the form where the winner pays the winning bet. Vickrey-auctions are another form 
of auction where the one that has stated the highest bid wins, but actually needs to pay the second-
highest bid. 
For allocation of slots in the railway sector Brewer and Plott (1996) introduced an auctioning mechanism 
called BICAP. In a BICAP auction any potential operator can bid on one or more licenses in a continuous 
time auction. The highest bid cancels out the lower, and the allocation of slots that maximises the auction 
revenue at any point in time is prevailing slots. The auction is over when a predetermined period has 
elapsed with no new bids. 
There are many other auction forms that can be analysed. See e.g. Milgrom (1989) and McAfee & 
McMillan (1987). 
In  the  evaluation  process  of  such  bids  the  concept  of  “auction  efficiency”  can  be  helpful  Auction 
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In this general equation there are n objects  n y y ,..., 1 that are allocated between ‘i agents. Agent j’s 
valuation of the objects is given by the value function  ( )
j
n
j j y y V ,.., 1 . Here  1 =
i
k y  if and only if operator 
i wins the auction for object k. The denominator is the maximum value that can retrieved by any allocation. 
n y y ˆ ,..., ˆ1  is the real allocation from the auction. 
Time needed to undertake the auction might be causing the bidders great costs. There can be a trade-off 
between time-consuming auction procedures and auction efficiency. 
 
5.2.6  A Model for Slot Allocation 
In a liberalised railway market, there is a need to allocate the scarce infrastructure between the operators. 
Slot allocation can be done in several ways. Obviously, one solution is to let some committee of qualified 
personnel  do  the  allocation.  This  has  some  advantages,  in  the  way  that  knowledge  of  experienced 
persons can be used actively. Unfortunately, this might also reveal the limitations of the human mind, as 
this system probably will be too conservative in changing the existing system.  
Possible connections to the old companies may result in biased decision making. Another way is to create 
a market for the infrastructure where the operators are invited to compete in a fair market. Different ways 
of doing this suggested by (Grether & al, 1989) are secret bids where the lowest accepted bid wins, or to 
distribute slots randomly and then let the slots be traded in a second hand market. It can be questioned if 
this might be too demanding for the operators. Another problem is that the operators cannot trade for the 
parameters set in the slots (e.g. risk premium by buying a “broader” slot), as we will explain later, this can 
be included in another auctioning system suggested by Nilsson (1998). We will concentrate on this theory 
and analyse its implications in the following. 
Two step optimisation problem 
Nilsson’s method can be roughly explained as follows: 
·  First, reveal operators’ true WTP for all slots. The bids will need to be some kind of distribution for 
WTP for departures near the requested points in time. A typical freight train may be illustrated by a 
quite broad value function, while a passenger train probably will have a higher sensitivity to time 
variations. 
·  Second, find the optimal composition of slots, i.e. the combination that maximises the social benefit. 
The solution of the first problem is some kind of auction. The solution of the second problem is some kind 
of  software  that  uses  a  mathematical  optimisation  technique.  This  ensures  a  non-discriminatory  and 
correct optimisation. We will analyse these problems separately. 
 
5.2.7  How to reveal the operators’ true WTPs for slots 
The  first  problem  is  basically  related  to  how  to  reveal  the  operators’  WTP  in  a  situation  where  the 
operators have incentives to cheat. By claiming that a train is more valuable than what is true, there is a 
possibility that this train excludes a train with a higher actual value. This forces a technique to reveal the 
true value that minimise or even eliminate the incentives to cheat. Nilsson (1999 and 2000) elaborates 
more thoroughly what is described in this section. 
Figure 4 and 5 exemplifies operators’ true valuation of two slots. The function is called a value function 
and not a WTP-function since there can be differences between true valuation and revealed willingness to 
pay. WTP can be influenced by e.g. strategic behaviour or mark-ups, whereas the value functions indicate 
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Figure 4. Valuation of slot for passenger train 
 
 
Figure 5. Valuation of slot for freight train 
 
We see that the valuation is distributed around a maximum point. The operator has a maximum value v of 
getting the departure exactly at t. For points in time near t, the value is lower but positive. Figure 4 will 
typically be a passenger train, while figure 5, which has lower maximum value and less sensitivity for 
deviations in time will typically be a freight train.  
Let  us  now  imagine  that  we  are  responsible  for  designing  a  new  timetable.  What  we  have  is  the 
infrastructure including signalling, terminals etc. and some laws and regulations ensuring the security 
level. In the old system with basically one operator, the timetable-designers could take all rolling stock into 
considerations along with knowledge of the demand structures as the railway company had yearlong 
experience. In the new system, this is no longer possible. Newcomers in the market must be treated on an 
non-discriminatory foundation, and the rolling stock, demand structures and products involved in a modern 
railway system is far too complex to be regulated by some central authority alone. Then we will have to 
create  a  market  where  most  or  preferably  all  aspects  can  be  reflected  in  the  pricing  mechanism. 
Auctioning access to the track is a way to actually manage this. 
An auction is a way to distribute track capacity among operators, according to stated willingness to pay 
(WTP) through bids. This is an efficient way to allocate track access, since the operator with the higher 
producer surplus can pay a higher price for a slot than the others. The operators will have some insights in 
the demand structure, and are now invited to bid for slots. These bids need to include some characteristics 
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is relevant, since as we have seen the timetabling is seriously affected by differences in speed between 
trains. The operator may want to pay for a reduction in risk for delays by buying some broader time 
interval than necessary to reduce the risk of delays induced by other trains. Where old-fashioned time-
tabling will be very conservative with respect to radical changes in the timetable, an auctioning system 
might provide timetables that differ significantly from the old ones, and thus be much more capable of 
adapting to changes in both supply and demand. 
 
True WTP 
We want to design a system that reduces the operators’ incentives for not revealing their true WTP. The 
problem occurs when the bidders try to exclude other bidders by setting the bids too high, or pinch the 
best slots by exaggerating their WTP, knowing that they will not need to pay this price or by cross-
subsidising  these  routes  with  other  where  the  producer surplus  is  positive.  The  situation  where  one 
operator wants to exclude another operator from the market by setting very high bids, is often referred to 
as predatory pricing. When the operators do this, or believe that other operators may do this, we will not 
have a fair and efficient allocation of track capacity. 
There have been multiple studies on the topic of auctions on infrastructure capacity. Not only for railways, 
as this problem also has a counterpart in for example the cell phone market and the aviation industry. 
Vickrey auctions (Vickrey 1961) is a way to avoid speculation in the bidding process. Vickrey showed that 
with a simple auction rule the dominant strategies of the bidders would be to reveal their true WTP. The 
main point is that the auction shall be won by the one setting the highest bid, but the winner shall actually 
pay the second highest bid. This simple rule can be applied, to reduce the risk of harmful strategies where 
e.g. a dominant bidder pushes competing bidders out of their potential markets. The use of multiple 
Vickrey auctions is suggested by Nilsson (Nilsson1999). 
The  infrastructure  manager  receives  the  first  bids  for  the  slots  and  runs  some  automatic  timetable 
procedure. The result is then sent back to the operators who can adjust their bids. The infrastructure 
manager runs the timetable procedure again, and the operators adjust their bids until nobody wants to 
change their bidding. This is then the final timetable.  
The timetabling objective function is then to maximise the WTP from the operators, given the limitations of 
the capacity of the tracks. Another condition that must be held is that the accepted bids must not be lower 
than the SRMC in the actual market. How this is done is by setting up the SRMC-prices in advance. The 
SRMC-pricing principle will typically consist of a few subdivisions like freight, passenger, electricity and 
diesel as well as some division of time and track according to (expected) density on track. Given these 
prices the operators will know the admission fee to the market, and the actual bids will be prices above 
SRMC. Operators unwilling to pay the SRMC will simply not be granted access to the track. 
 
5.2.8  Dealing with complementarities in the bidding process 
If we take a look at the figure below we see that the train leaving station a arrives at station b at time t. We 
see that there are two trains leaving from station b to a third station (d). The departure leaving after the 
arrival of the train from station a, will of course be of a greater value as the travellers leaving from station a 
to station d will be able to combine these two train departures without much waiting time. The value of the 
slot from a to b and from b to d will probably both increase if the departures are coordinated to match each 
other.  Off  course,  different  operators  can  run  the  trains.  The  question  is  how  to  consider  these 
complementarities in the slot allocation process. The most straightforward way is probably to let the 
operators bid for a whole package of slots. The extra value of the complementarities will make these bids 
beat  the  bids  for  any  slot  on  its  own  as  long  as  the  operators  correctly  assess  the  benefits  of 
complementary slots 
In practice, we are afraid that this is not yet achievable. This is an advanced topic, and an important 
property of the railways. Through research along further development of market mechanisms, new ways of 
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5.2.9  Designing the timetable  
As explained earlier the operators’ bids are run through an optimisation process, which finds the optimal 
timetable given the stated preferences from the bidding process. This optimisation process can also be 
done with “packages” of slots. The timetabling objective function is simply to maximise the payments 
through the bids, given the limitations of the capacity of the tracks. This will ensure that the most profitable 
routes  will  be  included  in  the  timetables.  This  gives  correct  incentives  for  cost-minimisation  and 
exploitation of the WTP for railway services in the market. 
 
Condition that needs to be taken into account: 
·  SRMC-prices.  Accepted  bids  must  not  be  lower  than  the  SRMC-rule  determined  for  the 
infrastructure access charge. Given these prices the operators will know the admission fee to the 
market, and the actual bids will be prices above SRMC. Operators not willing to pay the SRMC 
will simply not be granted access to the track. 
·  Pricing of risk. The operators can be given the possibility to pay for reduced risk for delays by 
buying “broad” slots, where there is more than the minimal required space around the train on the 
track, so that delays in the system will less likely affect this train. This will arrange for high-quality 
trains in the market. This might enlarge the railway market as passengers with high WTP and 
high value of time, will choose the railway instead of other modes of transport. 
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·  Barriers to entry. If financial or juridical obstacles are effectively hindering competition in the 
railway market, the foundation for well-functioning markets may be ruined. This demands that the 
authorities  take  some  actions  to  reduce/  remove  the  barriers  through  regulations  and 
interventions. 
 
A tricky question in the auctioning system is how to secure some minimum level of transportation in all 
areas and all relevant times of the day. There can be multiple solutions of this problem.  Much research is 
done also on this topic, and different ways to handle this issue have been suggested. Normally, some 
public authorities will secure some minimum level of supply of railway services. The operators are then 
given money transfers from the authorities for these services. 
 
Conditions that do not need to be taken into account: 
The  operators  must  comply  with  certain  demands  in  order  to  enter  the  railway  market.  Once  these 
requirements  are  met  however,  there  is  no  need  to  take  these  elements  into  account  in  the  actual 
auctioning process. Examples are: 
 
·  Financial requirements 
·  Safety requirements 




5.3  Current practice in slot allocation 
Slot  allocation  pricing  should  price  rail  infrastructure  capacity  in  a  transparent,  efficient  and  non-
discriminatory way. This requires international transparency with respect to infrastructure tariffs and results 
of access price negotiations. The pricing systems proposed by European Commission (Directive 2001/14) 
for  infrastructure  usage  are  based  on  the  ‘user  pays’  principle  and  should  realize  fair  competition. 
Environmental, congestion and accident costs should be embedded within these charges. 
 
5.3.1  Theoretical considerations regarding allocation of capacity in railway systems 
As previously seen, Slot allocation has been applied in air traffic for decades as an effective management 
tool,  maximising  capacity  usage  and  ensuring  good  utilisation  of  the  available  resources,  though 
considering that some flaws do exist. These have however been subject to analysis while reviews in order 
to cope with the changing environment may be adopted. It is worth noting however that pricing has not 
been an element in the slot allocation procedure. 
Unless railway infrastructure managers offer seamless, end-to-end services to customers, it won’t be 
possible for Railways to become competitive with other modes. The railway reforms must therefore aim at 
meeting the demands of the market and the client. Since equity issues are a major concern, it is essential 
to define a fair, non-discriminatory set of regulations when it comes to dividing the available capacity in 
railways.  In the context of IMPROVERAIL, it is interesting to see which lessons may be drawn from slot 
allocation process in Air Transport. 
However, it must not be forgotten that a delayed plane imposes far less problems onto another plane, 
simply because one plane can easily overtake another. 
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The national level is not necessarily the most relevant level for discussing rail transport, particularly freight 
transport. For the latter, the issues and markets are European. In fact, more than 50 per cent of the freight 
revenues of DB and SNCF are from international traffic. Infrastructure access charges should also send 
the right signals to the infrastructure owner concerning the need for investment on certain heavily used 
sections, in order to reduce congestion on rail infrastructure. The pricing mechanism should also promote 
efficient  allocation  of  train  paths  among  different  users.  It  should  be  said  that,  until  now,  where 
infrastructure has been separated from operation - notably in the United Kingdom - infrastructure access 
charges have not been found to provide the right signals and have undergone several major changes 
Getting the prices right is not a simple task.  
 
Risk for delays 
Delays are a major cause for concern among infrastructure managers, especially in the context of slot 
allocation. If one train is delayed, most of the times it will impose another delay onto other trains. If that 
other train belongs to a different operator, then how will responsibilities, priorities and penalties be dealt 
with? 
The risk for delays can be reduced by bigger time margins; this is, however, in conflict with the desire for 
maximising capacity on congested infrastructure. And some delays are simply unavoidable. Can operators 
or infrastructure managers be held liable for the delays that they caused? 
Penalty systems could be applied, but determining how much damage is caused by a delay is very 
difficult; the time of the delay is a factor but also the number of trains affected by the delay, and to what 
extent is the delay to blame on one operator? 
 
One  could  implement  a  penalty  system  where  the  operator  at  fault  would  have  to  pay  a  particular 
compensation to the affected operator for every minute of delay per affected train, of course only if a delay 
can  be  traced  down  beyond  doubt  to  one  operator.  Such  a  system  is  currently  used  in  the  United 
Kingdom. Besides, passengers could be entitled to get refunds from the operator in case of considerable 
delays; this system is already used in the Netherlands, for example. Government enforcement of such a 
refund combined with the above-mentioned system of compensation between operators would create a 
very strong incentive for operators to provide high-reliability operation. Consequently, similar penalties 
could be demanded from the infrastructure managing body if it is to blame for particular delays. 
 
Varying WTP for different slots and Peak/Off-Peak pricing 
The Willingness-To-Pay (WTP) describes how much a slot is really worth to an operator. The WTP is a 
key management element since it reveals the value of a particular slot to a train operator. But how does a 
railway infrastructure manager measure or even estimate the WTP of the different operators? 
Obviously, the willingness to pay (WTP) varies considerably between peak and off-peak periods, and also 
between congested and low traffic density lines. One way to ensure an acceptable level of service, can be 
to reduce the prices of the off-peak period and on low-density lines, possibly even to a negative amount. 
Another way to do essentially the same, would be to directly subsidise the operator that is willing to run an 
unprofitable line and not differentiate the slot price with time or place. The second option would be to let 
the operators bid on packages of slots/train paths; in this way the regulator can have more influence on 
the total service level. In this option there would be no, or less, price differentiation between the different 
slots. In every case, auctions are an effective way of revealing the true WTP of the operators. 
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Different treatment of freight and passenger transport 
The main difference between passenger and freight transport is that passenger transport is subject to 
Public Service Obligations (PSOs). Freight transport on the other hand does not have the public service 
aspect. As a consequence, slot allocation and pricing mechanisms of freight transport can be more simple 
and straightforward. The WTP for a slot is not so time-dependent and at night there is plenty of spare 
capacity on most railway networks. As shown in the Dutch example, there are already regulations in force 
stipulating that passenger traffic will have priority during the peak hours: 
 
·  Priority for goods transport on the rail network in the early hours. The capacity for passenger transport 
will be restricted to a minimum level to be specified, 
·  Priority for passenger transport in the rush hours. In the rush-hours, goods transport will be limited to 
a minimum level, 
·  In the off-peak hours, passenger transport has a slight priority. 
 
Objectives of the train operator regarding slot allocation 
TOCs will try to gain maximum flexibility, and the best slots, for the lowest possible price. In order to gain 
or maintain market dominance, it can be beneficial for the TOC to acquire even more slots than it probably 
needs, and then leave the surplus unused, just to bar new parties from entering the market. Another 
aspect is that the operator needs to have a long contract time in order to make investments in rolling stock 
worthwhile. Leasing companies (such ILFC in the aviation industry) that lease rolling stock would reduce 
the need for that, but such companies are still not available at the moment in Continental Europe. One 
single European standard for traction voltage, signalling and train dimensioning would make the market for 
train leasing much bigger and more viable. 
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5.3.2    Supply  Side  –  Review  of  current  and  best  practices  for  slot  allocation/  pricing 
procedures 
The current practice of railway infrastructure charging in many countries was outlined above. A practical 
overview of the situation for each country, is presented below which summarises what is described in 
greater  detail  along  this  subchapter,  including  flowcharts  allowing  a  better  understanding  on  the 
procedures related to the allocation of capacity : 
 
Table 5:  Summary of slot allocation practices throughout Europe 








BULGARIA  Yes  1  Independent government body  Negotiations 
FRANCE  Incomplete  5  Semi-independent body   
GERMANY  Yes  18  Independent government body  Negotiations  Auction 
GREECE  Accounts only  1  State Railways  None 
ITALY  Yes  4  Independent government body   
NETHERLANDS  Yes  7   Independent government body 
Negotiations 
Ruling or auction 




PORTUGAL  Yes  2  Independent government body  - 
UK  Yes  36  Independent shareholder 
company1)  Negotiations or ruling 
Source: Country Reports 
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5.3.3  Report on Member States Practices  





Vertical separation between the Infrastructure Manager, Réseau Ferré de France (RFF), and the operator 
SNCF has not been completed yet, in the sense that capacity planning is still done by the operator, since 
the IM has insufficient resources and information. Efforts to establish an independent regulating body have 
so far met huge resistance from SNCF; that is why this establishment is merely a medium- to long-term 
goal, considering SNCF' s political influences. 
 
When a new slot is required, SNCF tries to insert the new train in the circulation chart. Implicitly, priority is 
given to trains that were circulating before this new slot was required. The outcome of a request for a new 
circulation may be one of the following three possibilities: 
 
·  The new slot can be inserted without any difficulty. The access right is granted; 
·  Some difficulties arise, in which case some adjustments are considered and alternative proposals are 
presented to the operators. If necessary a priority is given to operators for which the infrastructure 
was built (i.e. mainly SNCF) or operators operating under public service contract with the central 
government or local authorities. At the end of the process, a slot is proposed, not necessarily the 
requested slot. 
·  Access is denied. However, the transport ministry keeps the right to deliver some special slot rights 
when: 
 
- It is necessary for the public service; 
- It is useful for an efficient utilisation of infrastructure, or; 
- It is helpful to finance new lines or improvement of existing lines. 
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NORWAY: 
The Norwegian railways (NSB) implemented an account separation in 1990. An independent government 
body, Jernbaneverket, was established 1996 to manage the railway infrastructure. 
Jernbaneverket determines timetables. The traffic ministry decides, after consulting all parties involved, on 
the allocation of train paths in the event of changes to the timetable. If the operating companies and the 
Jernbaneverket fail to reach agreement, existing traffic may be given priority in case of a change in the 
timetable. 
On a non-discriminatory basis and within the framework of the regulations, Jernbaneverket may lay down 
rules for the allocation of the train paths. Such rules shall be announced no later than at the start of the 
next timetable adjustment. 
In the event of routing changes the following rail services shall be given priority: 
·  Services provided in the interest of the public, as defined in Regulation (EEC) No 1191/69 of 26 June 
1969. 
·  Service wholly or partly operated on infrastructure for certain specific service (high-speed lines or 
specialised freight lines). 
 
The ministry has sold priority rights for a period of 30 years to Flytoget AS (the Airport Express Train) on 





In the Netherlands currently there is a large passenger train operator (NSR) serving most of the national 
network, some regional companies operating passenger trains on low-intensity branch lines, and three 
competing freight companies. Slot allocation is the responsibility of two independent government bodies, 
Railned and Railverkeersleiding (Rail Traffic Control). The latter deals only with last-minute allocation and 
handling of completed schedules. It is expected that the two bodies, as well as Railinfrabeheer (the 
government body responsible for track engineering), will merge into one single governmental infrastructure 
manager. 
 
The different slot allocation procedures are straight-forward, and are divided into three phases: 
 
1. Allocation through a standard hour pattern (clock-face timetable) 
Train paths that repeat in an hourly pattern will be allocated to passenger and freight train operators. If the 
requests of the various operators are incompatible, operators will be asked to adjust their request in order 
to solve the incompatibility. If this still doesn' t lead to a desirable result, the allocation will be done at the 
discretion of Railned, using the allocation rules mentioned below.  
 
2. Allocation on a daily pattern 
In this phase, the paths and slots remaining after the hourly pattern allocation can be distributed on a daily 
pattern if requested. Incompatibility procedures are the same as in the first phase. 
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The final phase allows operators to request railway capacity for particular dates. Spare capacity must 
remain for last-minute (re)scheduling. 
 
There is a hierarchical order between the phases: once an earlier phase has been approved, it will act as 
a fixed constraint in later phases. This gives passenger traffic a large advantage, since freight traffic is 




The following priority rules apply if operators have submitted incompatible requests following consultation: 
·  At junctions with the conventional network, international transport over the high-speed lines has firm 
priority over other passenger transport; 
·  International transport not running on the high-speed line has the same priority as train services on 
the main rail network; 
·  At junctions with the conventional network, domestic high-speed transport has just the same priority 
as transport on the main rail network. Should capacity conflicts arise between these segments which 
cannot be resolved through consultation, the capacity allocation agency (Railned) will decide on the 
basis of estimated advantages for the passenger based on criteria resulting from legislation; 
·  Transport on the main rail network has firm priority over regional transport, but regional transport does 
have the right to a minimum capacity and quality; 
·  Regional transport has slight priority for the number of train services as laid down in the capacity 
allocation policy framework and in the franchising conditions; 
·  Charter transport gets access to remaining capacity. 
 
If operators form the same market segment have a conflict regarding the capacity to be allocated, priority 
rules cannot be applied directly. Consultations between applicants and, in the case of goods transport, in 




The United Kingdom uses an infrastructure charging mechanism in which operators that do not respect 
their allocated slots are penalised; so that congestion costs for other users are to some extent covered. 
The way the slot allocation process works is described here. 
 
 
A.  Slot Allocation Process for FOC’s 
 
i. The received request is scrutinised under the Slot Analysis Process. 
ii. If there is a competing bid or bids they are passed to the Arbitration Procedure for a decision. 
iii. If the request is rejected by the Slot Analysis Process, the FOC may challenge the decision via appeal, 
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iv. If the rejection is not appealed, the slot allocation ceases. 
v. Approved slots are passed on to the Operations Planning Process and the Charging Process. 
 
B.  Slot Analysis Process 
 
i. The Slot request information is passed through a number of “tests” that filter for bids that Railtrack will 
have to reject. 
ii. The first filter for request comparison is against route characteristics. Can the track accommodate 
the train and consist proposed? Is the route electrified? Additionally it is at this point that it is determined 
whether the slot is currently free (and therefore a valid request). 
iii.  The  second  filter  is  for  capacity  constraints  -  these  are  a  combination  of  the  route’s  physical 
characteristics (e.g. maximum line speed) and the traffic type(s) using the route. 
iv. The third filter is for performance risk - will awarding the slot seriously and adversely affect other 
operators? What risk is posed to e.g. passenger services should the fright service be late or suffer 
mechanical failure? 
v. If there are competing bids (and two or more bids successfully pass the filters) the arbitration procedure 
determines the successful operator. 
vi. The Slot is approved and the details passed on. 
 
C.  The Arbitration Procedure 
i. If Railtrack rejects a request for a slot the FOC may appeal that decision. 
ii. If it decides to do so, the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) evaluates the request and Railtrack’s reasons 
for rejecting it. 
iii. If the SRA upholds Railtrack’s decision, the process ends. 
iv. If the SRA overrules Railtrack the slot is awarded and the process continues as would a successful 
request. 
v. Alternatively competing bids can be received for the same slot. In this case once again the SRA 




DB Netz performs the role of slot allocation agency in Germany. The slot allocation procedure consists of 
the following steps: 
 
A.  General 
 
In order to apply for a slot, the operator must apply before a deadline, determined by DB Netz. The 
deadline is related to the date of the timetable change. 
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The operator must apply for slots using sufficient technical data, as well as the time for which it requests 
capacity. Submitted requests are considered definitive, any changes after the deadline risk being denied. 
 
C.  Train path construction 
While constructing the train paths, the following priority rules are considered: 
Applications before the deadline above applications after the deadline, 
Previously used paths above new applications, 
Applications  that,  at  the  time  of  the  application  deadline,  already comply  with  the  technical/logistical 
requirements (as published by DB Netz) for particular lines, above non-compliant requests, 
Applications for path patterns that, due to their regularity, enable a higher infrastructure utility above 
irregular or on-demand services, 
Applications  for  paths  that last  through several  timetable periods  above  those  that  last  for  only  one 
timetable period or less. 
 
D.  Planning conflict 
In case the path applications of different operators clash, DB Netz will immediately inform the operators 
concerned and give them suggestions for a solution. A new deadline is set, until which the planning for 
that particular stretch of railway is suspended. The operators can suggest modifications to the timetable 
until this deadline. 
 
E.  Conflict-solving discussions 
In case a planning conflict cannot be solved in the way described above, DB Netz organises discussions 
with the operators involved, in order to seek alternative ways to a solution. Some of these discussions can 
also be held using local allocation criteria. 
 
F.  Auctions  
 
Finally, if discussions lead to no result, train paths will be auctioned. Each bidding operator must offer a 
price higher than the default track price and the highest bid wins. 
 
G.  Denial of applications 
If paths cannot be realised during the initial allocation or the discussions, and if the operator loses the 
auction, the application will be turned down. 
H.  Contract offer 
When the negotiations have successfully finished, DB Netz makes a final offer that stands for one month. 
If the operator does not respond to the offer, DB Netz reserves the right to withdraw the offer and allocate 
capacity to other operators. 
 
I.  Non-regular traffic 
Slots for occasional traffic can be requested some time ahead; they can be included in the timetable if 
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J.  Timetable modifications 
Operators may alter their timetables within the timetable period provided that other operators are not 
affected. DB Netz may claim any costs arising from this change.  
 
K.  No-show and cancellation 
When the operator cancels paths either before or after the start of the timetable period, the operators may 




The Bulgarian railway infrastructure is settled by the National Company “Railway Infrastructure” (NCRI), 
established in 1995. The slot allocation procedure is as follows: 
·  NCRI provides slots to any certified operator upon request; 
·  In case the slot is not allocated the deprived operator can appeal against NCRI’s decision using 
internationally standardised procedures. 




The Portuguese railway infrastructure manager, REFER (Rede Ferroviária Nacional, EP), was created in 
1997 . Since 1999, a new railway operator - Fertagus - operates suburban trains besides CP, the national 
operator. These two operators share part of the 20 km link used by FERTAGUS. Each year with the 
production of the timetables, slot allocation coordination is required to conciliate the FERTAGUS and CP 
requirements. In the shared section, CP operates suburban trains that use the North Line (the most 
important line in Portugal) and therefore imply constraints in other CP services.  With the extension of the 
lines used by FERTAGUS, the sharing of capacity will increase. 
 
GREECE: 
The Greek railway infrastructure is managed by OSE, which is also the only operator. Vertical separation 
is limited to accounts only. Given the fact that Greece has only one operator, and that train frequency is 
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5.3.4  International slot allocation in railways: RailNetEurope  
On September 24th 2002, eighteen infrastructure providers signed the RailNetEurope treaty, which offers 
international train paths in sixteen countries through one single organisation. The treaty went into effect 
immediately. RailNetEurope is the result of an international project called Trans-European Rail Freight 
Network (TERFN). 
The concept of TERFN originated with the EU Commission, which spelt out basic ideas in the papers “A 
Strategy for Revitalising the Community’s Railways” (COM 96/421) and “Trans-European Rail Freight 
Freeways” (COM 97/242).  
By this concept, Railway infrastructure providers were to form a consortium for the purpose of selling fast 
timetable  paths  along  a  railways  freight  corridor  at  a  commercial  price  to  any  licensed  freight  train 
operator. These sales would be through a single source, referred to as the “one-stop shop”.  
The aim of the TERFN concept was to overcome some of the well-publicised shortcomings of traditional 
railway freight operations on a European scale such as: 
 
·  Liberalisation of access rights created by Directives 91/440/EEC and 95/18/EC had not been fully 
exploited due both to certain barriers to entry and an incomplete legislative framework; 
·  reliability and punctuality of railway freight movements in Europe were considered to fall short of what 
customers wanted and what could technically be achieved; 
·  average commercial speeds in the order of 20 km/h for certain door-to-door railway freight services 
were considered inadequate; 
·  the problem of technical and commercial fragmentation along the national boundaries of the existing 
traditional railway systems had proven limiting to true competition and an to aggressive tackling of the 
need to increase the modal share of rail in long distance freight movements in Europe. 
 
The first Freight Freeways between Antwerp, Belgium and Gioia Tauro in Southern Italy (2 427 km) 
became operational in January 1998, being based on an agreement signed between SNCB, CFL, FS and 
RFF in November 1997, initially providing for 17 paths. Later, it was extended by incorporating RENFE, to 
Valencia and Barcelona, offering a total of 25 paths along 3 825 km as of 2000. Figure 3 shows the 
international train paths that are offered so far. 
So  far  results  have  been  disappointing  since  users  of  the  TERFN  were  the  existing  state  railway 
companies in the form of a grouping of their freight divisions running trains in the conventional way.  
On the positive side, the TERFN has clarified the technical and commercial characteristics of what the 
combined systems can offer under the existing structures. This relates to specification elements such as 
average commercial on-rail speeds (values in brackets are for the Belgium-Italy path): 
 
·  speeds: these are typically 45-55 km/h 
·  allowed length of through trains (400-700 m) 
·  electric traction systems (3) 
·  allowed loading gauges (PC 70/400, C 70-390, PC 32/341, etc.) for through trains. 
 
Slot allocation is often hindered by the fact that train paths on national borders do not match, which in turn 
might make a path less interesting to bid on or request for by a train operator. The fact that the operator 
has  to  deal  with  more  than  one  Infrastructure  Manager,  more  than  one  slot  allocation  system  and 
sometimes non-matching train paths is an obstacle for the running and developing of international train 
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Figure 3: International train paths offered through RailNetEurope. 
 
Since 1998, an organisation called Freight Freeways has been selling international train paths for cargo 
trains on the main North-South axes in Europe (e.g. Rotterdam-Italy, Hamburg-Scandinavia, Rotterdam-
Vienna and others). It was a joint initiative of the European Infrastructure Managers and the main objective 
of the initiative at the time of inception was to test open access for international rail freight traffic. On the 
24th of September 2002, it changed into RailNetEurope, with the participation of infrastructure managers 
from all EU countries except Ireland and Greece, plus Norway, Switzerland and a part of Hungary. 
 
One Stop Shops 
RailNetEurope  offers  cargo  operators  the  possibility  to  book  infrastructure  capacity  across  national 
borders, and they have to deal with only one institution, the so-called “one-stop shop” principle. This 
simplifies the work for freight operators considerably, since they can book capacity at only one “desk”. 
Booking happens through local offices, one in each participating country. Timesavings in the planning 
process can vary from several days to sometimes even several weeks. Capacity availability can be seen 
on the online catalogue, and the technical information and timetable information is represented as in the 
following example  
The first table shows the path, timetable, and availability. Fees are also calculated using this sheet (not 
shown). The second table shows the technical requirements for different sections of the path, such as axle 
load, traction type, braking performance etc. This is a typical example of clear, open-access business-to-
business  communication  (as  opposed  to  business-to-customer  communication  that  is  so  crucial  for 
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Figure 4: Example of international timetable (source: www.freightfreeways.com) 
 
 
RailNetEurope shows how slot allocation procedures of several countries can be dealt with as one, and 
gives an idea of future possibilities for the European railway market. RailNetEurope goes beyond the 
access rights specified in Article 10 of EU Directive 91/440: 
·  It does not demand allocation between operators on equity basis, but simply gives capacity to any 
operator based in one of the participating countries. 
·  It also includes non-EU countries 
·  It does more than just slot allocation, it actually organises railway capacity for the operator at one 
desk. 
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5.4  Supply  side  –  slot  allocation  and  pricing  procedures  from  the 
infrastructure manager’s point of view 
5.4.1  Implementation Drivers for the Infrastructure Managers 
Capacity maximisation versus revenue maximisation 
Different methods of charging for the use of infrastructure have been described in the previous chapters. A 
line can be drawn between schemes that maximise the IM’s revenues when capacity is used to its limits, 
and schemes that opens up for contests that maximise operators’ WTP at traffic levels below what can be 
obtained if the IMs set the timetable. In practice, maximum market share of railways (highest proportion of 
the travellers in a specific area travelling by train) may be reached by none of these methods, but as 
demand  and  congestion  rises,  the  closer  capacity  maximisation  comes  to  equal  market  share 
maximisation 
 
Incentives for the IM to be cost efficient 
Apart from the institutional context, the charging system itself can have some effect on the IM efficiency 
drive. Charging systems whereby the infrastructure charge is closely related to the actual cost level (e.g. a 
pure SRMC or full cost pricing regime) will leave little incentive for the IM to be cost efficient. But this is 
true only to the extent that such systems would require the benefits of any cost reductions to be passed on 
immediately to the operator. In reality, the level of infrastructure charge is fixed on the basis of budgeted 
cost and thereby any variance of actual costs below the budgeted amounts represents an additional profit.  
If the IM does not have to set prices at an overall cost recovering level, clearly loosening the relationship 
between the actual cost level and the price charged, there will be an incentive to the IM to improve 
efficiency. Because the actual price levels are outside the scope of this study, our proposals do not include 
any direct guidelines for setting the level of margins, nor for varying them. However, in contrast with a fully 
cost orientated pricing system, our proposals allow the IM to deviate from only applying cost related 
pricing parameters, i.e. it can apply the market modulating parameter and negotiate with the operator a 
price that is different from the published tariff. In this way the IM can loosen the cost relationship.  
Here we would like to point out that apart from the actual charging system it is important that contracts 
between the IM and the operator also sets sufficient incentives for the IM to be cost efficient. Contract 
clauses whereby prices are revised based on achieved efficiency improvements will clearly diminish any 
incentives for improvement. On the other hand contracts whereby charges are set for a period of several 
years, possibly based on expected efficiency improvements over this period, can give a clear incentive.  
In this case, the agreed charges will not be affected by the actual level of cost reductions achieved by the 
IM for the length of the contract period. The IM will therefore have an incentive to reduce its costs and 
thereby to improve its return on investment. 
 
Incentives for the IM to invest in new infrastructure 
Investment incentives can  be  established  by  long-term contracts  or  investment  engagements.  These 
mechanisms can directly resolve capacity problems. By providing a balanced risk-sharing framework to 
invest, they ensure that all new infrastructure investment that can be paid back by profitable services is 
actually undertaken.  
Also State intervention gives important incentives for the IM to invest in new infrastructure. Especially, 
investment and interest reimbursement can give important incentives for an IM to build new infrastructure. 
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Additional and ancillary charge 
In addition to the charges described above, operators may have to pay for other services: traction energy 
(either electricity or diesel, if supplied by the infrastructure manager), access to the telecommunication 
network or the right to call at stations, which results in additional fees being charged by the infrastructure 
manager. 
 
Attract more operators vs. more traffic 
From a business point of view, an IM would like to bring more operators to rail in order to limit its risk of 
being dependent on one single large customer (i.e. the incumbent rail operator). Operators however, 
regardless of whether they are an incumbent or a new entrant, would like to see as little competition as 
possible in their market. They will emphasise the importance of increasing their traffic volume. In terms of 
pricing the IM will favour a low entry barrier for new entrants, e.g. a relatively low fixed charge. Operators 
already in operation will opt for reaping economies of scale by having a relatively high fixed charge and 
low variable charge.  
 
Path allocation in timetable production and operation 
Path allocation in timetable can be written as an optimisation problem: conflicting demand for track access 
with scarce and lumpy supply.   
The path allocation in timetable must be based on the operator’s willingness-to-pay. The utility of a 
service to an operator can be approximated by his willingness-to-pay. By imposing a tariff per slot, only 
operators with a willingness-to-pay higher than the tariff will request the slot. With the auction procedure, 
the operator with the highest willingness-to-pay can be selected. The operator accepts to pay a tariff that 
does not exceed his maximum willingness-to pay for a given slot.  
Each combination of a route and time slot can be seen as a marketable good. There are substituabilities 
and  complementarities  in  demand  for  these  transportation  goods.  Operator’s  willingness-to-pay  is 
connected with the market segments of the operator, which are linked to demand elasticity. Demand 
elasticity depends on: 
·  Type of traffic (freight, passenger) 
·  Type of good (perishable product or not for example)  
·  Trip destination (number of alternatives) 
·  Time of day (peak or off-peak period) 
·  Type of vehicle (high speed lines, slow lines) 
·  Trip length (short, medium or long distance e.g. national/regional) 
·  The demand for transportation is: 
·  Negatively related to the price of transportation 
·  Negatively related to travel time 
·  Higher if there are connecting trains 
·  Lower if there are other trains on the same routes in adjacent time slots 
·  Higher in some time slots than in others. 
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5.4.2  Expected Drawbacks in Implementing Charging and Capacity Allocation Policies  
Not only are there difficulties in deriving and developing railway infrastructure charging policy, there are 
also barriers to the allocation procedures as well as in implementing policy once it has been agreed.  
Problems  may  come  in  a  number  of  different  forms.  Some  may  relate  to  the  industry  in  general, 
irrespective of the member state or region involved, whereas others will be more country-specific, being 
linked to the institutions, finances or philosophy of that member state or region [Quinet, 2001]. Whilst 
industry-related problems are likely to apply more or less evenly across the different member states, 
country-specific problems may be very relevant for some member states but much less relevant for others.  
In addition, problems may be perceived or actual. Perceived may exist where research is not effectively 
feeding through to the policy-making community. A failure to disseminate state-of-the-art research on 
issues affecting the implementation of marginal cost pricing may result in policy-makers perceiving there is 
a  problem  where  there  is  not.  It  is  important  to  expose  these  perceived  problems  through  effective 
dialogue between the research and policy-making communities. In the end, the important task is to identify 
the actual problems and, subsequently, possible means of overcoming them. 
 
The  following  list  summarises  possible  problems/restrictions  on  slot  allocation  procedures,  from  the 
production side point of view, always regarding the future situation. 
 
From the policy point of view, the relevant problems seem to be: 
·  Variation of railway reform across different member states – may affect international traffic 
·  Country-specific or organization-specific procedures may cause great difficulties in complete railway 
reform according to the EU Directives.  
·  Profit-maximising IMs creates a difficult environment for establishment of a system that serves the 
society in a way that is economically efficient 
 
From the pricing point of view, the relevant problems are concentrated mostly on implementing marginal 
social cost pricing in the rail sector: 
·  Problems of measurement 
·  Complexity of tariffs 
·  Financial implications 
·  Equity 
·  Technical efficiency 
·  Fair competition within the rail sector 
·  Fair competition with other modes 
·  Acceptability on behalf of train operators and infrastructure managers 
·  Acceptability on behalf of end users and the general public. 
 
From the allocation point of view, the possible relevant restrictions are: 
·  Existing poor quality of infrastructure may cause inability to satisfy operator requests  
·  Limitation of human mind in producing network statement, in single/few operators environment 
·  IM as the allocation body in some cases may cause unfair treatment among the different operator 
·  Limited information from the operator to IM may lead to unacceptable network description 
·  Processing of path requests may be time-consuming 
·  Open auction system may be time-consuming  
·  Secret auction system may cause problem to operator i.e. they cannot trade for the parameters set in 
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Last but not least, lack of suitable definition of property rights.  The right to use a part of the network is not 
straightforward to define. Allocation of track is tied to the scheduling procedure. As this report has stated; 
the operators’ valuation of a slot and ability to use a slot is a function of the whole scheduling process, 
where the final timetable sets the characteristics of each operators’ property rights to possess the network, 
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5.5  A  comparison  between  slot  allocation  procedures  in  railways  and 
aviation  
5.5.1  Lessons to Learn  
The dynamics of the railways in the context of the implementation of the EC Directive 91/440 are evolving 
slowly, while is it more and more clear that the inefficient allocation of capacity in the railways is a major 
drawback to the development of the railway in the European context, in particular regarding the freight 
market. This aspect is currently deserving the focus of the European Commission, since to some extent, it 
is preventing the implementation of strategies envisaging the growth of the railway market shares, as 
extolled in the recent White Paper: 2010 Time to Decide. The new need for close cooperation between the 
demand side of the industry, represented by operators, and the supply side of the industry represented by 
the infrastructure managers, previously together in one single entity, is bringing along a certain level of 
conflict.  Although such level of conflict has the potential to increase the overall performance of the 
system, it implies a new attitude from the stakeholders involved.  It also obliges the adoption of improved 
management procedures on both sides in order to tackle efficiently the most common flaws inherent to 
contractual relationships involving rights and obligations for the parties. 
While operators may adapt themselves to this new reality, moving from a production oriented strategy to a 
market orientated one, without really needing to sort out the basic constraints of the system itself, it is up 
to the infrastructure manager alone to decide on a wide range of crucial issues related to the infrastructure 
management  such  as  long  term  strategic  investments,  optimisation  of  the  capacity  allocation  or 
compliance with safety standards. These aspects are however critical and most of the times in conflict with 
the availability of the infrastructure. 
This situation poses serious problems to the ability of the IM’s to show increased performances, to some 
extent also because the vertical separation in Railways broke up the ties that could in theory allow to 
better manage the whole system (Supply + Demand).  It is therefore crucial to define clear mechanisms to 
solve the conflicts arising between the operator (Railway Undertakers or Operators) and to specify in 
which conditions may the operator have access to the Infrastructure.  This calls for clear procedures on 
the allocation of the existing capacity to the operator, which should be based on effective and clear market 
mechanisms, such as slot auctions.  Such approach should enable the overall railway system to operate 
better and will allow keeping the pressure for optimisation, and ultimately better quality of service towards 
the end user, being it either passengers or freight operators. 
In the last decades railway freight transport market share has decreased in comparison to other modes, 
because it is generally considered as slow, inefficient and unreliable.  Prompt and flexible allocation of 
capacity, in particular at trans-national level, is understood to be one of the drivers for such situation.  
In order to understand the theoretical aspects of slot allocation, we start by explaining how slot allocation 
is  used  in  Air  Transport,  later  linking  such  procedures  to  the  management  of  capacity  in  railway 
infrastructures. 
Slot allocation has shown to be an effective management tool in airports, maximising capacity usage and 
ensuring an optimal utilisation of the available resources. Therefore, congested railway infrastructure may 
be seen as a transport sector to which such procedures should apply. Since equity issues are a major 
concern, it is essential to define a fair, non-discriminatory set of regulations when it comes to dividing the 
available  capacity.  In  air  traffic,  slot  allocation  has  been  used  for  decades;  it  provides  the  railway 
infrastructure  managers  with  very  valuable  information  and  experience.  The  regulations  used  by  the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA) are mentioned in this document.  
 
In the context of IMPROVERAIL, it is interesting to see how the slot allocation process has developed, and 
which lessons are to be drawn from the skills and experience of the aviation industry. However, it must not 
be forgotten that some basic facts are different. Most importantly, a delayed plane imposes far fewer 
problems onto another plane, simply because one plane can easily overtake another. Furthermore, the 
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airlines. But still, the aviation industry offers a very interesting comparison. So, given that some conditions 
are  different,  what  can  be  learnt  from  slot  allocation  procedures  in  aviation  industry?  The  rules  of 
procedure are explained below. 
 
5.5.2  Slot Allocation in the Aviation industry 
Insight on slot allocation procedures applied to air transport 
The International Air Transport Association (IATA) rules slot allocation in air transport, co-ordinating flight 
schedules through its half-yearly Schedules Conference. Started by IATA in 1947 as a modest attempt to 
maximise interlining possibilities for a small number of airlines, the Schedules Conference (SC) is now 
additionally a world-wide forum for reaching consensus on schedule adjustments necessary to relieve 
airport  congestion.  With  the  help  of  airlines,  airports,  coordinators  and  industry  experts,  IATA  has 
developed a set of procedures which are intended to provide guidance on managing the allocation of 
scarce resources at busy airports on a fair, transparent and non-discriminatory basis.   
 
Procedures 
When starting the planning and allocation process, IATA first makes a distinction between three airport 
categories: 
 
·  Level 1 describes those airports whose capacities are adequate to meet the demands of users. Such 
airports are recognised from a schedule clearance viewpoint as non-coordinated. 
·  Level 2 describes airports where the demand is approaching capacity and a more formal level of co-
operation is required to avoid reaching, if at all possible, an over-capacity situation. These airports are 
referred to as schedules facilitated. 
·  Level 3 describes those airports where demand exceeds capacity during the relevant period and it is 
impossible to resolve the problem through voluntary co-operation between airlines and where, after 
consultation with all the parties involved, there are no possibilities of resolving the serious problems in 
the short term. In this scenario, formal procedures need to be implemented at the airport to allocate 
available capacity and coordinate schedules. Airports with such high levels of congestion are referred 
to as “fully coordinated”. 
 
For IMPROVERAIL, the focus will be on the third category, as it comprises the current requirements of the 
Railways in the context of a shortage of capacity to face freight modal shift from road to rail. 
 
Fully Coordinated Airports (Level 3), must have a coordinator to allocate slots to all airlines operating 
from that airport. The coordinator should be appointed by the appropriate authority, following consultations 
with  the  airport  managing  body,  the  airlines  using  the  airport  regularly  and  their  representative 
organisations.  
The  person  appointed  must  act  independently  of  any  interested  party.  Previous  airline  scheduling 
knowledge and/or coordination experience is highly desirable. Coordinators must have sufficient time and 
resources to provide coordination services in accordance with these guidelines. If a country has more than 
one Level 3 airport, there may be benefits if one coordinator or coordination organisation deals with all 
such airports, e.g. the ability to invest for high quality coordination. 
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Ideally, there should be a dedicated coordinator. Where there is dual responsibility for coordination and 
scheduling, coordination must take precedence over scheduling. The activities of the coordinator must at 
all times be neutral, transparent and non-discriminatory. 
 
When planning a slot schedule, the following general aspects are taken into account. 
 
·  Aircraft operations may be classified into the following broad categories: 
 
(a) Regular scheduled services 
(b) Ad-hoc services 
(c) Other operations. 
 
·  In the event of conflict arising between the interests of these different categories, priority should be 
given to (a) and then (b) above. 
·  The basic principle of the slot allocation process is historical precedence, which allows airlines to 
retain slots which have been allocated to them, and operated by them to certain operating criteria, in 
the next equivalent scheduling season. This principle is also called grandfathering. 
·  Historic slots must not be withdrawn from an airline as a means of providing for new entrants or any 
other category of aircraft operator. Confiscation of slots for any reason should be avoided, unless 
intentional abuse of the coordination system by an airline is proven. 
·  Slots may be transferred or exchanged within or between airlines subject to certain conditions. 
 
In order to give airlines the necessary information on historical slots prior to the Schedules Conference 
(SC), coordinators should use the following guidelines for determining which slots are historical: 
 
·  Slots cleared by coordinators as ad-hoc are not eligible for historical precedence. 
·  Slots are eligible for historical precedence when four consecutive flights have been operated as 
allocated, at the same time on the same day of the week. 
·  Slots cleared by coordinators as ad-hoc but forming a series by the end of the scheduling season, 
may be eligible for historical precedence. 
·  Flights initially requested as a series of slots and cleared by the coordinator at different timings (ie. not 
forming  a  series  of  4  consecutive  flights  at  the  same  time  on  the  same  day  of  the  week)  but 
subsequently re-cleared before operation, so as to form a series by the end of the scheduling season, 
may be eligible for historical precedence. 
·  Slots held on file by coordinators at the slot return deadline dates of 31st August (Winter) and 31st 
January (Summer), will be used as the basis for determination of historics. 
·  For slots allocated by coordinators after the slot return deadlines, the number of slots in the series at 
the date they were allocated will be used as the baseline for the “use it or lose it” rule and the 
determination of historical precedence. 
·  Whether slots are requested before or after the slot return deadlines, it will be the latest timings 
approved by coordinators for each series of slots that will form the basis for historical slots. 
 Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
Page 85 of 194 
Primary Criteria for Slot Allocation 
The prime objective behind the allocation of specific slots should be to ensure the most efficient use of 
scarce airport resources in order to maximise the benefits to the greatest number of airport users and to 
the travelling public. 
Against  this  background,  coordinators  should  allocate  the  declared  capacity  based  on  the  following 
priorities when developing an initial slot allocation plan for the Schedules Conference: 
 
1.  Historical Precedence: The core of the slot allocation process is the use of historical precedence. 
This precedence applies only to equivalent, and not consecutive, scheduling seasons (e.g. Summer 
to summer season) and is limited to the equivalent period and days of operation. This principle entitles 
an airline to claim a series of slots within the same coordination parameter(s) in the next equivalent 
scheduling season, provided that: 
 
·  The slots were allocated for regular scheduled services forming a series of slots; 
·  At least 80% of the slots were operated by an airline as cleared by the coordinator. 
 
1  Changes to Historic Slots:  A change to a historical slot should have priority over new demands 
for the same slot within the total capacity available. 
 
2  Slot Pool: Once slots have been allocated at a fully coordinated airport as outlined above, the 
coordinator should set up a slot pool. Slots available in the pool should then be allocated to 
applicant airlines using the criteria set out below. 
 
New Entrants 
Within each time interval coordinated, 50% of the slots contained within the slot pool at the initial allocation 
must be allocated to new entrants, unless requests by new entrants are less than 50%. Other criteria for 
allocating slots from the pool are secondary to this criterion. An airline’s request for a slot at an airport 
should have new entrant status provided that the request, if accepted, would not result in the airline 
holding more than 4 slots on that day at that airport. An airline must not claim new entrant status: 
·  if it intends to operate on an ad hoc basis, or 
·  if a controlling interest in the airline is held by another airline which itself is not a new entrant at the 
airport in question (subsidiary company), or 
·  if it holds a controlling interest in another airline which itself is not a new entrant at the airport in 
question (parent company). 
A new entrant, who has been offered slots within two hours before or after the time requested, but has not 
accepted this offer, will not retain new entrant status for that scheduling season. Airlines must advise the 
coordinator if they are requesting slots as a new entrant. If new entrants are dissatisfied with the response 
to their slot requirements, they may request a meeting of the appropriate coordination committee to 
consider the situation.  
 
Introduction of Year-Round Service 
Within each category above, i.e. changes to historic slots, allocations to new entrants and allocations of 
remaining slots, a request to extend an existing operation to a year round operation should have priority 
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coordinator that they are requesting them for year round operation. Coordinators should allow flexibility on 
timings to cover the differing requirements of short and long-haul services. 
 
Additional Criteria for Slot Allocation 
When  slots  cannot  be  allocated  by  the  application  of  the  primary  criteria  as  set  out  above,  further 
consideration should be given to the following factors: 
 
·  Effective Period of Operation: When two or more airlines compete for the same slots, the schedule 
that will be effective for a longer period of operation in the same scheduling season should have 
priority. 
·  Size and Type of Market: There is a requirement for a mixture of operations at major airports to 
satisfy the demands of the public. Domestic/regional/long-haul markets, covering both scheduled and 
charter services, are part of a total pattern and the size and type of markets and the airport network 
and links should, therefore, be considered. 
·  Competition:  Coordinators  should  try  to  ensure  that  due  account  is  taken  of  the  competitive 
requirements in the allocation of available slots. 
·  Curfews: When a curfew at one airport creates a slot problem elsewhere, priority should be given to 
the airline whose schedule is constrained by the curfew. In order to assist the coordinator, the airline 
should indicate that it is constrained by a curfew. 
·  Requirements of the Travelling Public and Other Users: Coordinators should try to ensure that the 
needs of the travelling public are met as far as possible. 
·  Frequency of Operation: Higher frequency should not in itself imply higher priority. The situation of 
charter and freight airlines should be particularly considered in this context. 
·  Local Guidelines: The proliferation of local guidelines is to be discouraged. However, conditions vary 
from airport to airport and therefore, when establishing priorities, the coordinator should take into 
account necessary local guidelines. Such guidelines must be approved by the local Coordination 
Committee or its equivalent. 
 
 
Transfer of Slots between Airlines 
Slot transfers between airlines may only take place where the laws of the relevant country permit. Slots 
may only be transferred to another airline that is serving or planning to serve the same airport. The 
transfer of new slots is not permitted until such slots have been operated for two equivalent seasons. This 
is to prevent airlines taking advantage of an enhanced priority, such as new entrant status, simply to 
transfer them to another airline. 
 
Recent Developments on Slot Allocation 
On 12 July 2001 the Council decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee (ESC), under Article 
80 (2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, on the: 
 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation 
(EEC) No. 95/93 of 18 January 1993 on common rules for the allocation of slots at Community airports 
COM(2001) 335 final - 2001/0140 (COD). 
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This initiative aimed to re-focus on the management of slots, and - in conjunction with that - to reflect ATC, 
airports  operation  and capacity  issues  alongside  current environmental  objectives,  to impart  fair  and 
transparent  procedures  to  protect  and  encourage  the  industry  and  users  alike  and  arbitrate  upon 
congestion.  It  seeks  to  offer  clarification  of  the  definition  of  slot  rights,  airport  status,  new  entrant 
management and coordination. It also has the objective of finding and maintaining the right balance 
between air carriers and the development of a competitive network within the EU and with third countries. 
 
The Section for Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society, which was responsible for 
preparing the Committee' s work on the subject, presented its conclusions on 26 February 2002.  At its 
389th  plenary  session  of  20  and  21  March  2002  the  Committee  adopted  the  following  proposal 
unanimously. 
 
About Principles of Slot Allocation 
·  Slots are considered as "rights to use infrastructure" and not "property rights". This does raise the 
question of the proposed examination of slot trading and the inevitable challenge by flagship carriers 
that the "grandfather right" embodied in the proposal is de facto their "property". 
·  There is concern at the provision (Article 2 (b)) to bar partners in route sharing from new entrant 
status; such route sharing has sound reasons e.g. load factor, environmental impact, services, to 
justify it. 
·  The  comfort  of  "grandfather"  rights  gives  balance  to  the  process  of  slot  mobility,  recognition  of 
historical commercial costs and control of transfers. 
 
About Coordination 
The time-window for which slot allocation plans are made can vary. Some references suggest six-monthly 
periods,  summer  and  winter,  elsewhere  the  emphasis  is  on  year  round  operational  provision.  It  is 
important that these periods be defined in order to offer the widest opportunity for competition to re-
position slots. Six-monthly periods would appear to be the most responsive format. 
 
The appointment of the coordinator must be totally independent and apolitical. There is concern that the 
coordination exercise could become both costly and bureaucratic. The Committee emphasised that: 
 
·  Coordination is established as a totally independent entity; 
·  Member States adequately ensure their operational budgets and assure their authority; 
·  Management systems be developed in cooperation with airports to create the data that ensures a fast 
creation of solutions.  
 
About the Role of the Coordinator 
The neutrality and independence of the coordinator are the essential ingredient for the success of the 
proposal.  Member  States  must  provide  indemnification  to  coordinators  so  that  they  may  act  in  an 
unimpaired  manner  to  pursue  their  brief  and  respect  their  principles.  This  does  not  remove  any 
responsibility from the Coordinator to satisfactorily account for its actions and decisions. 
It  is  assumed  that  standardised  data  will  be  made  available  to  the  industry  at  large,  within  defined 
response times, to ensure best competitive knowledge is disseminated. The ESC insists that coordinators 
cooperate with relevant authorities and respect the provisions of Article 81 and 82 of the EU Treaty to 
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About Slots allocation and entitlement 
Refinements to the process are justified. There is concern that coordinators are not compelled to arbitrate 
upon "alternative" transfer modes, which is outside their field of responsibility.  Intermediate capacity 
review should only happen after significant changes occur to airport capacity, or at three years'  intervals. 
 
About Enforcement 
It seems reasonable that non-performance is penalised by both fines and slot withdrawal. The coordinator 
must nevertheless act expeditiously to limit collateral damage to airports from such actions. Given the 
recent asymmetric shocks to the air-traffic industry, coordinators should hold a degree of autonomy to deal 
wisely in such occurrences. 
 
Final Remarks 
·  Well-displayed user-friendly records by way of e.g. score boards showing performance achievements, 
would be of interest.  Slots'  usage and punctuality performance must be reported to show actual and 
trend reliability. 
·  There  is  much  emphasis  on  new  entrants  developing  new  routes.  All  carriers  should  be  so 
encouraged,  those  already  established  then also  having more  leverage.  Recognition of  effective 
competition should be the driving principle. 
·  The allocation of slots will require sensitivity in the policing of "use it or lose it". Coordinators must not 
be bureaucratic and restrained by red tape, but should retain some authority to exercise discretion 
e.g. when a carrier is dislodged from a slot by the direct interventions of serious disruptive actions by 
terrorists. If airlines can account for their under-performance to the coordinator' s satisfaction, they 
should be accorded the right to retain their slots for the subsequent coordinated period, to facilitate 
recovery.  
·  Whilst the impact of forthcoming reports is awaited, it is the ESC’s view that coordinators reflect the 
latest understanding of environmental constraints in their selection process. It is anticipated that such 
findings will clarify the weighting of their impact upon decisions. 
 
 
5.5.3  Lesson learnt on slot allocation procedures from the air transport sector? 
How do slot allocation procedures relate to railway infrastructure management? What lessons can be 
drawn from current and best practice in airport slot management? To assess this, let’s have a look at the 
procedures and criteria. 
 
Procedures: 
IATA distinguishes three categories of airports, according to the way they cope with demand. They are 
coordinated  or  non-coordinated  airports,  meaning  that  the  former  do  need  a  particular  level  of  slot 
allocation, whereas the latter do not, since they a relative abundance of capacity. This principle can be 
applied  to  railway stations  and  junctions  as  well,  distinguishing  between  congested nodes  and  quiet 
countryside lines. Crucial point however, is that the IATA procedures limit themselves to the nodes, 
leaving the airspace in between untouched. Obviously, this airspace is heavily regulated in congested 
areas such as Europe and the US. On the other hand, “empty” areas such as the Pacific and the Poles, 
are virtually unguarded, and capacity allocation is hardly an issue there.  
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Projecting this situation on railway infrastructure, it would imply that slot allocation can be limited to those 
places where demand for infrastructure capacity exceeds supply. Indeed, it would seem strange to have 
bids and auction for access to stretches of railway with only one single operator. The problem starts, 
however, when a new entrant wants to have capacity and there is a clash of interests. In this case, the 
major difference between tracks and airspace manifests itself: railways are physically very inflexible, 
compared to airspace where every route has several “flight levels”, vertically separated flight paths where 
planes can overtake each other. That is why, for the sake of clarity, it is probably more easy and fair to 
have one standard system for the entire railway network. 
IATA wants to have an independent dedicated coordinator. When railway IM’s are completely independent 
from the operator, which they already are in some countries, this is the case in the railway world as well. 
The IATA rules stipulate that half of the slots are given to airlines that already held slots in the previous 
equivalent (summer / winter) season (the grandfathering principle). In order to be eligible for such a claim, 
an airline must have used at least 80% of the allocated slots in the relevant period. Concerning railways, it 
seems that such a regulation can be implemented easily, giving new entrants a fair chance to establish 
themselves; and at the same time, it gives an incentive to incumbent operators to have trains running 
more often in order to preserve their slots. This could improve the service of public transport of which in 
the end the customer would take the benefits. However, this regulation could perhaps be applied to less 
than 50% of the slots, since it would presume a market volatility that the railway sector probably does not 
possess. 
IATA classifies aircraft operations into three different categories: Regular, Ad-hoc and other, in descending 
order of priority. Furthermore, ad-hoc operations are not eligible for grandfathering claims. Railned, the 
Dutch rail operations regulator, classifies the train operations in a similar way. Hourly-pattern operations 
have a higher priority than the daily ones, which in turn have a higher priority than the occasional ones. 
Obviously, there is a dilemma when dividing slots: in order to maximise usage of the infrastructure, the 
infrastructure manager will want to give out as much capacity as possible, within maintenance constraints. 
This does eliminate flexibility to meet with sudden changes in demand, however. 
The “use it or lose it” rule applies only to those slots that were allocated before the IATA deadline when 




IATA states that 50% of available slots must be allocated to entrants, unless the requests amount to less 
than 50% (in which case all requests of newcomers will be granted). However, this cannot result in the 
newcomer having more than four slots a day at that airport. Newcomer status is denied if the airline has a 
controlling interest in another airline that already obtained slots at that airport, or if an incumbent airline 
has a controlling interest in the “newcomer”.  All these regulations can be easily transformed into railway 
regulations, if so desired. 
Newcomers can be less choosy when it comes to exact timing of slots: times can vary up to two hours 
from the original request. Furthermore, requests for extending existing operations receive priority over 
requests for new slots. All of this will fit the railways very well, since it matches the current situation 
practised by railway regulators. 
 
Additional criteria for slot allocation 
In case no agreements are made, IATA has the following additional criteria: 
 
·  Schedules that cover a longer period of operation will receive priority. Completely implementable by 
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·  Size  and  type  of  market:  domestic/regional/long-haul  market  must  be  served  in  a  healthy  and 
appealing mix. Well implementable by railways. 
·  Competition: slots are allocated in a way that will boost competition. Can be implemented in railways. 
·  Curfews: when a curfew at an airport creates a problem elsewhere, the affected airline will receive 
priority. Might be less of an issue at railways, since train services can be shortened more easily at late 
hours than flights. 
·  Requirements of the travelling public and other users: the equivalent of the PSO, in practice giving 
passenger trains an advantage over freight trains. 
·  Frequency of operation: higher frequency does not imply higher priority in aviation. However, for trains 
this might be a different story, considering the Public Service Obligation. 
·  Local Guidelines: to be discouraged according to IATA, and not relevant in national railways, with the 
exception of shunting licences: there are cases known where a municipality withdrew the licence for 
freight operators to shunt in the city centre. This is not normal practice, though. 
 
Integral slot allocation: “Acoustic Timetable” 
In The Netherlands, currently there is a so-called “Acoustic Timetable”, a computer program that uses the 
train timetable and rolling stock characteristics as input to calculate the total noise “pollution” that rail traffic 
generates. Rolling stock, and especially engines, are already classified using four categories, similar to the 
ICAO noise chapters in aviation. Currently, there is a new version under development, anticipating a new 
law that will put an upper limit on noise pollution by trains. As soon as the new law is implemented, noise 
pollution will become a crucial element in slot allocation, especially concerning freight trains, since they 
are generally noisier. If an operator cannot operate more freight trains because of reaching the noise limit, 
there will be a strong incentive to invest in new, more silent rolling stock.  
This Acoustic Timetable was implemented earlier by Amsterdam Schiphol Airport, and has led to major 
changes in slot requests, so that at some point the Dutch Traffic Minister even threatened to close 
runways if the violations of the noise constraints continued. Currently, a new system is implemented where 
noise is actually measured by microphones instead of being calculated as a function of flight paths. The 
old system did not distinguish between overflying residential areas and industrial areas, whereas the new 
system measures noise mainly in sensitive, densely populated areas. 
 
5.5.4     Managing the relationship between IM and RU in the scope of Slot Allocation  
With  regard  to  the  legitimate  expectations  from  the  railway  demand side  (Railway  Undertakers),  the 
following aspects should deserve special attention in the application of slot allocation: 
 
·  The  preferred  duration  of  the  contracts  between  infrastructure  managers  and  train  operating 
companies differs considerably between parties. In order to make an investment in rolling stock 
worthwhile for a train operator, the operator will want to have a long contract in order to guarantee 
stability of fees; the infrastructure manager on the other hand will want to maximise flexibility by 
having contracts as short as possible. Grandfathering partly solves this problem, but will also act as a 
barrier against new operators entering the market. 
·  Slot allocation presumes a free market with competing parties. In the case of railways, the market 
might  simply  not  be  big  enough  for  genuine  competition,  as  in  the  case  of  scarcely  populated 
countries. To reach the full economic and operational potential of slot allocation in these cases might 
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·  Some IM’s still have very cosy relationships with the national railway operators. This does not benefit 
the entrants, and will hamper the full development of competition. Non-discriminatory treatment for 
different operators is absolutely essential. 
·  An integrated international market for slot, freight or passenger, would certainly remove barriers for 
railway transport and make it a more competitive transport mode. 
·  Penalty systems could be applied, but determining how much damage is caused by a delay is very 
difficult; the time of the delay is a factor but also the number of trains affected by the delay. Finally it is 
not  always  clear  who  is  responsible  for  delays.  However  practical  systems  can  be  developped, 
accepted by both parties and put into practice, as the example of the private concession of Fertagus 
in Portugal clearly shows. 
·  A well-functioning and flexible system must be offered to the various operators, rules that are imposed 
should be considered fair, operators must perceive to be using a good product. New systems are only 
accepted if they work well. 
￿  Flexibility from the IM side in allocating alternative paths, allowing operators to meet sudden changes 
in  demand;  and  flexibility  with  re-routing  in  case  of  sudden  obstructions  or  other  unexpected 
problems. 
￿  Clear and up-to-date information from the IM side, providing the operators with transparent conditions, 
options and possibilities through high-quality Business-to-Business (B2B) information systems. 
 
The following table summarises what may be understood as major flaws and strengths looking at the 
above mentioned procedures: 
 
Table 6: Strengths and weaknesses of slot allocation 
STRENGTHS  WEAKNESSES 
·  Best utilisation of available infrastructure  ·  Vulnerability to delays 
·  Good representation of true demand for capacity  ·  Inflexibility 
·  Effective management tool  ·  Mismatches at national borders 
·  Procedural transparency  ·  Uncertainty among operators concerning investments 
  ·  Responsibilities in case of delays not obvious 
  ·  Potential unfairness towards newcomers 
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6  Charging procedures – potentials and pitfalls 
 
6.1  Complex issues regarding charging procedures 
6.1.1  Peak vs. off-peak prices 
Because of congestion and under the road sector background, the slot allocation in railways requires the 
introduction of peak/ off peak pricing system. In road sector, to make each traveller face the marginal 
social cost of her trip, it is necessary to levy a charge equal to the difference between that marginal cost 
and the portion of average variable cost that is already borne by the traveller. The marginal value of time 
depends on the total time for the trip. To evaluate the value of time, we can use market segmentation (the 
sample  is  divided  into  segments  according  to  willingness  to  pay,  to  the  demand  elasticity).  Another 
solution is to postulate a functional form for utility that determines how the marginal value of time varies. 
If an operator’s time value is close to the average, he will incur the “toll payment” that everyone is faced 
with. If an operator’s time value is higher (lower) than average, he would be willing to pay more (less) than 
the average “toll payment” for taking a slot. During the peak period, the demand for trips exceeds capacity. 
With a fixed capacity, the infrastructure manager can propose a higher tariff during the peak period in 
comparison with a lower tariff in off period. In accordance with his willingness to pay, the operator will 
make her choice in terms of slot buying. As long as there are buyers for all the previously specified trains 
(slots),the revenue of the infrastructure manager is maximised. 
 
6.1.2  Handling of quality diversification  
Diversification produces different kinds of trains and traffic on the same track or on the same network. We 
will address in this part of the report how various kinds of traffic and various kinds of trains might or should 
be handled by the slot allocation process together with the pricing scheme.  
First,  we  have  to  define  to  what  extent  the  diversification  of  traffic  and  trains  might  lead  to  some 
economics problems. Then we will try to analyse what might be the possible solutions.  
This will be done for: 
·  Infrastructure costs; 
·  Scarcity costs; 
·  The nature of the passengers or goods on the train.  
 
The infrastructure costs  
The first question is related to the different characteristics of trains, as they are the causes of different 
costs. Trains might vary according to their physical characteristics: axle weight, average speed, length and 
so forth. Each of those characteristics possibly leads to some additional costs. Weight causes some 
additional maintenance and renewal costs. Higher speed also causes some additional costs. Maximum 
curvature of track for example is linked to the maximum speed allowed on this track. Obviously, some 
costs are also directly linked to the length of the trains. 
Concerning those characteristics of trains, the principle should be that each train should be allocated to a 
group of trains, according to the cost of operating every kind of train. Ideally, if we suppose that the 
principle of marginal cost is applied, each category of train should bear the additional costs it is causing.  Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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In  certain networks,  this  pricing  mechanism  might lead  to  specialize  some part  of  the  network,  with 
different geometric characteristics. On some very busy routes, it makes sense to have two lines: one for 
slow trains (freight and commuter passengers) and one for fast trains (long distance passengers). The 
opportunity for such an investment might be not seen if the charging system does not identify and allocate 
the costs.  
 
The scarcity costs  
There seems to be some confusion about the concept of scarcity costs. In this report scarcity costs are 
defined as the alternative value of slot.  Normally, this concept only comes up in a process of altering a 
fixed timetable. For free capacity the scarcity cost is the cost of using the slot instead of letting it be left 
unused  (as  no  other  operator  has  demanded  it).  This  cost  will  then  normally  consist  of  increased 
congestion costs/ delay costs. 
Where the demand for slots is greater than the supply, handling the diversity of the trains lead to take into 
consideration the speed, because the slot attributed to the train is bigger for a slow train. Theoretically, the 
price to be charged to the slow train is the opportunity cost of the slot or fraction of slots consumed. This 
means that it is necessary to have an idea of this cost. Without a kind of market mechanism for the slot 
allocation process, it is very difficult to have an idea of the willingness to pay for the slot attributed. One 
possibility might be to compensate the operator whose train is delayed or cancelled, with an economic 
calculation of the costs of delays and cancellation. But one should keep in mind that those economic 
calculations are not very accurate and are relying on rather rough assumptions. To a certain extent such a 
compensation mechanism could provide an incentive to allocate "efficiently" the slots: the low-value trains 
having a tendency to run on a period of time where the opportunity cost of the slots is lower. 
 
The diversity of traffic 
a) The welfare implication of delays or cancellations of trains 
In case of delays or cancellation, because of the slot allocation process, or because of delays imposed on 
another train, the consequences, in terms of welfare for the society, might greatly differ.  
One of the first reasons is that different alternate modes of transport might be relevant and more or less 
easily used. A compensation mechanism to the end user of the train, and channelled through the operator 
might provide both an incentive and a fair solution to the crowding out effect.  
But the private cost of a train delayed or cancelled is different of the cost born by the society, notably 
because of externalities. A kind of penalty might be charged upon the operator (and finally the end user) 
and thus provide a kind of internalisation of the externalities. Of particular concern are, depending of the 
countries, the environmental externalities (local and global) and the accidents, with a value of life to be 
decided by the political authorities.   
b) The contribution to the objectives of the charging system 
It is desirable to have consistency between: 
·  The infrastructure charging system, 
·  The slot allocation process; 
·  The handling of quality diversification  
 
It follows that some of the objectives of the infrastructure charging system may constrain the handling of 
different quality of traffic. Notably, if we suppose that one of the aims of the charging system is to recover 
the costs of investment, it makes sense to charge the traffic according to the willingness to pay.  In other 
terms, price discrimination can be introduced in order to finance some investment.  Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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As a conclusive remark, we stress the fact that various factors might lead to differentiate access charges 
for different kinds of trains or traffic. The general objective should be to recover some sorts of costs, 
including external costs. The most controversial practice (at least in relation to current practice) could be to 
discriminate the access to the infrastructure according to the willingness to pay in order to maximize the 
return on investment.  
 
 
6.1.3  Handling of delays and risk of delays 
Background and principles  
The main principle we propose for delays is to compensate the different entities involved in the delays. 
That means that it is necessary to calculate the costs for the different parties. The regular courts might do 
this, but some basic computations are possible and a special arbitration body might intervene in case of 
disputes or of more complex circumstances than those assumed in the basic computations..  
We are only dealing with the delays caused by the infrastructure manager without any doubt. If the 
different parties do not agree on the responsibilities for the delays, an arbitration or judiciary body, with the 
expertise  capability,  should  pronounce  judgement.    Alternatively,  when  there  are  doubts  on  the 
responsibilities but no big damages have occurred, a 50/50 split may be used with lower costs of the 
allocation error than would have been the costs of the arbitration process. This is the practice in the 
contract of Fertagus, the private concessionaire of a suburban link in Portugal. 
It is necessary to distinguish between: 
·  A  delay  that  was  foreseen  at  the  signature  of  the  contract  between  the  operator  and  the 
infrastructure manager and thus included, with a compensation mechanism, in this contract. A 
quality of service clause in the contract should make sure that the delays covered by the contract 
do not exceed a certain level. The economic theory of contract is relevant to analyse those kind 
of contract, but this is somewhat out of the scope of this report.  
·  A delay exceeding the contractual level and thus requiring a special appraisal of the damaged 
inflicted to the operators and the final clients. In this case, two situations are to be distinguished: 
o  The delay is anticipated and the users can take any appropriate measure to mitigate the 
effect of the delay; 
o  The delay is occurring without notice and thus the user of the infrastructure have to bear 
the full consequences of the delay.  
 
We will now address the question of the appraisal of the costs of the delays (detour included). The cost of 
a delay is to be valued with reference to a regular timetable, "contractual" delays included. The delays are 
to be assessed for all the trains delayed, and thus an important delay leads to numerous trains being 
delayed and to an important compensation.  
 
Assessment of the costs of delays  
In the cost of a delay, the following parties are to be taken into account: 
·  the state  
·  the client (the operator) 
·  the final clients  
·  passengers  
·  shippers  Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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In case of frequent unanticipated delay we suggest to consider the cost of a permanent delay.  
The main problem is an occasional unanticipated delay, which might be the cause of tremendous costs for 
the operators and the shippers. Great Britain is an interesting market where some experience has been 
gained. See examples in section 7.4. Anyway, more research is needed. 
 
1.  The costs of delays might be calculated by an arbitration body; having the required expertise  
2.  This calculation is likely to lead to high cost estimates. This is the reason why some contracts 
should be established in order to foresee the compensation in case of possible delays 
3.  The most important case is the unanticipated and occasional delay that can disrupt totally an 
industrial process; given the possible costs and the corresponding compensation, an independent 
IM obviously needs insurance.  
4.  The calculation of the costs of the delays could help the infrastructure manager to manage the 
risks of delays, delaying more the trains with low costs of delay.  
 
6.1.4  Handling of additional trains to scheduled trains asking for slot 
Handling of additional trains asking for a slot is especially linked with delays and risk of delays analysis, 
peak-off peak pricing system, quality diversification. In other words, the integration of additional trains 
depends on the demand for trains already accepted. 
Handling of additional trains consists of in the evaluation of the “opportunity cost”, per unit of slot sold, for 
an  additional  demand  for  a  slot.  This  new  demand  is  a  marginal  and  variable  one,  which  may  be 
calculated for each slot. 
For maximising profit, the infrastructure manager or the regulator body should minimize this opportunity 
cost.  
This additional demand evaluation depends on different constraints, as the following: 
·  Capacity constraints: technical conditions (capacity in number of trains, type of line, type of train, 
maintenance operations), level of congestion on this slot. 
·  Security constraints: maximal speed, signalling etc 
·  Quantity and quality of the demand already accepted: additional demand is links with the demand 
already fixed. So this new demand does not modify the quality (in terms of speed for example) or 
the quantity (in terms of the capacity in the number of trains) of the previous demand. Precisely, 
the risk of supplementary delays because of this new demand must be equal to zero. This 
additional demand can be based on a “forecast probability distribution”.  
The evaluation of the opportunity cost underlines the capacity of the infrastructure manager or the body 
regulator both to allow, to react and to anticipate the additional demand. In this way, it seems to be 
necessary to preserve a flexible percentage or part of the contract for this additional allocation demand (or 
for new negotiation). Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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6.2  Timetabling and slot allocation: Examples from Germany and UK 
This section provides an insight into track allocation procedures that are performed up to now. It is focused 
on the problem, how slot requests are brought into an order in the timetabling process and what happens, 
if the conflict cannot be solved.  
The  timetabling  process  is  described  for  two  developed  markets  –  UK  and  Germany.  Whereas  the 
Infrastructure Manager in the UK is completely independent from TOC´s, the German IM is part of the DB 
Holding, which also keeps the TOCs of DB under the same umbrella. In the recent months, the slot 
allocation rules set up by DB provoked a conflict that finally had to be solved by a decision of the Railway 
authority. The decision revealed the discriminating potentials of the procedures performed up to now. 
Pricing the railway infrastructure becomes more complex when there are certain routes and/or certain 
times for which some path requests of different train operators exclude each other. Then a mechanism 
has to be found, that decides which operator gets the right to use the infrastructure as requested. 
This path conflict always existed. In the former state monopolies it was solved internally. In most state 
railways there should have been a hierarchical timetable production, with the paths for fast long-distance 
passenger trains being implemented firstly, followed by the regional and local passenger trains. Freight 
traffic would then be assigned the leaving capacity with slow paths that often are interrupted by other 
traffic. 
This allocation rule is no longer sufficient even from a purely administrative point of view, when several 
train operators with different products seek to use the infrastructure. The European Directive 2001/14/EC 
on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges for the use of railway 
infrastructure and safety certification [EP 2001/14] inspires the development of new allocation rules, but 
does not give any guidelines on specific allocation criteria.  Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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Figure 6: Current path allocation process in Germany 
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Figure  7  shows  the  current  allocation  process  for  Germany,  which  should  be  similar  in  many  other 
European countries. The core of the process illustrated is the processing of the path requests by the 
infrastructure company (or by a capacity manager).  
First the IM publishes a general infrastructure charging system and a “network statement” describing the 
state of infrastructure and external timetable restraints, e.g. from European timetabling. Based on this the 
TOC´s plan their services and form their slot requests to the IM, at the latest 8 months before the next 
change of timetable. The IM processes (sorts) the path requests by internal rules, partly given by public 
law. Without conflicts, the timetable can be produced. In case of conflicts, the IM can reject certain 
conflicting slot requests or propose altered routings. If the TOC accept the alternative routing(s), the 
timetable can be produced. If not, a round table of IM, TOC´s and the authority (Eisenbahnbundesamt) is 
organised as a kind of mediation process. If the round table comes to a common solution, the timetable 
can be produced. If not, the EBA has to decide if one service is to be classified as regular service whereas 
the conflicting service is an irregular one. In that case the regular service would have the priority. If none 
or both services are regular, the final allocation has to be decided within a bid process (cf. Section 8.4.2).  
The box below shows two different frameworks that are used by Railtrack for Great Britain today, and by 
DB Netz for Germany (and in a similar way by ÖBB for Austria). 
 






“Public decision criteria”  “Administrative priority criteria” 
According to §4 Railway Act 
·  Usage of the network in the most efficient and 
economical manner and in the interest of all 
users of railway services 
·  Maintaining and improving the levels of service 
reliability 
·  Maintaining and improving connections 
between railway passenger services 
·  Evenly spread services where demand is 
evenly spread over time 
·  Promoting competition 
·  Avoiding frequent timetable changes 
 
According to AEG (common railway law) 
·  Non-discrimination 
·  The needs of services with regular intervals 
have to be taken into account 
 
According to EIBV (regulation of the use of railway 
infrastructure) 
·  Timely requests served before delayed 
requests 
·  Paths bound by existing contracts before new 
requests 
·  Requests consistent with the service 
description1 before those which are not 
·  Regular (repeating) services before irregular 
services 
·  Long-run requests before short-run requests 
·  Long paths before short paths 
 
Additional criteria: 
The  duties  of  the  TOCs  through  their  franchise 
agreements have to be taken into account 
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Germany 
In autumn 2002, the German Nordwestbahn (NWB), a subsidiary of the French Connex Group and two 
public utility operators (Stadtwerke Osnabrück, Oldenburger Gesellschaft Verkehr und Wasser) requested 
slots for operations between Osnabrueck and Hannover and between Osnabrueck and Wilhelmshaven. 
The frequent service between Osnabrueck and Hannover should replace the former Interregio-traffic of 
DB, which was cancelled for financial reasons, from spring 2003 on. DB Reise&Touristik intended to 
substitute those Interregio-trains by Intercity-trains, where the ticket price is about 26% higher than on 
Interregio trains. Between Osnabrueck and Wilhelmshaven DB Cargo operates some irregular Cargo 
trains. 
DB Netz refused access to the slots because of missing capacities. In December 2002 the new Anti-
discrimination unit of the German Rail Regulator Eisenbahnbundesamt (EBA) decided that all slots have to 
be allocated to the NWB. For the cargo relation, the EBA stated a clear dominance of regular (repeating) 
passenger services before irregular cargo services, as it is also rules in the EIBV. 
For the passenger relation the EBA gave the instruction to DB Netz to allocate the slots in a sealed-bid-
auction within one week.  
The EBA-decision was perceived as a pilot decision. On the one hand, the EBA refused a dominance of 
grandfathered slots as ruled in the EIBV. On the other hand, the EBA enforced the first bid process for 
slots in Germany. The management of NWB feared that DB Reise & Touristik could offer any price in that 
bid process because the auction revenues would directly flow back into the DB Holding. However, in the 
end DB has not delivered a bid, so that the slots were allocated to NWB. 
The management of DB attacked the EBA decision verbally and legally at court. The EBA announced that 
it would file an appeal against any court decision different from its own decision. The court has not decided 
so far. According to the authority DB has done everything to delay the decision as much as possible. 
 
6.3  International traffic: Harmonisation of charges 
In Deliverable 1 of this project the current situation in Europe regarding charging was explored. A great 
variety of infrastructures charging systems are now in force in various European countries. The following 
section describes problems encountered caused by lack of harmonization of charges between countries. 
 
The subsidization problem  
For various reasons, the infrastructure charges might not cover the cost of providing an efficient quality 
and quantity of infrastructure. One reason might be that marginal cost principle is applied. The difference 
between the infrastructure charges levied and the cost has to be paid by any body in charge of financing 
this quasi-public good. Given the tax structure of the EU, it likely that the taxpayer of each country has to 
pay for his own infrastructure. There are some well-known problems in welfare redistribution effects of 
charging systems, subsidization and tax systems. One of them is the spill-over effect, where some non 
tax-payers, benefit form the public good because their location allow for that. But more specifically it is 
worth mentioning here: 
 
·  It is appropriate to have a link between the level of public good provided, the level of fees and the 
level of subsidies decided by an authority controlled by an elective power, where the taxpayers 
are also the voters and the beneficiaries of the public goods. It is an explicit choice to provide 
some special kind of quasi-public goods for some users. In the case of subsidization of rail 
infrastructure, the tax payer of a country with an efficient network and located in the centre of the 
EU could pay a lot for some trains just passing trough its network. This could lead to some wealth 
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·  There is another side of this subsidization/transfer problem. A possible solution is to phase out 
global subsidization and introduce fine tuned compensation. But, to diminish the subsidies, a 
national  government  might  be  tempted  to  increase,  beyond  what  corresponds  to  economic 
rationale, the fees for the foreign operators. This would create an allocation problem, and with 
risk for retaliatory reactions from other countries, this can lead to some inefficient situations 
analogous to the tariffs wars regarding international trade.   
 
We will address now more specifically the question of allocation of resources.  
 
The efficient allocation of resources 
We can analyse the question from different perspectives.  According to the strictest or strongest point of 
view, the same basic principles should apply everywhere, as there is a common market for goods and 
services. Transport costs and infrastructure charges are the prices to pay for a given service: there is no a 
priori reason that the price should be fixed with different methods in different countries, as any difference 
might lead to allocative inefficiency. Another way to look at the question of harmonization is to determine 
to which extent non-harmonization is costly, regarding the allocation of resources.  
The first misallocation of resources involved in non-harmonization of charges is the allocation of track 
capacity.  
As soon as there is scarcity of slots, and that some capacity investment might be needed, the question of 
the relevance of such investment is to be dealt with the consideration of alternate route, including the 
routes  via  different  countries.  It  follows  that  difference  in  infrastructure  charging  system  can  lead  to 
misallocation of investment in capacity, namely investing where it is not the most efficient.  
Another misallocation of resources regards the running costs of the train. If the fee is lower in a longer 
route, this route can be used instead of a shorter one. There is here the possibility of a loss of surplus, 
because of more running costs (energy, wear and tire, wages, etc.) 
 
The possibility of parallel competition  
This kind of competition seems to concern, firstly, the freight transport and it will be more relevant as the 
EU  expands  eastward.  If  there  are  no  harmonized  charges,  there  is  a  possibility  that  the  various 
infrastructure charges might preclude effective competition. It might be the case, for example, if a country 
has very high fees and that another one, for some various reasons, has very low charges. Even if parallel 
competition is not so important in a railways system with open access (Europe) as compared to a system 




6.4  Service quality and product differentiation 
The important thing for an optimisation of slot allocation procedure in railways is to allocate different slots 
with different quality of service. For example, the HGV line allows, in terms of travel time or comfort 
between point A and point B, a better quality of service than a regional line which is slower. 
Thus, the slot allocation procedure must integrate train segmentation according to the product. 
Firstly,  we  have  to  separate  two  type  of  “product”:  passenger  or  freight.  We  can  also  differentiate 
urban/regional/national passenger train and perishable/non perishable product for example. Even if the 
differentiation can bring up some opposition, the product differentiation can be quite precise (see WP5) 
and connect with the demand elasticity. 
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·  punctuality: when the punctuality of train decrease, then the quality of service decrease too. This 
characteristic needs an evaluation which integrates the methodology used for the delays and risk 
of delays calculation,  
·  speed: higher speed leads to the decrease of travel time, the quality of service is better. As the 
willingness to pay depends on value of time, the quality of service can be judged in reference of 
the train speed. 
·  comfort: the comfort (number of seating places, noise, frequency, information) is an element of 
the service quality, especially for passenger train. 
 
6.5  Possible obstacles for creating an efficient railway market 
6.5.1  Barriers to entry 
Even if the market is open and we have established a marginal cost scheme, there can still be barriers to 
entry. If there is a barrier to enter the railway market, marginal cost slot pricing may be insufficient to 
create more competition in the train operating market. 
A  barrier  to  entry  is  an  advantage  enjoyed  by  firms  already  in  the  market  that  makes  it  difficult  or 
impossible for other firms to enter. This is sometimes referred to as a relative barrier to entry. Legal and 
statutory monopoly rights will then make an absolute barrier to entry. What we discuss here is relative 
barriers to entry, since we are talking about relative disadvantages between competitors. We do not carry 
on this distinction in the further. A barrier to entry may be because of: 
 
1.  Legislation 
2.  Different cost structures 
3.  Capital market imperfections 
4.  Consumer loyalty 
 
It is known that there are few legislative obstacles to enter the market of freight and person transport on 
the tracks. Then why are there not more new train operating companies eager to enter the market? 
One answer is sunk costs. In competition with a company already in the market, an entrant will have a 
disadvantage. So, what are these sunk costs? 
First, one common type of sunk costs is costs related to poor financing. Even after the separation between 
provision of track and operation of trains, the train operators faces high fixed costs. The initial investments 
necessary to enter the markets are substantial. If potential rivals have limited ability to obtain financing to 
purchase the necessary capital, entry becomes more difficult. Possible entrants may not be able to finance 
the appropriate scale of operations. This will make them less competitive. Even if the new company 
succeeds in raising enough capital, the interest rate might be higher, because of a high risk-premium. This 
increases the marginal costs of the new entrant. 
Second, another sunk cost is the cost of advertising to get the new services known among the travellers. 
The third, and possible the most important one, is the second-hand value of the capital. A company that 
plans to enter the market will have to do the calculation of what will be the assets if the company fails and 
goes bankrupt. If these investments could be recovered after a bankruptcy, this would only be a problem 
of financing the investments. But if the value of the capital that needs to be sold after a bankruptcy is much 
less than the initial value, a substantial amount of money will be lost during the time that the company is 
able to operate. This risk will have to be covered by a risk premium on the interest rate paid the creditors, 
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If the company already present and the possible rivals have the same cost structure of their variable costs 
of operating, the rivals will have a disadvantage because of their initial sunk costs, and a price war 
(predatory pricing) will probably push the rival out of the market. If the financing of the new competitor is 
limited as must be expected in a deregulated market (The only provider of virtually unlimited financing are 
the governments), there will be possible to push the new rival out of business without running much risk of 
going bankrupt for the established company. 
If these structures are known in advance by the operating company in business, the rivals and the 
financing institutions, there is no surprise that new entrants to the train market are very few. 
 
6.5.2  Modelling Financing an operator’s investments to enter the railway market 
We present here a model that illustrates the financing of an operator’s entry to the railway market. Both 
the financing institution, hereafter called the bank, and the operator, called the borrower, who needs the 
funding are regarded as private profit-maximising firms. 
The  model  is  a  two-period  model.  The  first  period  has  subscript  zero.  In  this  period  the  necessary 
investments to get into business are accomplished. In the second period, with subscript one, the operator 
is  either  running  or has been  declared bankrupt.  The  operator’s  revenue in  period one  is  known  in 
advance. The bank and the operator are risk-neutral. The set of variables is presented below: 
 
Table 7: Set of variables for model for barriers of entry 
Variable  Explanation   
p   Borrowers Profit   
X  Gross Revenue for the operator in period one when in business.   
p  Probability for the loans granted in period zero is paid back in period one. That is, the 
operator has not gone bankrupt. 
 
K  Necessary investments to enter the market as a train operator.   
A  The operators share capital   
L  The operators loan capital  K=A+L 
R  Interest rate paid to the bank   
I  Interest rate   
r  The bank’s rate of return   
b  Losses connected to bankruptcy   
 
The borrowers profit in period one is: 
( ) ( )L r p Xp + - - + = 1 1 0 p , if p³0 
0 = p , otherwise 







1 ˆ  
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The bank’s expected gross profit E(j), is shown below: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) p F b dp p pf X p F r L E
p
ˆ ˆ 1 1
ˆ
0
× - + - + = ￿ j  
 
The bank has two instruments to maximize their profit: L and r. 
Differentiating the profit function by r gives us: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
r
p
p f b p F L E
¶
¶
× - - =
ˆ
ˆ ˆ 1 j  
The first part of this expression is positive. This represents the increase in payments to the bank when the 
interest rate increases. The second part is negative and represents the higher risk of bankruptcy when the 
interest rate is increased. Setting this equation equal to zero, gives us the first order condition for optimum. 
The first order condition gives us an optimal r called r*. 
 






r =  
 
Obviously, the bank has some minimum acceptable rate of return. We see that then both the interest rate 
and the maximum amount of loan are given. We call the maximum loan available for the operator LM. If LM 
is greater than K, the operator will be able to finance the necessary investments. If not, The operator will 
need additional financing, typically shares. The condition for entry to the market for the operator is 
 
K A L
M ³ +  
 
What cost elements are parts of K? 
One major element is the purchase/ leasing of the rolling stock. Another element is all planning and 
investments that needs to be done in order to be able to plan a time-table for the routes. Here, the 
governmental demands for the financial and safety situation are of great importance. Another element is 
the money needed in order to stay solvent before the business starts paying off. In an industry of this scale 
we can conclude that this time period may be substantial.  
In which ways can the government influence these decisions in a liberalized economy? In order to answer 
this question we need to find which variables that directly affect the financing of the operators investments. 
‘b,r,L,A,p,K,X,r. 
 ‘b’ is a very central variable. We have seen how this variable directly affects the bank’s decision. We will 
claim  that  this  variable is  a key  variable  to  make  the  railways  more  efficient,  and  that  it  is  already 
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Obviously, national rules and standards on infrastructure and rolling stock leads to a reduction of the 
second hand value of rolling stock. In fact, for some countries the only buyer of the rolling stock of a 
bankrupt company may be the competitor that drove the company out of business in the first place. This 
will  obviously  lead  to  a  dysfunctional  second  hand  market,  (The  original  company  will,  through  the 
bankruptcy of the rival, not only resume operation without competition, but also receive a reward in the 
form  of  heavily  discounted  material),  and  therefore  destroy  the  possibility  for  competition.  Thus,  an 
adjustment of the national rules to a set of joint standards for the community and eventually also for 
adjacent countries, will improve the second hand market for rolling stock, and thus increase the possibility 
for competition on track. This is an example of a technological type of barriers to entry, not yet totally 
phased out. 
All traffic on the tracks needs to be allocated in time and space. The Railway Infrastructure manager 
normally does this. If this process is slow and full of obstacles of different kinds, the cost for the company 
that needs to get a positive money flow may be dramatically high. Worse, if the national new railway sector 
has been ruled by a major company for many years, there might be personal bindings through earlier 
employment etc, leading to that the first company present has certain advantages. 
L, A and K can be influenced by public funding or by adjustments of the financial claims by the authorities 
to grant access to the railways. 
X can be influenced in multiple ways. By avoiding unhealthy competitive situations, that is to secure a 
certain level of ticket revenue and reducing uncertainty about this revenue, the provision of necessary 
capital will be easier. The government can also improve new entrants possibilities to succeed, by giving 
the operator lower variable costs e.g. by reducing the rail access fees, and further by providing some 
subsidies connected to the traffic. This can off course be done in multiple ways. PSO-contracts is one 
example. 
So, how do these facts impact on the cost structure? Obviously, we are here talking about both changes 
upwards in the fixed investments costs and the marginal costs (e.g. the additional risk premium on the 
loans). Thus, a period of predatory pricing from the already present company is likely to succeed. Studying 
the case of a perfectly competitive market, where prices equals marginal costs, we can easily see that 
higher marginal costs for any entrant will make entry to the market impossible. 
 
Comparison between a post-monopoly company versus a new entrant. 
There is a common feature of the liberalised markets of transport and communication. Just a few years 
ago, in many European countries, telephony, railway and post were all provided by a single state owned 
company. All across Europe these monopolies have been opened up for competition. The old monopoly 
companies have had to learn to compete in a more liberalised market. The entrant lacks the knowledge, 
brands and markets of the former monopolist, but has the advantage of being able to optimally adjust 
number of- and qualifications of personnel and do the optimal investments taking a competitive situation 
into consideration. The last years have shown us that the original firms have done well in this situation, 
and that new competing firms have had problems to enter the market. Especially for railways this seems to 
be the case. This can lead us into suspicion that some characteristics of the railway market make the 
position of being well established in the markets an advantage.  
Clearly, this is also the case in our model. Initially, the situation in many European countries was that a 
monopolist running on a deficit covered by the state operated the railways. Thus, for the investments 
made in that period the risk of the investments were zero, the railway operating company could not go 
bankrupt. In this period substantial investments have been done. Not only in infrastructure, but also in 
rolling stock, maintenance plants, amenities in connection to stations etc. This capital stock might be a 
great  advantage  for  the  original  company,  making  it  hard  for  newcomers  to  compete.  The  risk  of 
bankruptcy for the settled company may still be close to zero. The total capital stock of the established 
company can function as A in our model, so that L – loan capital can be reduced. Therefore it will be 
easier for the established operator to make the necessary investments (that is invest to the capital level 
that maximizes profit per Euro) than for any newcomer. This will not be so if there are pending debts in the Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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former monopoly which are not fully underwritten by the State: in that case, additional borrowing by the 
established operator may be very difficult and expensive.  
 
Are discounted slots a good idea? 
If slot prices are designed to reflect the marginal costs (long term or short term) there is obviously no way 
that pricing under the marginal costs will lead to cost recovery in the market. This is enough to conclude 
that pricing under marginal costs will not lead to a stable situation where governmental transfers are not 
needed. Opening up for temporal pricing principles in the slot allocation, gives us some freedom to reduce 
the burden that we have seen fall on an entrant to the railway market. 
 
Higher fixed costs can be compensated by 
1.  A lump sum transfer from the government to cover the entry costs of the new company 
2.  Tax reductions to increase overall profitability for the new company, or 
3.  Reduction in the marginal costs of production, that is reducing the price on the slots. 
 
A version of (1) is public funding to provide sufficient supply of railway services at special times and 
special places that a pure profit-seeking company would not find profitable. Is it possible to provide this 
funding for special companies without tendering the contracts? 
If the pricing principles of the slots are set equal to Long-term marginal costs, to make the slot revenue 
high enough to pay for renewal of tracks, a discount to one company automatically sets the price for the 
other competitors higher than LTMC. If the different companies run on different tracks, this can lead to 
some undesirable distributive effects for the passengers. 
The capital cost concepts used so far have only covered the costs regarding the tear and wear of the 
infrastructure. If the difference in interest rate between the established and the newcomer can be included, 
a market with two or more relative equal companies might be possible. 
The conclusion of this section is that a multi-operator environment is not a very likely situation for most 
railway lines. In order to increase the market share of the railways above what is experienced without 
public intervention, some financial advantages for the railway sector might have to be introduced. It is 
important to mark that these transfers should be incentive–neutral in all other extents than to favour the 
railways as a whole. The relative prices of slots, of infrastructure charges should be maintained in order to 
ensure efficient railway production. Through ownership, through public consumption of railway services 
etc. the public authorities are in position of favouring the railways. 
 
6.5.3  Market imperfections 
The  slot  allocation  procedure  will  allow  more  efficiency  (e.g.  competitiveness)  in  the  rail  transport. 
However this new objective will face with some market imperfection still existing in this sector. 
 
￿  One of the market imperfections is linked to the market power of each national company, which 
behave as they have some “grandfathers rights”. In fact, existing rail national operators possess 
natural monopoly characteristics such as economies of scale and have effective market power. The 
operator, who had the same slot in the previous timetable period, has priority rights to that slot in the 
next timetable period.  
￿  On a European level, network access is only guaranteed for a limited number of categories, i.e. 
international rail services operated by international groupings of railway companies and international 
inter-modal transport which have market power too. Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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￿  Due to safety requirements, the capacity of railways is relatively limited and under constraints.  
￿  Due to the technical rail requirements, time and space specific network access is determined in 
advance.  For  instance,  certain  users  or  user  groups  can  be  excluded  from  some  infrastructure 
elements (high speed lines only used by high speed passenger trains), or transit demand bring up 
specific problems (connexion, transit in different countries European or not…). 
 
As the European white paper (2001) said, there is a growing imbalance between modes of transport in the 
European Union. Most passenger and goods traffic goes by road. The flexibility of the car remains a 
“symbol of personal freedom in modern society” (White paper, 2001, p.23). Even if they are faced with 
congestion, road and air transports increase, while rail and short-sea shipping are yet impeded to become 




6.5.4  Priority rules in solving path conflicts 
During the slot allocation process, conflicting slot requests have to be solved by, for instance, negotiation, 
priority rules. 
To resolve conflict, one request is to try to reach an agreement with both parties. For instance, the 
allocation body can propose to modify the requested train paths, for instance by assigning a (slightly) later 
or earlier train path.  
In case of conflicting slot requests, different types of priority rules can be used to force a decision. For 
instance in France, the SNCF gives the priority of passenger trains over freight transport.  
Priorities rules can distinguish: service types, vehicle type, vehicle occupation, line type, traffic type, 
existing alternative or not. 
In practice, the infrastructure manager can specify a minimum or a maximum % (or random) of the 
capacity that can be assigned to each market segment. Directive 95/19/EC already had the possibility to 
adapt the tariff to the ' market situation' .  
Another solution is to give the priority to operators (trains) with high value-of-access has the priority over 
those with low value.  
In the Netherlands, the governments report (1999) suggests the following: 
·  priority for passenger transport during peak hours, with a guaranteed minimum 
·  capacity for freight transport; 
·  priority for freight transport in the evening/night, with a guaranteed minimum 
·  capacity for passenger transport. 
 
 
It details three sub-segments (ordered by decreasing priority): 
·  international high-speed trains (on high-speed lines) 
·  other international trains, mainline trains 
·  regional trains 
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However, conflicting capacity requests may also arise within one market segment, for instance between 
two competing freight companies. In this situation, the Dutch allocation body (Railned) considers selling 
this slot in an auction procedure (see Koolstra, 1999).  Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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6.6  Past, Present and Future of Track Allocation Rules 
6.6.1  Current Practice 
For the allocation of tracks today, mainly rules of thumb and political definitions are used to assess the 
“social value” of certain services. As a result, priority is given to  
 
·  Trains that are necessary for public service (F, NO),  
·  Trains that are part of regular / hourly service (NL, D),  
·  Trains that are operated by a TOC for which the infrastructure was built (F), 
·  International high speed trains over other forms of passenger transport (NL),  
·  Main transport over regional services at the main network (NL), 
·  Regional transport over main transport and charter traffic at the regional networks (NL), 
·  Grandfathered traffic prior to new traffic (D), 
·  Long-run request prior to short-run requests (D). 
 
Only in some states and some cases slot conflicts are solved by auction processes, which are for example 
UK and Germany  
Therefore systems in practise require definitions of network characteristics (high-speed network, main net-
work,  regional  network),  type  of  train  services  (main  services,  regional  services,  charter  services), 
regularity of services and public service. Without precise definitions of those slot allocation criteria, slot 
conflicts cannot be solved in a reliable manner. Even if those definitions are given TOC´s may have 
incentives to manipulate their service in order to gain priority over competing services. In the end, current 
data  used  for  solving  the  slot  allocation  problem  may  produce  serious  malfunctions.  Only  auction 
processes are free from that.  
 
6.6.2 Needed Rules for Track Allocation 
Auction Procedure 
Under perfect information the IM could assess the willingness-to-pay of each TOC rather well and would 
set an infrastructure charge (or an infrastructure scarcity surcharge) that will be accepted only by the TOC 
with the highest WTP. The track access fee and the tariff regulations are for all the same and they are 
published. Then transparency is essential to this procedure. 
With a fixed capacity, the infrastructure manager can propose a higher tariff during the peak period in 
comparison with a lower tariff in off peak period. 
In case of delays or cancellations, because of the slot allocation process, or because of delays due to 
another train, a kind of penalty might be charged upon the operator. The cost of a delay is to be valued 
with reference to a regular timetable, "contractual" delays included. The delays are to be assessed for all 
the  trains  delayed,  and  thus  the  delay  of  one  train  might  lead  to  numerous  trains  delayed  and  a 
considerable compensation. If the different parties do not agree on the responsibilities for the delays, an 
arbitration or judiciary body, with the expertise capability, should pronounce judgement. 
The main problem is an occasional unanticipated delay, which might be the cause of tremendous costs for 
the operators and the shippers. A special study would be needed. One solution is to set some limit for Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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what is referred to as an incident, which should be compensated, and what are major events, where 
compensating all parties seems unreasonable. 
The costs of delays might be subject to a standard computation rule for the typical cases, and calculated 
by an arbitration body, with the necessary expertise, when special cases come up. 
 
Market target 
The slot allocation procedure should differentiate slots according to:  
1.  Passenger/ freight 
2.  Urban/ regional/ national passenger trains  
 
This slot allocation procedure is linked to service quality, which are connected to: 
1.  Punctuality: methodology for the delays and risk of delays calculation is useful  
2.  Speed 
3.  Comfort 
 
One market imperfection is linked to the market power of each national company, which behave as they 
have gained certain “grandfathers rights”. The operator, who had the same slot in the previous timetable 
period, has priority rights to that slot in the next timetable period.  
An adjustment of the national rules to a set of joint technical standards for the community and eventually 
also for adjacent countries, will improve the second-hand market for rolling stock, and thus increase the 
possibility for competition on track.  
In  order  to  increase  the  market  share  of  the  railways  above  what  is  experienced  without  public 
intervention, some financial advantages for the railway sector might be introduced. It is important to mark 
that these transfers should be incentive–neutral in all other extents than to favour the railways as a whole. 
 
The implications of infrastructure charging systems and slot allocation mechanisms are not independent 
from each other. As Ewers et al. (2001) showed for the slot allocation problem in the airline industry, IM 
may either use charges to cash out an excess of demand over supply (ex ante) or use auction mecha-
nisms to allocate the free capacity to the user with the highest willingness-to-pay (ex post).  
Under the conditions of perfect information, perfect competition and independence of IMs and TOC´s both 
solutions lead to the same results: 
1. Under perfect information the IM could assess the willingness-to-pay of each TOC perfectly and would 
set an infrastructure charge (or an infrastructure scarcity surcharge) that will be accepted only by the TOC 
with the highest WTP. 
2. Under perfect information and perfect competition among IMs the (surcharge) will be set up to a level 
just crowding out the demand of the TOC with the second highest WTP. This will ensure that the TOC with 
the highest WTP will carry the opportunity costs of the final allocation result. 
3. Under perfect organisational separation of IM and TOC the setting of infrastructure charges is free from 
discrimination against certain TOC´s. 
 
In the real world, those conditions are not fulfilled. A perfect separation of IM from TOC´s will be achieved 
by the complete implementation of EU Directive 2001/14. In the meantime some infrastructure charging 
systems may contain some elements of discrimination. Moreover, competition among IMs will remain 
imperfect due to public subsidies and to the geographic extension of some networks. Scarcity oriented Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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charging therefore may lead to a “monopolistic crowding out” of some traffic. This recommends a certain 
caution with infrastructure charging systems from the regulatory view: IMs might have an incentive to set 
scarcity (sur-) charges in an exaggerated manner. As a result, of course, slot conflicts will not arise, but 
the  overall  level  of  railway  traffic  is  socially  not  optimal.  Regulators  will  have  to  prevent  such 
developments. 
However,  the main  problem of  IMs is imperfect information  about  the valuation of  traffics.  Only slot 
auctions are suitable to reveal the real WTP of certain conflicting traffics. However, some elements of 
infrastructure charging systems as performed up to now contribute to the avoidance of slot conflicts ex 
ante: An infrastructure charge containing a relative speed component contributes to a saving of capacities. 
Moreover it dissipates slot conflicts due to different speed requests. However, it cannot solve fundamental 
slot conflicts. 
Infrastructure charging systems which take into account the general traffic density or which contain a 
peak-load component set incentives to TOCs to reschedule traffic with lower WTP to the off-peak. This 
results in a reduction of potential slot conflicts. Moreover they lead to a self-selection of TOCs according to 
their WTP for certain services.  
All in all, slot coordination by infrastructure charging evokes a crucial conflict: On the one hand, low infra-
structure charges do not provoke a monopolistic crowding out of traffic, but additional slot conflicts. On the 
other hand, peak-load oriented infrastructure charges contribute to avoid slot conflicts, but may be abused 
for monopolistic purposes. 
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7  Data requirements 
7.1 Identification of relevant cost categories 
7.1.1 Overview 
In terms of getting hold on the various cost elements, there can be drawn a line between regular per 
kilometre costs like environmental costs, wear and tear and marginal costs of signalling etc. and costs that 
are functions of the whole railway activity.  These system costs are typically congestion costs (delay) and 
accident costs. Based on variable quality of models in different countries, we do not propose a general 
methodology  for  the  assessment  of  these  costs,  but  refer  to  the  cost  calculation  deliverables  of 
IMPROVERAIL.  Our  general  proposal  for  harmonisation  of  charges  is  to  use  SRMC-charging  in  all 
countries and include a surveillance organ and an information organ to control and increase the efficiency 
of these procedures. These organs are explained in section 7.5. The reason that we do not propose a 
clear  way  of  assessing  congestion  costs  is  that  we  are  not  proposing  a  single  track-allocation/  slot 
allocation procedure. As delays and accidents will vary according to the density as well as traffic pattern 
on  the  tracks,  these  costs  are  best  calculated  in  combination  with  models  for  timetabling  and  track 
allocation. We believe that a surveillance organ will reduce the risk of hiding charging schemes departing 
from SRMC-pricing. 
National  valuations  of  these cost  elements  vary.  Variations  in valuation  between  countries  are  not 
regarded as a problem. Different charging practices in different states, is on the other hand a problem. 
This might lead to suboptimal incentives of routing of trains etc.  Charges may vary but charging 
principles should not. 
As  seen  in  WP6,  the  costs  incurred  by  the  IMs  are  broadly  related  to  the  initial  capital  costs 
(depreciation and interests) for new investments and to running costs for Maintenance, Management 
Administration and, finally, to Asset Renewal. The definition for the latter is particularly relevant in this 
scope  given  that  replacement  of  assets  should  be  associated  to  major  upgrades  in  the  existing 
infrastructure, rather than with investment in additional elements of infrastructure, which should fall in the 
Capital Costs category. 
The Initial Capital costs includes all the costs of buying/building the physical asset and bringing it into 
operation and may be divided into three sub-categories of cost, namely: 
 
·  Purchase costs include assessment of items such as land, infrastructure and superstructure, fees, 
furniture and equipment. Current costs may be estimated by obtaining quotations from suppliers.  
·  Finance costs include the cost effect of alternative sources of funds.  
·  Installation/ commissioning/ training costs: installation of equipments, construction of the infrastructure 
etc. and the costs of training personnel to operate the equipments and the infrastructure. 
 
The Maintenance Costs include direct labour, materials, fuel/power, equipment and purchased services. 
Maintenance may be further broken down into smaller classifications such as: 
·  Regular planned maintenance 
·  Unplanned maintenance (responding to faults) 
·  Intermittent maintenance (for major refurbishment, other than renewals)  
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Presented below is a list referring to the Rail infrastructure cost estimation and the allocation process 
according to the HLG recommendations, which supported the identification of cost elements in the scope 
of IMPROVERAIL (see WP6 – Deliverable 8) 
 
COST DEFINITION   
 
Fixed costs:  
·  Land purchase 
·  Construction of new lines 
·  Upgrading/Enlargement of investments 
·  Overhead 
 
Partly variable costs 
·  Replacement investments 
·  Construction maintenance 
·  Operation 
·  Servicing and on-going maintenance. 
 
Pure variable costs: 
·  Security 
·  Scheduling/train planning 
 
COST CATEGORIES 
·  Land purchase 
·  Construction of new lines 
·  Upgrading/Enlargement of investments 
·  Overhead 
·  Replacement investments 
·  Construction maintenance 
·  Operation 
·  Servicing and on-going maintenance 
·  Scheduling/train planning 
 
COST DRIVERS 
·  Train categories:  
·  Freight trains (with sub-categories according to wagon load, combined transport, rolling road), 
Passenger trains (with sub-categories according to train type)  
·  Network categories:  
·  Electrified main lines, Non-electrified main lines, Electrified minor lines, Non- electrified minor 
lines (with further categorization according to type of traffic) 
 
Furthermore, this HLG considers a division of the network into main lines and minor lines with a separate 
treatment of electrified lines. The minimum standard typology is defined as: 
 
·  Short-distance passenger transport, 
·  Long-distance passenger transport and 
·  Freight. 
About Cost allocation, the HLG states: "It is possible to determine, which classes of wagons impose a 
particular damage to the track, and which (passenger/freight) demands different types of services. Whilst a 
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cost data implies that the top-down approach is more practical. Costs can be categorized and allocated or 
attributed according to general engineering relationship."   
 
This may be seen as a key sentence with regard to the development of any information system, as in our 
view reflects what has long been the solution for the lack of detailed cost management information about 
the railway infrastructure. Although the mentioned top-down approach may solve some problems it may 
definitely become a second best solution when new technology and integrated information systems are 
available.  This is, as already said, based on that the administration costs of an advanced bottom-up 
system are lower than the total system benefits of better cost-computations. 
 
Delays and congestion costs 
These cost elements are natural parts of any SRMC charging scheme. WP6 has more on this topic. 
Delays and congestion are system costs. It is difficult to measure these costs as the costs are functions of 
the total activity level and economical characteristics of the train causing the delay as well as other 
affected trains. Also congestion is a function of the total activity level. To complicate it even more, the 
costs are generally depending heavily on safety measures and block lengthsetc.  Data requirements for 
these costs are thus linked to the way that track is allocated to operators. The best way to calculate these 
costs is to use national models that includes all domestic traffic and assess consequences on delays and 
congestions  of  marginal  changes  in  activity.  It  is  natural  that  these  costs  are  calculated  for  minor 
subsections of track. 
 
Accident costs 
Accident  costs  are  normally  calculated  as  average  per  kilometre  costs.  This  methodology  seems 
reasonable and is also presented in WP6. Lowering expected accident costs might increase delays and 
level of congestion. Therefore: to measure these costs factors correctly demands a model that assesses 
the value of all traffic as well as the marginal costs of departing from schedule for all involved persons and 
vehicles.  
 
Economic Principles and Cost Categories 
According to economic theory and to EU-Directive 2001/14, rail infrastructure charging systems should 
reflect the (short run) marginal costs of use and may raise an additional capital cost coverage factor to 
finance partly or fully the residual costs. EU-Directive 2001/14 says that path conflicts in infrastructure 
bottlenecks have to be solved by auctioning mechanisms. In theory, in a well-designed auction scheme, 
the revenues of path auctions will reflect the scarcity costs or the opportunity costs of infrastructure 
bottlenecks. As auctioning systems are only possible in multi-operator environments, still rare in the world 
today, an alternative may be to perform a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) after setting the charges without the 
scarcity costs. In a well-performed CBA the best allocation should be revealed. Future infrastructure 
charging systems should incorporate the short run marginal costs (SRMC). 
There are some difficulties with the concept of scarcity costs. In an auction procedure, the scarcity 
cost can be defined as the alternative value of a slot used. Also the value of the most valuable train that 
does not get the privilege to use the track can be called scarcity costs. In this way, scarcity cost reflects 
the cost of having limited capacity. 
As a short term marginal cost component scarcity costs must be equal to the marginal increase in the 
average system costs of one more train being granted access to the track. Thus, scarcity cost is a 
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In systems where auction procedures are not the way that track is allocated, adding huge scarcity cost 
components  is  a  highly  questionable  practice.  We  should  remember  that  SRMC  does  not  include 
components to finance long-term development of the infrastructure. 
In addition, if political and financial decisions indicate a capital cost coverage factor might be added.  As 
shown in preceding chapters, such elements that raise charges above SRMC will make the solution sub-
optimal in terms of economic efficiency. Even the most cost-efficient national railway system may still 
be unprofitable for a given output. If authorities make political decisions on the level of provision of 
railway services, the effect of capital cost coverage factors may only be an equal rise in needs for 
subsidies. Therefore, in case of railway subsidies, high capital cost coverage factor will reduce public 
transfers to the IM but increase the subsidies to the operators. High capital cost coverage factors demand 
profitable TOCs. In this case, capital cost coverage factors are a way to transfer some of the operators’ 
profit to the IM.  In this case, the capital cost coverage factor must be set by a party that has the 
necessary knowledge to set the right charges.  
Auctioning  procedures  might  be  used  in  multi-operator  environments  for  allocating  scarce  capacity. 
Capacity at bottlenecks might be especially fitted for allocation by auctions. 
The costs of accidents and the environmental externalities are also part of the social marginal costs. 
Frameworks  wherein  those  externalities  are  estimated  are  needed  in  order  for  externalities  to  be 
internalised through charges. 
The aim of the harmonisation of infrastructure charges is to adapt the existing charging systems to the 
system characteristics sketched above. This structural harmonisation is also expected to contribute to 
more transparency of charging systems in particular on a cross border contexts. Marginal costs are 
thoroughly discussed and explained in earlier chapters. 
 
Assessing the relevance of different categories 
Although the investment costs may be considered as the most relevant cost category when looking at the 
amounts involved, it is the component of ”running costs”, related to maintenance and normal operation, 
that should concentrate most of the attention of the information systems. In the end, these are the costs 
that can be controlled on a day-to-day basis, from which will depend the self-sustainability of the business 
operation. Besides, an in-depth knowledge of what is going in a systematic way represents an invaluable 
asset in order to minimise the overall lifecycle costs associated to the provision of infrastructure. These 
costs (borne by the IM) have been divided in WP6 as follows:  
·  Ongoing maintenance costs (those maintenance measures which have a life expectancy of less that 
one year and which are consequently not to be capitalised), 
·  Operation costs (for example: signalling, lighting, cleaning, personnel cost for switch-boxes at rail 
lines) 
·  Administration costs, mainly consisting of overheads of infrastructure providers, traffic police costs, 
traffic control, time tabling, planning.  
 
The main driving factors for the ongoing maintenance are the maintenance standards (level of service), 
the  maintenance  philosophy  applied,  the  level  of  technical  progress  and  the  climate  conditions.  For 
operating costs, the level of service and the institutional background (important for the level of personnel 
costs) are important driving factors. Institutional background influences administration costs. 
Having  determined  the  key  causes  of  the  various  costs,  it  is  clearly  important  from  an  efficiency 
perspective to be able to pass these costs on as closely and as accurately as possible to those who 
impose them.  For rail, it is possible to determine which classes of wagons (according to weight and 
speed) impose a particular damage to the track. Whilst a detailed model linking costs to users through Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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such relationships is ideal, the aggregated nature of most infrastructure cost data implies that the top 
down approach is more practical.  WP6 gives a framework for suitable cost categories. Again, we stress 
that it is only marginal costs and not the full costs that should be charged. 
 
Furthermore, 3 main groups of factors may be distinguished that contribute to the deterioration of railway 
infrastructure: 
 
·  Use: wear by physical contact, static and dynamic load 
·  Environment: climatic influence, water 
·  Failures: faulty components, bad construction 
 
In accordance with the methodology developed in WP5, the deterioration of components mainly depends 
of  the  use,  or  load  (traffic),  namely  on  the  track  and  switches.  Therefore,  a  short  overview  of  the 
deterioration process in relation to the life span is available hereunder: 
 
Deterioration – Dynamic Restoration of the railways infrastructure under load dependent wearing 
By far the most significant factor contributing to the deterioration is the dynamic load. The dynamic load is 
directly related to the axle load and track geometry. The two elements are closely linked in the complex 
process of deterioration: 
 
Figure 8: : Restoration and deterioration processes 






The deterioration of material contributes significantly to the deterioration of the track geometry, which in 
turn produces higher dynamic loads on the material, which accelerates the degradation of the material. 
The degradation curve of a generic railways track component is shown by the figure below. Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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According to the figure above, the life of such components can be divided into three distinctive parts:  
 
·  youth 
·  intermediate life  
·  old age.  
 
During youth, the component experiences substantial deterioration due to track settlements. After a while, 
the importance of degradations diminishes and the component starts its intermediate life. When reaching 
the end of its lifetime, the component undergoes higher degradations: it' s the old age period. 
A more accurate description of this topic will be available in the final reports for WP5 and WP6. For 
calculation of marginal costs of specific train types different models and practices are developed and are 
continuously improved throughout Europe. 
 
Requirements for data quality and reliability 
In the attempt to overcome flaws in the Information Systems, it is rather common to obtain proxies for Cost 
Assignment by means of Top-Down approaches in the absence of a better option based on suitable cost 
breakdown and correct assignment.  In fact and since some costs may be fully assignable to specific 
activities/drivers while other costs, such as overheads, are hardly assignable in a fair and efficient manner 
to their effective cost drivers, costs are usually broadly divided in two categories: 
  
·  Direct Costs: costs that may be assigned with reasonable accuracy to the activities performed by the 
IM. All costs sharing this characteristic are able to support the grounded application of methodologies Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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relying on variability of the costs according to the level of activity and, ultimately, the thorough 
application of the marginal cost concept. 
 
·  Indirect Costs: this category comprises all the costs that for some reason such as lack of information 
cannot be assigned to the level of activities performed by the IM.  Whenever the need for assignment 
arises, these costs are usually spread across several activities, most of the times based on a rough 
estimation of their relative contribution to their magnitude.  When this happens, it is understood that 
the causal link between cost drivers and costs themselves is lost.  Although usually supported by 
some statistical information or expert opinion, what in fact is obtained along this process may be seen 
as mere guesses, while the major risk is the fact that such guesses and their consequences tend to 
remain unchanged along the years, regardless of any changes that may occur in the railway system 
with an impact in the initial framework. A classical example of Indirect costs that usually play a 
significant role in the Railway Infrastructure are wages.  
 
Again, see WP5 and WP6 reports for state-of-the-art of cost categorisation. 
 
7.1.2 Regulatory environment 
The way railways are organised affects how charging principles should be applied. Following are three 
archetypes of railways organisation 
 
Three different regulatory regimes 
The railway sector is, and will forever be, a sector that needs public control in order to function in a way 
that ensures efficient provision of railway services. This fact is related to: 
·  Externalities 
·  Limited competition 
·  Significant risk of harmful predatory behaviour between market contestants 
·  Building and designing railways, station areas etc. affects land use and urban planning to an extent 
where public participation in the decision process is absolutely necessary. 
 
These points are independent of profitability and ownership of railways. 
In addition: In most railway systems, one or more of the following elements create needs for public 
regulation of railway activity. 
·  Price regulation of end-user prices in order to ensure end-user welfare. Price regulation may have 
many different motivations, such as interregional equity, maximum price regulations etc. 
·  Price regulation of infrastructure services. These regulation of these prices may be caused by political 
will to ensure non-discriminatory treatment of different operators as well as wishes to maximise the 
number of operators on track 
·  Public funding of investments in railways 
·  Indirect public funding of railways by guarantying the conduct of IMs or operators 
·  Public responsibility through ownership of railway entities 
·  Politically set levels of railway services, which normally will lead to a need for subsidizing specific 
routes.  Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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The list could be made even longer. The important lesson to learn is that no matter how advanced and 
competitive a specific railway industry is, the first set of bullets will always apply. There will always be 
important externalities in production and consumption that needs proper regulatory measures in order to 
be internalised. There will also be, linked to the huge investments needed in order to provide rolling stock, 
necessary certificates etc. room for only a handful competitors within a market. Therefore, the need to 
ensure that market power is not exploited through cartels etc. will always be present. Finally, there will be 
a need for surveillance of all railway units, also IMs, in order to ensure that operators are handled in a non-
discriminatory way. 
There are different ways of performing this public control. In pre-reform environment, prices and activity 
were regulated directly: 
 
S1= ( ) s s x p S ,  
Here S represents the social value of the railway activity, taking both consumer surplus and producer 
surplus and all externalities into account.  s p  is the vector of all politically set prices. This function was 
maximised given financial conditions etc. This practice has been rightfully accused for not give good 
incentives for cost-minimisation and to be regulated by too many political aims. The government is the 
actor that maximises this function 
Vertical separation of the railway industry, has for most countries lead to this situation: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) f s f s Oi IM x x p p S S S , , , 2 P =  
In this situation the social welfare is secured in two steps: 
First the infrastructure managers, being public or semi-public have the right to set some of the charges for 
the operators and perform within different business activities. The government controls the overall activity, 
and is usually the party that decides on the level of PSOs (xs), and juridical and organisational decisions in 
the railway industry. The operators are free to set some prices and the activity on some lines up to a 
certain level (xf,pf). This is obviously a more complex system, increasing the complexity of the task of 
regulating the railways. The “administration cost” of the railways may therefore have increased. On the 
other hand, the performance of operators has increased dramatically. Also IMs tend to be more effective 
than before, especially in countries where the IMs are free to make profit. If S2 is nearer to the true social 
optimum than S1 taking changes in public expenditures on regulation into account, has not been proven - 
only made probable. It is difficult to say in which way prices, output and regulations should be altered in 
order to make the system altogether run the best way, but progress has been made in the past decade 
that shows that a new era has started. 
 
A third possible regulatory environment can be drawn: 
 
S3= ( ) ( ) ( ) f s f IM s Oi IM x x p p p S , , , , P P  
 
Here the IM is profit maximising, and the government ensures the social welfare. This solution may seem 
more plausible and simple than S2, but the number of factors that needs to be controlled by the regulator 
increases dramatically. The main problem is that a monopolist IM has an incentive to cooperate with one 
operator in order to function as an integrated monopolist. It can be shown that a situation with one IM and 
one operator is inferior to an integrated monopoly both in respect to producer surplus and consumer 
prices. (Tirole J. (1990)) Public transfers to operators will directly enter the IM’s profit function, and the IM Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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might be able to set prices in a way that maximises public transfers. Obviously, this leads to a sub-optimal 
situation. 
 
The latter regulatory environment (S3) is thus only an interesting solution if: 
·  The railway industry as a whole is profitable without public transfers. Even the most cost-effective 
railway industry may still be unprofitable. So, increased cost-efficiency is not enough to conclude that 
railways will be profitable in the future. In many countries the railways may never reach a size and 
standard where end-user payments will be larger than the total costs. 
·  The operators function as a competitive market, with limited market-power for all contestants.  
·  The IM’s activity can be controlled by the authorities 
 
Conditions 1 and 2 are usually not fulfilled even for most advanced railway systems. Profit maximisation 
demands profitable railways, and this is unfortunately a rare event. Condition 3 will probably demand a lot 
of public effort, which should be added to the cost- side when calculating costs and benefits of these 
different systems. If public transfers are given to the railway sector, for operation of for investment in 
infrastructure,  a  profit  maximising  IM  is  not  a  good  solution.  This  deliverable  suggests  a  general 
methodology to be applied in regulatory environments of type 2 and type 3 or somewhere in between.  
 
7.1.3 Operators’ share of infrastructure investment costs – additional cost recovery 
Many countries demand a fee from operators in order to finance parts of the infrastructure costs. In this 
deliverable, we conclude that such practices are in general not recommendable. Short run marginal cost 
should be the base of the charging system. If such transfers from operators to IMs is necessary due to 
limited will or ability to grant public funding, this section gives some guidelines in how to design this money 
flow system.   
 
Charging principles should be set in a way that takes all the following aspects into account: 
 
·  Efficiency, incentives 
·  Equity 
·  Justice 
·  Transparency 
·  Non-discriminatory 
 
The three latter aspects are related to how the charges are published, and how they vary between 
operators. The two first principles are directly affected by how the charges are set. 
 
Additive contribution – worst case in terms of efficiency 
An additive component to the SRMC is the worst way to collect a financial transfer in terms of efficiency. 
This method changes the relative prices between different routes, and thus leads to sub-optimal traffic 
allocation. This is most severe for the routes with the lowest SRMC, thus traffic reduction is most likely 
where the costs of the traffic is lowest. In terms of equity, this methodology is basically appropriate. 
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Multiplicative mark-ups to SRMC – a better solution in terms of efficiency 
A  multiplicative  factor  to  the  SRMC  will  not  distort  the  relative  prices  between  routes.    The  direct 
substitution effect is therefore zero. The price level increases, so the number of routes that the operators 
will afford to run for given revenue is reduced. The operators will have to choose between reduced profits 
or increasing prices for end-users.  Usually, the result will be somewhere in between. This result depends 
on the properties of the end-users’ demand functions. The elasticity of demand will determine how much 
of the prices can be paid by the end-users. It is an inevitable fact that higher charges than SRMC will lead 
to reduced and sub-optimally low supply of railway services, either by reduced activity of the operators, or 
by fewer operators on track. So, if the aim of social planners is to maximise the market share of the 
railways, SRMC should be chosen and financial components in the access charges be set equal to zero. 
 
Ramsey pricing – best solution in terms of efficiency 
Ramsey pricing, explained in chapter 4, is a methodology for minimising the consequences in terms of 
reduced demand for a given charge increase. Weighting the price increase on each route by the elasticity 
of demand will distribute the different contributions to the routes where demand is least affected. The logic 
is simple: Those that are less sensitive to price increases, are punished hardest, while those that quickly 
change their behaviour will face smaller increases in prices. This is the optimal procedure of collected a 
given amount of money in terms of efficiency. Equity is on the other hand strongly affected.  Some end-
users may have no other option than to use the railways, and if Ramsey rules are applied the fares can 
increase dramatically. Also public transfers like PSOs are troublesome. 
 
Two-level charges 
An alternative to charging the operators per kilometre is to introduce a fixed sum to be granted access to 
the  infrastructure  and  then  use  ordinary  SRMC  afterwards.  The  entrance  fee  is  motivated  as  cost 
coverage for the infrastructure investments costs. This method has some advantages. First, SRMC-pricing 
of the use of infrastructure secures incentive-neutrality. The fixed sum that the operators must pay, makes 
the risk of excluding newcomers from market entry more obvious. Visualising these costs in this way 
shows clearly that pushing capital costs of infrastructure over to operators is not congruent with the wish to 
increase  the market  share  of  railways.    Although  two-level  pricing  seems  feasible in the  timetabling 
process, two-level charges seems less well functioning to handle occasionally journeys, and additional 
journeys to schedule. 
 
7.1.4 International traffic 
International traffic and SRMC 
International  traffic  creates  some  problems  of  allocation  of  capital  costs  to  operators  that  run  only 
occasionally on the network. The capital cost coverage factors that these operators face must be linked to 
the level of use of the network on a short-term basis. The most appropriate way should therefore be to use 
multiplicative charges to the SRMC. 
 
International traffic makes charging more complex. IMs can take three different roles in the process of 
providing paths for international rail carriages: Origin IM, Transit country IM and Destination country IM. 
SRMC-based railway charges should be allocated to each of these IMs according to the SRMC-charges 
that apply for the different routes.  Marginal congestion costs should of course also be included, and as a 
first adaptation, a mark-up matrix for city-areas and rush hours is recommended.  
It is essential to make these costs visible for the operators before the actual journey is undertaken. 
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International traffic and charging regimes 
There are a number of different charging regimes in practise. Those systems may be affected by the 
implementation of recent EC directives. However there are no activities in the member states that actually 
reflect a change of charging systems towards directives 2001/12-14. Derived from this situation one might 
call for a harmonisation of the charging of cross-border traffic. Our recommendation is not to have similar 
charges in different countries. Cost structures, level of external costs and density on track are all variables 
that vary among countries. National charging principles should on the other hand be equal or at least 
adaptable.  
 
We suppose that the transparency of national charging systems is given if they are published on paper 
and on Internet. The criteria freedom of discrimination is fulfilled if (1) different TOCs have not to pay 
different charges without the reason of cost differences and (2) procedural aspects provide a maximum of 
transparency to all TOCs acting in or entering the market of rail services.  
 
Unfortunately the complex combination of different charging systems with numerous differentiators makes 
it very difficult for TOCs to adapt their operational variables to the optimal ratio of operational benefits and 
infrastructure charges. Therefore we need some recommendations on how to improve the transparency of 
charges for cross-border traffic. Transparency will be improved if the IM reveal the sensitivity of charges 
according to operational parameters such as alternative times (off peak), alternative loads, alternative 
routings, alternative speed, alternative loads and so on. For this purpose the IM should build priorities by 
which change of an operational parameter the most savings can be achieved. In cross border traffic, the 
aim of the one-stop IM responsible for acquisition of the access rights will have to aggregate the potential 
savings.  
In section 7.5 we have some proposals that might create an easier environment for operators seeking 
increased international activity. 
 
7.2 Data assessment 
Differences in national subsidies or in the degree of the internalisation of external costs might lead to 
inefficiencies in the use of rail networks. Ceteris paribus TOCs prefer networks more subsidised and with 
less internalisation of externalities.  
Moreover, differentials in the internalisation of external costs result in similar effects as differentials in 
subsidising networks. Basic internalisation standards may contribute to avoid unfair competition between 
network operators. However this is a task of the overall European environmental policy. External costs 
should be treated in a similar way for all modes of transport. The part of the induced external costs a 
traveller must bear should be equal for all modes. 
From the point of view of TOCs who are interested to offer a service on a specific track, the following data 
requirements are necessary to plan and develop such a service:  
 
1.  The actual capacity utilisation per route and for different times that should be published for each 
track  by  anonymous  time-utilisation-schemes  in  a  transparent  way.  This  would  allow  new 
entrants to identify opportunities for new train services 
2.  The technical restrictions (cf. the following section) 
3.  The prevailing scheme governing infrastructure charges. 
 
From the point of view of an IM it is also necessary to forecast the potential delays per route and per 
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overview of delay cost estimates in order to assess potential penalties and to incorporate them into the 
overall infrastructure payment system. 
 
Technical restrictions 
Vertical  separation  of  the  railway  sector  has  many  benefits,  but  also  some  drawbacks.  One  major 
drawback is the increased difficulty of cost – linkages between track and train. Wheels damage track and 
track  damages  wheels, but  the  IMs  and  the  operators  have  in  a  pure  competitive  environment little 
motivation for reducing the costs that are borne by the others. An integrated railway company had a more 
straightforward optimisation problem when choosing materials and equipment to find the optimal mix of 
investment cost and maintenance and renewal costs. The new environment demands that the total system 
costs are taken account for by the different parties. This can be done in two ways. Either by cooperation or 
by  incentive  mechanisms  that  secure  this  issues  to  be  taken  account  of.    In  small  environments, 
cooperation  will  probably  be  the  best  solution,  while  incentive  mechanisms  are  the  best  solution  in 
advanced, complex markets of larger scale.  
 
Cooperative solution 
Tracks and rolling stock are stable assets. New investments are done in a pace that gives time to find 
system solutions using the knowledge and opinions of the different parties involved. Normally this includes 
IMs,  operators  and  the  government.  In  such  environments  the  best  solutions  to  a  minimum  of 
administration costs could be found.  
 
Network capacity can be regarded as the ability of the infrastructure to provide a seamless path through 
time and network over track whose technical characteristics match the need of the train to be run. So not 
only has there to be a slot, also limiting technical aspects have to be respected: 
 
·  axle load 
·  maximum train length 
·  maximum speed 
·  inclines 
·  braking ability 
·  loading gauge 
·  type of electrification (incl. none) 
·  type of train protection 
 
Incentive mechanisms 
In a complex market, with many operators and train types, the cooperative solution may not apply. In this 
situation  a  system  where  the  different  characteristics  of  trains  are  published,  and  where  these 
characteristics  are  linked  to  charges  schemes  that  incorporate  the  system  costs.  The  track’s 
characteristics  should  also  be  published,  but  these  costs  are  internalised  by  the  operators  in  their 
decisions about running on the tracks. We propose a special international organ for this purpose in section 
7.5 
Each IM has to publish these characteristics for each section of his network in the network statement. This 
allows the TOC to adjust their rolling stock and to make slot requests, which are not to be rejected 
immediately for technical impossibility. 
When processing the slot requests the IM has to take into account these technical capacity restraints, 
meaning that not all trains can be displaced onto alternative routes even if they connect the origin and the 
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Within most national networks the type of train protection and electrification is uniform over the network. In 
contrast the train protection system is different across European countries and the type of electrification 
changes at most borders.  
 
Additionally administrative rules have to be respected 
·  drivers licence 
·  technical certification 
·  safety certification 
·  scheduled restrictions 
·  prioritised connections in international traffic. 
 
All in all, technical and administrative aspects of the network are necessary data requirements for the 
planning and development of new services. Therefore the IM has to identify and declare those restrictions 
in a transparent and discrimination free manner. 
 
Data existing in practice 
In practise different charging systems make use of the relevant cost data to a different degree. Table 10 
gives an overview on what data are used for a sample of actual infrastructure charging systems:  
 
Table 8: National comparison of cost categories used 
















Wear and Tear  X  X  X  X  X      X 
Train Control      X  X    X    X 
Maintenance      X    X  X  X   
Cost of Capital      X(2)      X    X 
Costs of avoiding path conflicts at short term     X  X  X        X 
Costs of avoiding path conflicts at long term   X(1)               
(1) Under consideration; (2) only implicitly incorporated 
 
Some IMs are running commercial accounting systems as Quo Vadis (NL) or SAP (NL, P, D). In these 
cases the quality of available data is assessed to be sufficient. Some IMs as in Norway or Germany are 
using own LCC models to assess the costs of wear and tear. Some have precautions to develop and 
establish new accounting models with external support (RO). Therefore the quality of existing data is 
presumably  not  sufficient.  Development  of  cost  methodologies  is  performed  in  many  countries,  and 
IMPROVERAIL has made a contribution to give the European railways a new tool for designing such cost 
schemes and for comparison of cost categories, structure and level between countries. 
 
Analysis of data sources 
For  the  assessment  of cost components  different  information  systems  are  used.  Some  systems  are 
standard accounting systems, some are simulation systems and some are based on more or less regular 
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The data sources mainly allow the identification of cost categories and the allocation of specific costs. 
However, the allocation of overhead costs follows different principles that cannot be analysed from an 
outsiders´ point of view. Moreover, even the different definitions of cost categories used in practise make it 
uneasy to get a harmonised input into cost data sources.  
What  is  still  missing  in  the  existing  data  sources  is  the  linkage  of  cost  to  the  benefits  of  certain 
infrastructure managing activities. For example, the use of specialised railway snowploughs imposes costs 
to the IM, but creates benefits to all TOCs in winter times. However, if the benefits of the TOCs are 
unknown IM will reduce investments in such equipments to the damage to the overall system quality. 
Therefore it is necessary to establish Service Level Agreements in order to internalise such benefits (or 
damages) in the non-cooperative system.  
 
Data reliability and comparability 
Different principles of cost data identification used in practise are not sufficient to explain the differences in 
infrastructure charging systems. Even comparing charging systems, which are mainly based on the same 
cost elements such as Germany, Norway, Netherlands and Switzerland, differ in the level of charges to a 
high degree. Those differences cannot be explained only by geographical differences, for then the charges 
of Switzerland should be much higher then the German charges. On the other hand, the differences also 
cannot simply explained by the different incorporation of the cost of capital.  
 
All  in  all  the  comparability  of  the  existing  data  is  bad  and  cannot  be  improved  without  a  specific 
benchmarking process or by comparable substitutes (e.g. yardstick competition). On the other hand, the 
low level of data comparability is also based on different cost allocation principles. For that problem, a 
better  transparency  of  infrastructure  charging  components  could  increase  the  performance  of  all 
infrastructure charging systems and the performance of planning cross border-train services. 
 
 
7.3 Implementation Options for Slot Allocation 
As described in chapters 5, 6 and 7, there are different levels of complexity in possible charging 
procedures. Ambitious planners may want to implement advanced system in an early phase, while others 
may have a conservative attitude, only doing what is demanded through approved directives.  There is a 
link  between  regulatory  environments  and  cost  categories  needed,  as  well  as  which  charging 
principles that are functional.  The functionality of the chosen regulatory environment is also depending 
heavily on the underlying economic characteristics of the market. When choosing a regulatory scheme 
for a specific railway industry, one has to take many elements into account.   
 
The following procedure is a procedure suggested by this Work Package, as a procedure that we believe 
will function in the typical European railway environment. Sections 5.2 and 7.1 deepen our view on which 
practices are recommendable for charging the infrastructure.  
 
7.3.1 Example of a possible slot allocation regime 
This chapter contains a short description of a methodology for infrastructure charging and slot allocation. It 
is not the most advanced system that could be developed. On the contrary: It forms a basic framework 
that might avoid some of the market failures, sub-optimal solutions and awkward results that may have 
come from a too hasty introduction of advanced infrastructure charging 
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This report does not recommend one single methodology for the process of slot allocation and timetabling, 
but a number of conclusions are drawn, enabling us to suggest ways to go in European railways. Some 
different systems are proposed, and the systems are designed to show how we are able to include new 
parameters in the charging procedure by increasing the complexity. Our main conclusion is of a rather 
simple system that is of such kind that it should be possible to adapt it to all national railway environments. 
The background of the railway system for which the methodology is designed is the national railways 
reforms, partially as a result of EU legislation, partially a result of national initiatives. The EU directives 
state some minimum level of development of the railway systems in Europe. As has been well described 
in other parts of the IMPROVERAIL project, the national railway systems show variety among a number of 
dimensions. What has been implemented throughout Europe is the separation of infrastructure manager 
(IM)  and  the  national  railway  operator.  In  some  cases  the  IM  has  kept  a  close  connection  to  the 
government,  while  in  order  to  motivate  competition,  the  operator  has  been  made  economically 
responsible. Within this framework all facets can be found in Europe. Our main suggested methodology 
fits best, where the IM at some extent can take other aspects into consideration than profit maximisation. 
Also with a profit maximising IM a charging procedure can be introduced. Such a market would need 
extensive control from a public organ, securing the welfare of the passengers and the public as a whole.  
The main conditions for this framework to function is: 
 
·  Infrastructure charges set by an organ securing public interests rather than own profitability 
·  No financial flows between government and any operator. If so, do not let this company use its 
financial advantages to destroy any attempts for competition 
 
Some pitfalls that will erode the benefits from any commercially oriented systems are: 
 
·  Too high level of cost-coverage of the provision of infrastructure. Most car users never pay for the 
road that they drive upon. Until then, neither should the railway passengers. The need for a 
certain level of cost recovery is understandable. It is in general better to tax the companies’ 
income, rather than a kilometre-dependent charge. This element creates a spike between the 
optimal  charge  and  the  actual  charge,  and  thus  induces  a  too  low  level  of  railway  service 
production. 
·  Too much use of PSOs. PSOs should be used when railway services on some lines are socially 
profitable but not commercially profitable. Of course, if few lines are profitable, no market really 
exists, but as external conditions as technology, jurisdiction as well as the demand structure 
changes and evolves, new lines may become commercially viable. Then, the use of PSOs should 
be reduced. There is a risk that PSOs may function as a pillow, avoiding the stride to increase 
productivity. 
·  The authorities must ensure that international external conditions are set in such a way that 
international traffic faces the correct set of prices and as little bureaucracy as possible. National 
protectionism is a loss for all. 
The methodology can be described as having two main stages: 
 
First stage: Set the infrastructure charges 
Charges should be set equal to the short run marginal cost. The cost structure should include costs as 
wear and tear of track and signalling, but also external costs as noise and pollution. The congestion cost is 
a continuously changing function in time and space. For practical purposes we suggest a simple mark-up 
structure to be used in areas with congestion. Second-best considerations may be used, if based on 
proper analysis. Second-best charging is a good way of avoiding too high rail-tariffs compared to other 
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Add national financial mark-ups. Off course, the combination of second-best pricing and infrastructure-
financing components is contradictory. 
Add national time-dependent mark-ups to deal with congestion in the rush hours. Hence, this mark-up is 
predetermined at a one-step or multi-step level in this simple model. It is an estimate and not a market 
solution. Note that congestion charges will improve the system’s efficiency while financial mark-ups will 
undermine the efficiency. 
Make this regime (all national charging regimes) transparent to all parties, domestically and abroad. 
The capacity is at all times regarded as the feasible capacity given national and international regulations 
on safety etc.  
 
Second stage: Design the timetable: 
At the stage of setting the timetable, there are multiple successive steps that must be taken.  
1.  Set the framework for the timetable. Define the total capacity on each line, taking into account the 
linkage between density on track and safety, reliability and expected number of delays as well as 
impacts of delays. 
2.  PSOs are the first type of departures to be set in the timetables. PSOs are first placed in the 
timetables without auction. The government is the purchaser of the PSOs. The government 
should be as flexible as possible in terms of time-slots for these trains. The PSOs have to be set 
in a transparent and discrimination free procedure. The PSOs can of course be distributed in a 
“competition for the track”-system, but if the government already runs a railway company it seems 
reasonable to give these contracts to this company. 
3.  Long distance departures, international inter-city passenger traffic and transit trains are then 
adapted  into  the  timetable.  As  far  as  networks  are  dedicated  to  long-distance  traffic  those 
relations should even have the priority. 
4.  Some  corridors  for  freight  are  established  mainly  outside  of  peak-hours  in  order  to  ensure 
efficient  international  freight  traffic.  The  freight  trains  should  not  come  in  conflict  with  any 
commuter train services etc. 
5.  At this stage, if the organ that sets the time table can cooperate with the purchaser of PSOs, the 
PSOs may be adjusted slightly in order to improve the timetable 
6.  Packages of slots, offering specific train products on specific networks are sold to a company – if 
possible by some kind of auction. This procedure is chosen, as there will generally be economies 
of  scale  in serving a  certain  region  or passenger  group in  a certain  area.  Therefore letting 
different companies serve the same passengers with the same services might reduce overall 
efficiency. Avoid direct competition on track for similar services. Different packages could be like: 
City - commuter westwards Capital – Large city Intercity trains 
7.  The remaining slots are kept for a slot market for anyone to compete. The entrants must pay the 
same charges as in step 1 as well as the increased system delay costs that the newcomer 
pushes upon the others. This charge is paid to the IM, even though the operators are the ones 
suffering.  
8.  This timetable is set for some predefined period of time. Adjacent countries would benefit from 
designing  their  national  timetables  simultaneously.  This  is  a  condition  for  ensuring  this 
methodology to function 
9.  A second-hand market is established, in order for any pareto-improvements to be revealed. 
 
A slot is the right to run a specific train at a specific line at a specific time. It is also a duty. This is 
absolutely necessary on order not to end up in a situation where one company strategically buys several 
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Equally important is the transparency of all processes in the timetabling procedure. There should be no 
need to keep things secret. On exception might be the bidding procedure, where closed bids might be 
used. But this does not contradict an open, non-discriminatory process.  
 
Conditions for procedure 1 
Vertical separation. No money-flows from IM to operators 
IM takes social welfare into account.  
SRMC-pricing plus eventual mark-up (capital cost coverage factor) 
Subsidises of operators are not recommended. PSO-contracts is a typical way of subsidising the ancestor 
of the old railway company. This might be reasonable if the government is financially responsible and if the 




7.3.2 Description of other methodologies 
Procedure 2: the German system 
First the IM publishes a general infrastructure charging system and a “network statement” describing the 
state of infrastructure and external timetable restraints, e.g. from European timetabling. Based on this the 
TOCs plan their services and form their slot requests to the IM, at the latest 8 months before the next 
change of timetable. The IM processes (sorts) the path request by internal rules, partly given by public 
law. Without conflicts, the timetable can be produced. In case of conflicts, the IM can reject certain 
conflicting slot requests or propose altered routings. If the TOC accepts the alternative routing(s), the 
timetable can be produced. If not, a round table of IM, TOCs and the authority (Eisenbahnbundesamt) is 
organised as a kind of mediation process. If the round table comes to a common solution, the timetable 
can be produced. If not, the EBA has to decide if one service is to be classified as regular service whereas 
the conflicting service is an irregular one. In that case the regular service would have the priority. If none 
or both services are regular, the final allocation has to be decided within a bid process. 
 
Two necessary, but not sufficient conditions for this system to be optimal are: 
·  the social value of regular services exceeds the value of competing non-regular trains, 
·  the WTP of competing TOC´s reflect the WTP of the end users. 
 
The second condition might be not fulfilled if the market for rail services is distorted by near-monopolistic 
behaviour of an incumbent firm or by cross-subsidizing of a vertically integrated firm. Therefore a certain 
degree of competition, a vertical disintegration of railway companies and a suitable regulatory environment 
are necessary preconditions to lead to a social optimum.  
 
Procedure 3: An auction system 
This system might be as explained in section 5.2.6  “Model for Slot Allocation” 
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7.3.3  Data requirements as a function of Slot Allocation Regimes 
The three systems described above are not only different in terms of slot allocation criteria but also in their 
specific data requirements. The next table provides an overview on the data requirements resulting from 
such different slot allocation regimes: 
 
Table 9: Data requirements from different slot allocation regimes 
Data required  Procedure 1  Procedure 2  Procedure 3 
SRMC  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Data for financial mark ups   No  Yes  Yes 
Data for congestion mark ups  Yes  Yes  No 
Technical restrictions  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Punctuality requirements  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Economic benefits of PSOs  Yes  Yes  No 
Economic benefits of long distance 
traffic 
Yes  No  No 
Economic benefits of freight traffic  Possibly  No  No 
Maximum of payments through all 
bids 
No  No  Yes 
 
 
7.3.4   Implementation Options in Cross Border Contexts 
Cross Border Traffic Context 
Within the EU all railways hold a market share of 16% in freight transport by land in 1995, the share had 
dropped to 13% by 2000. Road transport carried 76% in 1995 while 8% of the European cargo was 
transported via inland waterways. Interestingly the railways had a slightly stronger position when only 
cross-border traffic is regarded; here they carried 20% of all goods (road 59%, inland waterways 21%). 
Over the last decades rail’s market share steadily decreased which is true for national and international 
transport. A major reason for the international market share being better is that the railways have a 
structural advantage in long hauls, which naturally cross borders more often. Also the railway’s strong 
position in cross-alpine relations helps explaining the fact. According to Faulhaber [FAULHABER 2001] 
the market share in 1992 was 49% in the Germany￿￿Italy market, 64% for Belgium￿￿Italy and even 
76% for Sweden￿￿Italy.  In 1996 45% of all rail freight traffic within EU was cross-border traffic. 
International rail transport is still ruled by the national networks. As mentioned, technical characteristics 
differ between the networks and require the use of multi-system rolling stock or the change of rolling stock 
at the border. Timetable planning is carried out individually which results in long waiting times at border 
stations.  The  average  speed  of  cross-border  rail  freight  is  at  18  km  per  hour  and  its  market  share 
continuously declining. 
 Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
Page 129 of 194 
European corridors: 
Each system of slot allocation might work to a certain degree at the national level. However such systems 
cannot  afford  the  slot  allocation  for  international  services.  Therefore  an  international  co-ordination  is 
necessary as well as a reservation of some corridors for international traffic prior to timetabling national 
slots. 
Today international paths are planned within the Forum Train Europe (FTE). FTE coordinates the national 
timetable planning by holding three conferences before a new European timetable becomes effective. 
Within  FTE  “capacity  managers”  shall  plan,  coordinate  and  allocate  paths  and  solve  conflicts 
independently from the train operators. FTE facilitates to request international ad-hoc paths over a single 
IM. Members of FTE are the former national railways and the IMs. 
An example of pre-planned international corridors is the European Freight Freeways (“Freightways”). One 
of the many aspects they were created for is that they run on internationally coordinated paths which have 
a higher average speed than common international trains. The paths are timetabled and usage can be 
requested shortly before departure depending on availability. For more details see 6.3.3. 
The Freightways shall be developed into a bigger Trans European Rail Freight Network (TERFN) which 
covers many of the EU’s principal rail lines. But until today it is only planned to grant open access on the 
TERFN. No measures to assert high quality paths for freight are yet decided. Directive 2001/14 only calls 
for cooperation among the national IMs in the case of international paths. In the long run it will be 
necessary a) to set incentives to national IMs to establish Freightways and b) also to set up rules to co-
ordinate traffic at those Freightways in cases of path conflicts. 
 
7.4 Contractual Relationship and Harmonisation of Charges 
7.4.1 Service level agreements 
The term quality is widely used in most markets offering services or goods for consumers. The transport 
sector is no exception; choosing between different modes of transport or between different companies 
includes choosing among vectors of many different quality aspects. 
Often the term quality is used for all characteristics that are not included in the price of the service or good. 
Using this interpretation, quality may appear to have no relevance for business decisions. This point of 
view is false. One has to separate between quality aspects for which there is potential willingness to pay 
(WTP), that is the consumers are better off consuming the good or service with more of that specific 
quality parameter, and quality parameters for which there is no WTP. (The latter is probably no quality 
parameter at all).  
Having defined quality, the next question will be for whom the quality parameter is relevant. The obvious 
and most common actor is the consumer. The consumer has certain preferences for a wide number of 
quality parameters, some that are purchasable in the market, and others which will affect his decision 
making without directly affecting prices and yet others which the consumer just has to take for granted. 
Three examples from the railway sector follow. An example of the first type is the quality of comfort (which 
itself probably is a bundle of a number of different quality aspects like space, air conditioning etc). The 
traveller  may  choose  a  business-class  ticket  in  order  to  enjoy  more  comfort,  whereas  travel  speed, 
frequency and risk of delays obviously is the same as for the passengers sitting in a regular compartment. 
An example of the second type is choosing between different modes of transport. Having the choice 
between two train departures with the same price, same travel time etc, might still involve considerations 
of differences in quality level. An example of quality aspects of the third type is quality aspects that are 
technologically or practically impossible. 
Customers of railway services can in different ways include quality in their decision-making behaviour. 
Thus the implicit valuation of different quality aspects can often be derived from market data. The most 
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quality aspect can have its own price and the demand for this good can be measured in a regular way. 
Normally, it is impossible to reveal the valuation of quality aspects from real market data, but through 
different kinds of stated preference methods the valuation of quality parameters can be estimated. 
In a non-commercial market with regulated activity, the planner might take account for different quality 
parameters. In a way, the social planner can act upon one kind of stated preference method: the expert 
opinion.  
In a deregulated market with increasing level of competitive behaviour, quality parameters for which the 
companies are unable to charge for will stand in risk of disappearing. This can lead to sub-optimal 
situations and the need for regulatory interventions.  
Security, safety and environmental concern are typical quality aspects that the travellers are concerned 
about. 
 
How to measure quality? 
Different ways of measuring and controlling quality aspects are 
·  Benchmarking  –  use  of  indicators  to  compare  with  other  competitors  or  time-series  of  own 
performance 
·  Standardisation 
o  Company standards 
o  National standards 
o  European standards 
o  World standards (ISO…) 
·  Quality auditing 
·  Customer satisfaction surveys 
 
Quality vs. Service level 
Service level agreements (SLA) are in this report, defined as some kind of contractual agreement between 
operators and government or infrastructure manager on the minimum service level that the operators 
must provide for the end users (passengers and freight shippers), and on the service level that the IM will 
provide  to  the  operators.  Off  course,  also  other  service  level  agreements  may  be  established,  e.g. 
between operators and end users by long-term contracts etc, or between operators. As infrastructure 
managers to an increasing extent are commercially responsible, the operators might find it even more 
important to define specifically what services the IM will provide for the next years etc.  As we see there 
are two important levels of service level contracts: 
 
1.  Contracts between Infrastructure manager and government. Generally, as the IMs in Europe are 
becoming less dependent of governmental transfers, the regulator might wish to influence on the 
way that the IMs is acting. This, in order to secure public interest. Normally, the IMs are acting in 
a  public  or  semi-public  environment  where  public  interests  are  accounted  for.  Thus,  the 
regulatory environment will determine whether contractual agreements must be set on this level. 
2.  Contracts between infrastructure manager and train operator. This is the kind of contracts that 
are studied in this report. Considering the different relevant areas to regulate by contract, one 
might  be  able  to  on  a  general  level  give  some  indications  on  importance  of  service  level 
contracting. 
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Four different kinds of quality measures can be distinguished. Two of these measures are consumer 
related and the other two are service supplier related: 
·  Expected quality - Customers’ expectations 
·  Perceived quality - Measurement of customer satisfaction 
·  Targeted quality - Companies’ strategy 
·  Delivered quality – Benchmarking, Quality level auditing 
 
Expected quality is the quality standard that consumers expect ex ante their consumption of the service. 
Perceived quality is the quality level the consumer experience consuming the service. 
Targeted quality is the company’s strategic level of quality. Of course best quality is never expected, as 
this is generally not optimal in a cost-revenue considerations or socio-economic decisions. All companies 
will of course aspire to the best bundle of quality assets for given investments. The quality parameters 
perceived by the consumers are often not identical to the quality delivered by the company. And the 
delivered quality of the services is generally not equal to the quality level that the company has aimed at.   
 
7.4.2  Contract Types 
The  following  two  types  of  contracts  refer  to  service  production  contracts,  often  used  in  tendering 
procedures. 
 
1.  Gross cost contract: The operator is paid an agreed price for the production of a determined 
level of services, and revenues accrue to the authority. Production risk is thus covered by the 
operator and revenue risk by the authority 
2.  Net cost contract: The operator is paid by the estimated difference between operating costs and 
revenues for a given level of service. Both revenue and production risks are covered by the 
operator. 
These two regimes have different incentives. The net cost contract is better than gross cost contracts to 
motivate for increasing market shares (competitive behaviour).  
Tendering is a method of competition for the market. The one that wins the tendering bidding process, will 
for some period of time have some privileges like public transfers, grant of access to a certain network etc. 
In tendering there is a risk that procedural fairness is distorted. The credibility of each tender needs to be 
analysed, so that unfair strategic bidding is detected and avoided. 
In contracting the fairness of the final solution must be considered. Elements to consider are 
 
·  Incentives and motivation for efficient production 
·  Incentives and motivations for competitive behaviour 
·  Division of risk between operator and regulator 
·  Division of profit between operator and regulator 
·  Consequences of incapability of delivered the agreed services for the regulator (IM) 
·  Consequences of incapability of delivered the agreed services for the operator(s) 
·  Possibility to renegotiate contract if needed for operator 
·  Possibility to renegotiate contract if needed for IM 
·  Considerations of the agreement’s consequences for future tendering rounds 
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A typical tendering process consists of some or all of the following steps: 
1.  Construction of tendering offer 
2.  Tendering delivered 
3.  Tendering bids received 
4.  Credibility of bids analysed 
5.  (Possible sequential bidding procedure) 
6.  Winner of tendering contract announced 
7.  Contract 
8.  Tendering period of varying duration (1 year up to 20-30 years) 
9.  New tendering period prepared. Construction of tendering offer 
 
The majority of the steps, step 1-7, are related to the tender contracting procedure. Step 8 and 9 are 
directly affected by the result of the contracts.  
 
Quality parameters are not visible 
Some quality parameters like punctuality and reliability are visible to other parties. Other quality aspects 
are  not  so  directly  observable.  Examples  are  processes  affecting  safety  and  environment.  In  such 
situations there is a risk that somewhere in the production process the quality is deliberately lowered, 
since others may not detect this quality reduction. Of course, the motivation for this is that keeping up a 
high level of quality is expensive, at least in the short run. This kind of situation is by economists referred 
to as moral hazard. The workers in the company providing the services may slacken the quality of their 
work, as the quality cannot automatically be checked and therefore be adjusted to the proper level. This 
will lead to discrepancy between officially targeted and delivered quality. Also between regulatory level 
and market participants there is a risk for lowering of quality level in order to increase profit and short-term 
competitive power relative to competing companies. Agreements, contracts and standards are ways of 
securing the quality level delivered. These can be done by either a system of punishing the companies if 
quality is delivered below some predetermined level or by creating some kind of operational measure for 
quality that can be observed and surveyed. Also combinations of these methods can be applied.  
 
The company must aim at a level of quality that  
·  Meets standards and requirements of Company level, National, European or of global origin 
·  Will  meet  the  expectations  and  demands  of  the  consumers.  Depending  on  services  from 
competing firms in the same market or from alternative markets and the quality experienced 
earlier. 
 
Service level contracts are not special to the railways. On the contrary, it is relevant for all commercial 
markets, where quality level is not immediately observable for consumers or when temporary monopoly 
status is granted by means of tendering (consumers have no other supplier to go to).  
Tendered contracts are examples of service level agreements. Public Service Obligation contracts (PSOs) 
are often specifying frequency etc. which sets some general level of quality of the services the operator 
provide, and with a threat of holding back revenue if the standards are not meet.  
Defining quality is a heavy task. Quality goes along many dimensions. The matrix presented in table 24 is 
a good example of a reduction of quality standards into main components. 
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Building up a Contractual Relationship based on the WTP principles  
As seen in chapter 5.1 and 5.2 it would not be much help for the IM if it only knew the WTP for exactly the 
requested slot, because it is unlikely that the IM can realise a slot without any alteration. The IM rather has 
to know how the TOCs WTP changes with alterations of the slot – the operators elasticity –, e.g. for earlier 
or later departure time, longer travel time, different routing. WTP then is a function of all aspects of the 
slot, primarily of the time-related aspects. 
In general freight slots are considered to have a lower price-elasticity in departure and arrival time then 
passenger trains, with the only exception of logistic trains, which have a low flexibility (high elasticity) 
because they have to be timed on the production process they supply. 
Pre-sort of WTP with slot products 
Quality differentiation is way to pre-sort the operators’ WTP prior to slot allocation. In most cases the WTP 
for a slot will rise with the slot’s average speed. It will also rise when a higher level of punctuality is 
guaranteed. High-value passenger services will show an extra WTP for clock-face departure times or 
undercut of key journey times (e.g. 3h29’ between Berlin and Frankfurt/M). For revealing the operator’s 
WTP the IM can tailor slot products that incorporate different combinations of slot qualities and charge 
different prices for the different products. The operator can choose the product that matches the value of 
his train and from the products chosen or not the IM can conclude on the operators’ WTP for different 
aspects of the slot. The EU-project Quattro suggests the following public transport quality matrix: 
Table 10: The quality matrix 
1.  AVAILABILITY 
a.  Network 
b.  Timetable 
2.  ACCESSIBILITY 
a.  External interface 
b.  Internal interface 
c.  Ticketing 
3.  INFORMATION 
a.  General information 
b.  Travel information – normal conditions 
c.  Travel information – abnormal information 
4.  TIME 
a.  Journey time 
b.  Punctuality and reliability 
5.  CUSTOMER CARE 
a.  Commitment 
b.  Customer interface 
c.  Staff 
d.  Physical assistance 
e.  Ticketing options 
6.  COMFORT 
a.  Ambient conditions 
b.  Facilities 
c.  Ergonomics 
d.  Ride comfort 
7.  SECURITY 
a.  Safety from crime 
b.  Safety from accident 
c.  Perception of security 
8.  ENVIRONMENT 
a.  Pollution 
b.  Natural resources 
c.  Infrastructure 
Source: Quattro (1998) 
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These 8 categories adds up to the main components of quality for railway services. Each component can 
be further divided into subcomponents and each subcomponent may be operationalised to a measure that 
can be monitored, continuously or regularly, in order to check that eventual quality level agreements are 
fulfilled. 
 
7.4.3 Need for division of responsibility between IM and operator 
Provision of good quality has a cost for the service provider. The profit-seeking firm must have all relevant 
quality parameters included in the tendering contract etc. in order to ensure that all parties are contented 
with the service level experienced later. 
Depending on the regulatory environment the IM or the authorities may undertake a cost benefit-analysis 
in  order  to  assess  the  social  optimal  level  of  service  provision.  The  benefit  of  specifying  all  quality 
parameters is that the cost function of each quality variable in order to avoid over- or under-investments of 
one or more quality aspects. As the aggregate level of outsourced services rises, so too does the potential 
for the IM to lose control of service quality. By specifying expected quality by contracts, the risk for 
accidents and delays etc. can be reduced. 
 
7.4.4 Planning the infrastructure maintenance and renewal: Contracting 
Outsourcing over extended time periods infrastructure maintenance and renewal becomes frequent. It has 
the  advantage  to  create  competition,  driving  down  the  costs  and  improving  the  quality.  Innovative 
procedures  come  to  light:  automation  of  labour-intensive  tasks,  more  efficient  management,  … 
Contractors are committed to maintain the network condition throughout the contracting period, being free 
to define their maintenance policy. 
This is not fully sufficient to ensure network durability. As a matter of fact, geometric condition of the track 
may be kept through efficient maintenance and without renewal. By doing so, infrastructure grows older 
and older, and the requirements for corrective actions increase exponentially. Eventually, the network 
experiences  shortage  of  maintenance  equipment,  and  capacity  losses  as  well,  that  lead  to  system 
imbalance. Pushed to the limit, maintenance of the network is not possible anymore and speed restrictions 
become unavoidable. To revert from such degradation, huge investments are needed over short time 
periods, and this is never a pleasant situation. The figure below indicates how quality, substance and 
capacity are interlinked in a way that these aspects cannot be separated in long-term planning. The IM 
must keep the long-term effects of maintenance and renewal activity performed, either by the IM or by 
outsourced contractors, so that responsibility for the long-term value of the assets are not deteriorated 
onto a number of units. 
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Consequently, infrastructure managers must remain in control of the medium- and long-term maintenance 
policy, even if maintenance is outsourced. They must set frame conditions that force the contractors 
towards an acceptable mix of maintenance and renewal. 
IMs are outsourcing maintenance services in order to generate competition, but there is an obvious need 
to set up medium- and long-term maintenance policies to ensure sufficient renewal rate of infrastructure. 
As Gordon (2000) states it “If a contract is silent or unclear about an agency’s requirements with respect to 
quality, timeliness, or responsiveness to customers’ needs, the work performed may fall short of the 
agency’s expectations.” 
One technique to find measures that can be used in order to document the quality of services delivered, is 
by benchmarking. By a benchmarking procedure, measures can be found that are suitable as measures 
for predefined quality level for a service level agreement.  
The  provision  of  services  has  gradually  been  dispersed  on  many  different  dependent,  independent, 
private, public, semi-public, specialized or general units performing different tasks and providing different 
services needed in order to provide passengers and freight forwarders the service paid for. This dispersion 
of control on to a large number of different units demands a system where the following questions are 
clarified. 
 
·  Who has the responsibility of offering the service 
·  When should the service be delivered 
·  What is the service level that should be offered 
·  What happens if we fail to deliver this service on time 
 
Three vital dimensions of service level agreements 
 
1.  Price 
2.  Quality standard 
3.  Incentive/ penalty system 
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These three dimensions are interrelated. High demands of quality will increase the costs of providing the 
services. New investments in equipment or rolling stock or increased number of employees may be 
necessary  in  order  to  be  able  to  adapt  a  higher  quality  standard.  This  will  naturally  lead  to  higher 
production cost of services, and thus lower value of the contracts offered from the authorities. 
An incentive/ penalty system is needed in order to reduce the risk of strategic behaviour, where the quality 
of the services is lowered after the contract is won, and thereby increase profit.  
Through auctioning of tenders/ franchises with detailed prescriptions of quality standards, the services 
provided can be secured, but there is a risk that equally good or even better quality levels could be 
reached by a lowering of some standards and increasing of others. By letting the bidders give offers of 
both  price  and  quality  standards  the  different  technological  characteristics  of  the  companies  can  be 
revealed and thereby reach higher efficiency in the production process. But of course, the comparison of 
the bids becomes more difficult and subject to litigation. 
 
7.4.5 Quality control schemes from around the world  
Australia and New Zealand 
The urban rail system in the Melbourne region is an example of a fully competitive railway system, and is 
therefore an interesting study case. The system was completely franchised to the private sector in 1999, 
with two separate 15-year franchises. For other Australian systems the systems continue to be operated 
by public authorities or corporations, through negotiated contracts/ agreements with varying levels of 
details and formality. The contracting system in Melbourne is among the most sophisticated systems 
worldwide. In part it is based on the UK train operating (TOC) franchises, but adaptations to the Melbourne 
system have been undertaken. 
Main payment component is the net annual subsidy, which was the focus of competitive bids: this covers 
both capital and net recurrent costs, and generally reduces year-by-year over the franchise period.  In 
addition, there are passenger-related payments for concession travel reimbursement and for passenger 
growth above a threshold, and a system of incentive/penalty payments relating to operating performance 
(see below).  
  Other Australian Systems.  Payments are negotiated, based essentially on: either net costs, in 
those  cities  (Sydney,  Brisbane)  where  rail  has  its  own  fare  system;  or  gross  costs,  in  these  cities 
(Adelaide, Perth) with integrated multi-modal fare systems. 
 
  New Zealand.  Both systems essentially have net cost contracts. 
 
Quality and incentive/ penalty systems 
Melbourne has the most elaborate system, both of quality standards and of penalties/incentives relating to 
performance relative to these standards.  The standards and incentive/penalty systems cover: 
 
·  Operational  performance:  reliability  (cancellations,  short  trips)  and  punctuality  (early  and  late 
running) 
·  Customer satisfaction, as measured by a composite index, assessed through random telephone 
interviews. 
 
Quarterly payments to/from each franchise have ranged up to some A$1.5M.  Further, unsatisfactory 
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In addition, a passenger compensation code applies to holders of periodical tickets (4 weeks or more) 
where punctuality and reliability fall below threshold levels, and to individual trips in cases of disruption of 
services and inadequate information.  
·  Other Australian systems.  All these systems have quality standards.  Adelaide, Brisbane and Perth 
also include financial penalties for poor performance. 
·  New  Zealand.    Both  systems  have  a  range  of  quality  standards,  but  no  separate 
incentives/penalties (beyond the effects on fare revenue).  However, in Auckland persistent failure 
to meet standards is a factor influencing early termination of contract or consideration for future 
contracts. 
 
Contractual agreement for future development 
·  Melbourne.  Minimum service levels are set by Government (as at start of franchise).  Some service 
enhancements were also incorporated into the franchise conditions as an outcome of the bidding 
process.  Franchisees are also required to increase service levels as necessary to cater for increased 
demand (to meet specified loading standards).  Other service enhancements are at the discretion of 
the franchisees. Maximum fares are regulated by Government: fare increases are generally not to 
exceed CPI increases. 
·  Other Australian systems.  Service development is generally a joint responsibility between the 
Government authority and operator, but with Government having the final say.  Setting of (maximum) 
fares is primarily a Government responsibility. 
 
MELBOURNE – DETAILS 
A - Funding Basis 
·  Base  subsidy  (lump  sum)  payments  for  each  year  of  franchise  based  on  net  cost  (capital  and 
operating) bids, allowing for allocation of revenue between operators.  Payments generally reducing 
over franchise period (become negative in one case). 
·  Concession travel reimbursement, relating to concession ticket-holders carried at reduced or free 
rates. 
·  Capital grant funding – pre-specified amounts relating to new/upgraded infrastructure and rolling 
stock, over franchise life. 
·  Passenger growth incentives – additional per passenger payment for patronage greater than 10% 
above the level at the start of the franchise. 
·  Incentive/penalty payments under Operational Performance Regime (OPR). 
 
B - Operational Performance System 
Loading Standards: Set of maximum loading standards, related to vehicle capacities. 
Operational Performance Regime (OPR): Set of defined thresholds for proportion of ‘lost’ services, 
‘early’ services and ‘delayed’ services.  If these thresholds are exceeded in any reporting period, this 
constitutes cause for ‘call-in’, ‘franchise breach’ or ‘termination event’ (depending on extent and duration of 
deficiency). Complex OPR incentive/penalty system based for each quarterly period, based on: 
(sum of passenger weighted minutes relating to cancellations, short trips, delays and 
early running) less performance target  
        multiplied by 
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Delays etc caused by the actions of other franchisees, by Government actions or resulting from force 
majeure events may be excluded for calculation purposes. 
Penalty  payments  under  CSI  (below),  expressed  as  %  reduction  in  annual  payment,  are  based  on 
proportionate shortfall of CSI score relative to defined threshold score. 
 
C - Customer Satisfaction Index 
Defined a Customer Satisfaction Index, covering customer satisfaction with key service aspects, including 
service delivery, rolling stock comfort, passenger information, stations, ticketing arrangements, complaints 
handling, staff attitudes. 
CSI score determined through a random telephone survey of 1,700 passengers, spread evenly over the 
year. 
Continued poor performance under CSI, relative to defined thresholds, may constitute a ‘call-in’ event or 
franchise breach 
 
D - Passenger Compensation Code 
Franchisees  are  required  to have  a  Customer  Service  Charter  and  Passenger  Compensation  Code, 
relating to service reliability and punctuality, and to report monthly to passengers on their performance. 
Where performance is below the defined thresholds, franchisees are required to compensate (usually with 
complimentary tickets) those passengers holding periodical tickets (4+ weeks validity) for the month in 
question.  Compensation may also be payable to all passengers affected by non-performance, without 
adequate information, on individual trips. 
 
THE NETHERLANDS 
In a “memorandum of understanding” signed September 2000, the Dutch railway authorities and the 
operator NS agreed in a new quality contract. Regarding punctuality it was agreed that customers should 
be in position to expect that trains arrived and departure on time. Therefore, good punctuality should not 
be  rewarded,  but  bad  punctuality  be  sanctioned.  Originally,  these  measures  of  punctuality  were 
negotiated. The percentages refers to trains which are less than three minutes delayed according to 
schedule on 34 points of high importance. The measures are the average of multiple countings. 
 
Table 11: Punctuality agreement in the Netherlands 
Year  Minimum percentage delayed less than three minutes on 34 predefined points in the railway 
network 
2001  88 
2002  89 
2003  90 
2004  91 
2005  92 
 
In 2001 the level of punctuality was approximately 80%. The level of ambition was therefore lowered to 
80% in 2001 increasing to 89% in 2005. From 2003 the operator must pay Euro 450.000 for each tenth of 
a per cent lower result than in the contract, with a limit of Euro 11.25 million which corresponds to a 
punctuality 2,5%-points lower than targeted. As an indicator of these charges, NS produced 129 million Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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train kilometres in 1999. (Source: UIC) So, the fines correspond to approximately Euro 3.5 per train 
kilometre. In addition to this agreement, the passengers suffering from severe delays shall be granted 
compensation. This reimbursement shall be 50% of the ticket price in case of delays between 30 and 60 
minutes, and the whole ticket price for longer delays. Finding an agreement between NS and the IMs 
(Netherlands has a system of multiple units responsible for railway related services. For more information 
read Improverail Deliverable1) on how to share these costs is given to NS. The punctuality achieved must 
be published every three months. If punctuality falls below 3%-points below the standard, NS must present 
a plan for the authorities describing the causes of delays and ways to solve these problems. 
 
UK – United Kingdom 
Strategic Rail Authority (SRA), the railway regulator in Great Britain, has an incentive system including 
punctuality and reliability.  
·  Punctuality incentive payments (PIP). The operators’ punctuality and reliability is measured by a 
“benchmark” which normally corresponds to the level of punctuality before the franchise contracts are 
settled. Better punctuality leads to a bonus and poorer results leads to fines. The benchmark level is 
an annual mean value, so that it is expected that bonuses and fines varies systematically with time of 
the year. 
·  Timetable Change Incentive Payment (TCIP). Operators are punished if route plans are changed 
according to the printed schedule. This system is introduced in order to motivate operators to get 
better control with planned/ expected deviations from schedule, by setting the TCIP lower than the 
PIP. This is passenger-friendly, by making more cancellations known in advance, although they are 
not written in the schedule. 
These  agreements  are  independent  of  who  that  causes  the  delay.  The  operators  have  separate 
agreements with the IM Railtrack. These agreements distribute economical responsibility between all 
parties. The following table shows the money flow between the operators. Separate incentive agreements 
between the operators and the Passenger Transport Executives are not included. 
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Table 12: Charges/ rewards for punctuality (PIP) in 1000GB£** 
Operator  April 2000-March 2001  April 2001-March 2002 
Anglia Railways  42  -162 
Arriva Trains Merseyside  -837  -923 
Arriva Trains Northern  -7,434  -5,594 
c2c –869  -1,232  -192 
Central Trains  -8,084  -8,430 
Chiltern Railways  -301  -534 
Connex South Eastern  -8,663  -3,438 
First Great Eastern  -4,453  -2,615 
First North Western  -2,100  -3,024 
Island Line  -39  -12 
ScotRail  -3,429  -8,822 
Silverlink  -1,843  -772 
South Central  -7,664  -4,695 
South West Trains  -10,563  -10,951 
Thames Trains  -3,267  -3,248 
Thameslink  -2,715  -2,470 
WAGN  -5,788  -7,119 
Wales & Borders  n/a  -670 
Wessex Trains  n/a  -1,620 
Total  -71,287*  -67,064* 
* Operators and Authorities are negotiating on new measurement methods for punctuality, and 
the new guidelines will lead to revision of older data. Thus, these figures may be altered in 
future.  
** Positive figures indicate bonuses from SRA. Negative numbers indicate fines from SRA. 
 
Operators are obviously not the only entity causing loss of punctuality; therefore also operators and 
Railtrack need contract agreements. Then, operators are able to claim the IM for any incidents that are 
infrastructure-related. The following table shows one example of such contracts.  
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Table 13: Example of transactions between operator and infrastructure manager on different levels of 
punctuality 
Punctuality, per cent  Payment, £1000/year  Comment 
98 or better  250 
97  150 
96  50 
From Operator to IM 
95  0 
94  0 
93  0 
92  0 
No rewards/ punishment 
91  50 
90  100 
89  150 
88  200 
87  250 
86  300 
85  350 
84 and below  400 
Payment from IM to operator(s) 
 
This table shows a targeted punctuality level of 92%-95%, which is a rather broad target, making the 
system less sensitive for random variations. This system has the right incentives for the IM. This is very 
interesting:  The  operators  face  direct  contact  with  end  users  and  experience  reduced  demand  and 
reduced consumer goodwill if punctuality is low, thus the incentives for the operators are strong in order to 
minimize number of delays. The IM has on the other hand has often not the same close link to end users, 




Through  Public  Service  Obligations  (PSOs)  the  Norwegian  authorities are  giving  the  operator2  some 
quality demands such as frequency of services during weekdays and weekends, and peak hour capacity 
measured by number of passenger seats. Also some regulations on fares and especially on different kind 
of rebates (military, season tickets etc) are regulated. Regularly, NSB must report their performance to the 
Ministry. 
Hopefully, the further harmonisation of the European railways will reduce the National variations, and thus 
making contracting and regulatory environment more similar.  
As far as passenger rights are introduced into the European railway system it has to be ensured that the 
TOC are not finally responsible 
a) for delays caused by the IM (which are approx. 50-75% of all delays in German railways) 
b) for delay caused by other TOCs. 
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7.5 Recommendations for harmonisation of charges 
Chapter 7 identifies initial capital costs and maintenance costs as the main cost elements in railway 
infrastructure management. According to their nature they can be divided into fixed or variable costs, 
where some costs are dependent on the rolling stock using the infrastructure. Infrastructure charging 
systems should be based on short run marginal cost pricing. With this charging principle, the initial capital 
costs  are  not  covered  by  the  operators.  Some  countries  may  demand  some  cost  recovery  of  the 
investments by an additional element added to the SRMC. We have stressed that this practice causes a 
spike between the cost of providing the railway services, and the price that the operators pay. This leads 
to sub-optimal provision of railway services. A general fee for the right to provide train services, paid 
annually etc. would be a better way in terms of efficiency. This practice will also show in a better way that 
the provision of additional contributions from the operators may reduce the number of operators as well as 
the total railway activity.  On the other hand, this method would have increased welfare transfers between 
countries in international traffic. 
In a new competitive market with increasing decentralization, the need for creating a system with correct 
incentives for all actors is vital. This report has given some examples of what quality measures are of high 
relevance for such contracts. Some guidelines on how these contracts should be designed and some 
examples from around the world are given. As no national railway system is similar as well as no National 
jurisdiction  and  regulatory  environment  is  equal,  there  is  a  need  for  encompassing  and  making 
adjustments in order to fit into another countries’ contract. Hopefully, the further harmonisation of the 
European  railways  will  reduce  the  National  variations,  and  thus  making  contracting  and  regulatory 
environment more similar.  
Transparency for all parties is a very crucial requirement for all infrastructure management activities. 
Based  on  transparency  TOCs  are  able  to  develop,  plan  and  improve  own  services  without  causing 
unnecessary path conflicts. Transparency helps to avoid path conflicts before they emerge. TOCs should 
be able to assess the economic impacts of certain decisions by route, time and choice of equipment. 
Current  practices  in  Europe,  vary  significantly  between  European  states.  This  leads  to  tremendous 
variations in infrastructure charges. Although most countries are using the SRMC principle, the practice of 
adding capital cost coverage factors to these charges leads to charges that are far from the true SRMC. In 
addition; the real SRMC might be very different between states and should therefore vary.  
The railways across Europe have been subject to change, from integrated organisations closely related to 
governments  into  several  split  bodies,  increasingly  separated  from  governmental  control.  While  the 
Council Directive 91/440 changed the basic organisation of railways, other measures were put to place 
furthering the objectives set. The Railway package (esp. Directive 2001/14) is the most topical one, which 
is  to  be  implemented  in  2003.  It  has  implications  for  infrastructure  charging  systems,  slot  allocation 
mechanisms,  the  institutional  independency  of  slot  allocation  from  transport  operation  and  for  the 
regulation of the sector. With respect to the slot allocation problem it is relatively open to the criterion, 
which can be used for solving path conflicts. Three systems for charging were presented in chapter 7.3. 
Those systems naturally have different data requirements: 
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Table 14: Data requirements from different slot allocation regimes 
Data required  Procedure 1  Procedure 2  Procedure 3 
SRMC  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Data for financial mark ups   No  Yes  Yes 
Data for congestion mark ups  Yes  Yes  No 
Technical restrictions  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Punctuality requirements  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Economic benefits of PSOs  Yes  Yes  No 
Economic benefits of long distance 
traffic 
Yes  No  No 
Economic benefits of freight traffic  Eventually  No  No 
Maximum of payments through all bids  No  No  Yes 
 
As we see there are two important levels of service level contracts: a) Contracts between Infrastructure 
manager and government. Generally, as the IMs in Europe are becoming less dependent of governmental 
transfers, the regulator might wish to influence on the way that the IMs is acting. This should be done in 
order to secure public interests. Normally, the IMs are acting in a public or semi-public environment where 
public interests are accounted for. Thus, the regulatory environment will determine whether contractual 
agreements must be set on this level. B) Contracts between infrastructure manager and train operator. 
This is the kind of contracts that are studied in this report. Considering the different relevant areas to 
regulate by contract, one might be able to on a general level give some indications on importance of 
service level contracting.  
 
7.5.1  How can data requirements and information systems be harmonised at EU level? 
This report recommends SRMC-pricing without financial mark-ups. This point of view seems not to be 
shared in all European countries at present time. Agreeing on a common pricing methodology would 
seriously improve possibilities for international railway traffic. This demands an EU legislative framework 
for implementing a similar charging methodology across Europe. Much is done in the railway package 
currently implemented, but a close control with the development of the European railway systems by both 
regulatory organs as well as by R&D programmes seem necessary. 
As we have proposed, the charging methodology should be equal across Europe, while charges are free 
to vary as long as these variations are based on proper calculations of underlying cost differences.  For 
example, external costs have presumably a lower valuation in Eastern Europe. All local emissions must be 
given a cost level that relates directly to local valuation, normally separated by country. There is one 
important  exception.  CO2-emissions  have  global  rather  than  local  impacts,  and  should  therefore  be 
charged equally in all countries. 
Operators must give information to the relevant bodies about all train specifications needed. At the same 
time information about the track should be ready for the operators. The information organ might provide 
the operators this information. 
 
Proposition for implementing marginal cost scheme 
The European Council must develop the legislative framework needed in order to ensure that a well-
functioning and non-distortive charging procedure is used in all European countries. 
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There is a line that must be drawn between regular railway systems and special-designed railway systems 
as high-speed lines like the TGV and different light-rail lines. For this infrastructure, a vertical separation 
may not always be recommended. Competition on track may also be unfavourable in some such systems. 
Tear and wear can, as described in WP5 and WP6, be calculated by top-down approaches as well as 
bottom-up  approaches.  A  well-designed  LifeCycleCost  (LCC)-model  could  easily  verify  a  reasonably 
reliable  top-down-calculated  tear  and  wear  measure.  A  bottom-up  approach  seems  like  a  superior 
methodology in terms of assessment, but there is a risk of calculating a far too high cost level, accidentally 
or intended, by adding all kinds of minor cost components and unconsciously fall into situations of multiple 
counting of the same items . A top-down approach may be a good way to ensure that the tear-and-wear 
calculations are not exaggerated. Off course, accounting principles used and accounting practices used 
limit this approach. Data requirements should concentrate mainly on the feasible output of information 
systems  and  not  on  the  technical  system  characteristics.  As  the  development  of  railway  accounting 
systems are evolving rapidly, standards for how such calculations should be performed may be introduced 
in few years. 
Every  IM  has  to  implement  an  information  system  that  is  able  to  produce  all  relevant  cost  types. 
IMPROVERAIL has created tools to aid the IM with this task. Also new software increases the ability to 
assess all relevant cost types in a good way. The data have to differ along all facilities listed in Annex II of 
Directive 2001/14 and they have to reflect the overall aims of the Directive, which is a discrimination-free 
and efficient use of the rail infrastructure. 
System costs is the main problem for a full SRMC-scheme. System costs are mainly related to delay costs 
and  congestion  costs.  These  costs need  to  be  assessed  in  the  timetabling  procedure,  and  then be 
allocated in a fair way. This is a heavy task and approximations must be done. We propose to introduce a 
surveillance organ that ensure that the national calculations are done fair. The consortium expects that  
 
The main requirement for fully assessing delay costs and congestion cost is an advanced computer 
program that is able to assess consequences of delays and mishaps on all parts of the infrastructure. This 
program  must  include  all  activity  on  track.  Also  elements  of  system  costs  exist  in  maintenance,  as 
maintenance normally demands blocking a part of the infrastructure. Such costs could and should be 
analysed as well in such models. The rate of development of available software is very rapid, and the gap 
between the most advanced IMs to the less advanced IMs in terms of using such software becomes 
bigger. We expect this process to converge.  
 
Proposition for Surveillance Organ for Charging and Timetabling 
We propose that an organ is established to audit national cost calculations in order to reveal charges that 
depart from correct charging principles and cost estimates. 
This organ should have the necessary authority to perform this audit and secure that reactions are taken 
whenever errors are found. 
In addition to the surveillance of the charges set by the national infrastructure managers, this organ may 
also monitor national timetabling procedures.  The consortium is less conclusive about which timetabling 
procedures  to  recommend.  For  example,  in  densely  populated  areas  with  heavy  traffic,  capacity 
maximising policies by the IM may stand in the way for some potential market entrants. As such system 
benefits and system costs are difficult to calculate, we will not draw strict conclusions about what is good 
and what is not. Obviously, the IM must be open about what allocation rules apply. This is covered by the 
general need for transparency.  
This organ may also look for state-of-the-art processes at different IMs, and through counselling with the 
European commission, such processes may become recommended practice. 
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7.5.2  What are the specific data requirements related to international traffic? 
Proposition for Information Organ for Railway Operators and Infrastructure Manager 
We propose that an organ, different from the Surveillance organ, is established, in order to provide the 
operators  information  about  free  capacity  on  all  European  networks,  information  about  charges  and 
functioning  as  a  representative  for  international  operators  concerning  allocation  of  track  in  national 
timetabling rounds. 
Based on operators’ requests to this central organ, this organ will be able to represent the operators in a 
good way. 
Timetabling should be done on a national level, although we have stressed the benefits of simultaneously 
setting of timetables in neighbouring countries. The information organ can represent foreign operators and 
help these operators to get a fair treatment in the national timetabling procedures. 
The two organs proposed established will be helpful for international railway carriers to plan and perform 
cross-border journeys. Increasing international traffic sets high demands on data needs and information 
systems. As different train sets have different impacts on each other, tear and wear costs will vary from 
train type to train type and between different track qualities. As we have described, internalising these 
costs  through  infrastructure  charges  will  give  operators  the  right  incentives  for  replacement  and 
investments of track, and the operators the right incentives to choose train types for different paths. 
International traffic increases demand for fair treatment of transit operators as well as transit countries. Per 
kilometre charges secures that each country can be compensated according to the costs borne.  
In order to avoid favouritism of domestic traffic and operators (This might especially be a problem related 
to transit traffic) equal charging principles should apply for national, international and transit trains of 
similar characteristics. 
 
Data needs and information systems in the near future 
Under  market  pressure  and  due  to  Directive  2001/14,  we  expect  that  IMs  will  develop  a  more 
disaggregated view on their costs related to different services to TOCs. This means that data needs as 
well as information systems will become more complex within the next five years.  
As the market become more disaggregated and complex, the need for clear demands on necessary 
statistical information becomes ever more vital. Regulatory organs, control organs and researchers 
need to have detailed information about the market available.   
 
7.5.3  Data reliability and data validity 
Data reliability as well as data validity might be a problem. The legislative framework stated in directives 
should secure the latter. Different ways to calculate cost elements may cause great differences. Further 
R&D  in  combination  with  new  software  is  needed  to  help  IMs  and  operators  to  assess  the  SRMC 
elements. Reliability can be a problem for different reasons: 
·  Calculation errors 
·  Statistical deviations  
·  Strategic decisions 
 
System  costs  are  costs  that  are  functions  of  the  total  traffic  systems.  The  main  components  are 
congestion  costs  and  delay costs.  Also scarcity  costs  are  relevant,  when  it comes  to  slot  allocation 
procedures. These costs are also the hardest to assess. We refer to other parts of the IMPROVERAIL 
project for state-of-the-art calculations of these cost types. It is only external costs that are relevant for 
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There is always a risk for wrong figures for multiple reasons as described above. Therefore it seems 
necessary to have “systems in parallel” that can control the data proceeded by the national IMs. One such 
organ is the surveillance organ, already described. Continuous independent R&D-activity will limit the IMs 
ability to departure from pricing principles over time. Also national differences in understanding of rules 
and regulations will be revealed by such studies. 
Policymakers and regulators are not able to fully overcome the natural information asymmetry against the 
regulated firms. Therefore regulatory economists have developed a set of light-handed instruments for 
regulation. Those instruments set incentives to behave as efficient as possible without pulling the regulator 
into the procession of huge amount of detailed data.  
 
One instrument to support the theoretical pricing mechanisms with grounded data is the harmonisation of 
data  quality.  Another  instrument  is  to  oblige  IM  to  publish  a  yearly  report  on  the  implementation  of 
marginal cost principles as a necessary precondition for any state aid/subsidies. This instrument allows a 
better benchmarking of individual cost allocation policies and different pricing policies across Europe.   
Last but not least EU policy should clearly indicate under which conditions (freedom of discrimination, 
proof  that  money  is  used  in  the  best  alternatives,  yearly  reports  to  the  public,  establishment  of 
performance regulations etc.) IMs can receive subsidies for infrastructure investment and management, 
and how these subsidies can be given.  
 
The  consortium  recommends  national  detailed  models  able  to  assess  system  costs  for  the  use  of 
calculating system costs as well as allocate track efficiently. Gradually, as the technology evolves, such 
systems can be made mandatory for all countries. 
 
In Chapter 7 is shown a visible gap between data requirements for harmonised infrastructure charging in 
theory and practise even if it takes into consideration that the need for such harmonisation can be limited 
to the principle of transparency. The following table gives an overview over which theoretically required 
cost data are used in practise: 
 
Table 15: Comparison of National cost categories used for charging principles 
















Wear and Tear  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Train Control      X  X    X    X 
Cost of Capital      X      X    X 
Costs of avoiding path conflicts at short term     X  X  X  X      X 
Costs of avoiding path conflicts at long term   X(1)               
(1) under consideration 
 
What is generally missing in the existing data sources is the linkage of cost to the benefits of certain 
infrastructure managing activities. If the benefits of the TOCs from certain IM activities are unknown the IM 
will reduce investments in such equipments to the damage to the overall system quality. Therefore it is 
necessary to establish Service Level Agreements in order to internalise such benefits (or damages), or 
some cooperation between the different parties must continue.  
In a new competitive market with increasing decentralization, the need for creating a system with correct 
incentives for all actors is vital. This report has given some examples of what quality measures are of high 
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examples from around the world are given. As no national railway system is similar as well as no National 
jurisdiction and regulatory environment is equal, there is a need for encompassing and adjustments in 
order to fit into another countries’ contract. Hopefully, the further internalisation of the European railways 
will reduce the National variations, and thus making contracting and regulatory environment more similar.  
 
As far as passenger rights are introduced into the European railway system it has to be ensured that the 
TOCs are not finally responsible 
a) for delays caused by the IM  
b) for delays caused by other TOCs. 
Last but not least the actual transparency of the network use and of free capacities is crucial for TOCs to 
develop and introduce new train services. From the point of view of TOCs who are interested to offer a 
service on a specific track, the following data requirements are necessary to plan and develop such a 
service:  
 
1.  The actual capacity utilisation per route and for different times. This should be published for each 
track  by  anonymous  time-utilisation-schemes  in  a  transparent  way.  This  would  allow  new 
entrants to identify opportunities for new train services 
2.  The technical restrictions (cf. the following section) 
3.  The infrastructure charges. 
 
From the point of view of an IM it is also necessary to forecast the potential delays per route and per 
different times to incorporate them into his service level agreement with the TOC. Moreover he needs an 
overview of delay cost estimates in order to assess potential penalties and to incorporate them into the 
overall infrastructure payment system. 
For  international  traffic  even  the  transparency  of  infrastructure  charges  (sensitivity  to  operational 
parameters of the TOC) should be improved. 
Commercial IMs demand public control. The consortium suggests establishing strong and independent 
regulators at the national level. This requires: 
a) the establishment of regulators who ensure the efficiency of infrastructure charging systems, either by 
approving those systems or by setting up an incentive regulation such as price-cap regulation / rate-of-
return  regulation,  yardstick competition  and  efficient  sanctions  to the management.  The  aim  of  such 
regulation is to ensure static and dynamic (investment) efficiency. Public money spent to the operators or 
to the IM should not be absorbed by the IM but transformed into a better performance 
b) the development of service level agreements to realise qualitative efficiency 
c) the development of state aid control at the European level to ensure that the market conditions of 
infrastructure managers and TOCs are not perverted by extensive national subsidies into the network. 
This aims at fair competition within the common market 
 
Public IMs might be less proactive in terms of market development. Public IMs might also be suffering 
from political control rather than aiming at efficient pricing. On the other hand, the public IM will probably 
design a charging system that is dedicated to maximise efficiency rather than profit. The demands for 
governmental surveillance and control should therefore be much lower, and thereby increase efficiency for 
the  operators  and  low  public  expenditure  on  surveillance  and  control.  Deregulating  the  IM  will  not 
necessarily lead to increased efficiency in the market; increased governmental control must follow such 
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The socio-economic success of those systems depends on the efficiency of regulation and on the degree 
of competition between TOCs. Presumably this degree of competition will be sufficient mainly for relations 
in and between urbanised regions. Regulation of the IM has not only to ensure the discrimination-free 
access to path capacity at earlier stages of implementation but also the right incentives to the IM to realise 
static, qualitative and dynamic (investment) efficiency. 
 Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
Page 149 of 194 
8  Recommendations and conclusions 
As the market become more disaggregated and complex, the demand for reliable information becomes 
ever more vital. Regulatory organs, control organs and researchers need to have detailed information 
about the market available.  Under this market pressure and due to Directive 2001/14, we expect that IMs 
will develop a more disaggregated view on their costs related to different services to TOCs. This means 
that data needs as well as information systems will become more complex within the next five years.  
In practice different charging systems make use of the relevant cost data to a different degree. In table 9 
an overview was provided on what data are used for a sample of actual infrastructure charging systems. It 
was seen that some IMs are running commercial accounting systems as Quo Vadis (NL) or SAP (NL, P, 
D). In these cases the quality of available data is assessed to be sufficient. Some IMs as in Norway or 
Germany are using own LCC models to assess the costs of wear and tear. Some have precautions to 
develop and establish new accounting models with external support (RO). Therefore the quality of existing 
data is presumably not sufficient. Development of cost methodologies is performed in many countries, and 
IMPROVERAIL has made a contribution to give the European railways a new tool for designing such cost 
schemes and for comparison of cost categories, structure and level between countries. 
For  the  assessment  of cost components  different  information  systems  are  used.  Some  systems  are 
standard accounting systems, some are simulation systems and some are based on more or less regular 
studies carried out by accountants and consultants.  
The data sources mainly allow the identification of cost categories and the allocation of specific costs. 
However, the allocation of overhead costs follows different principles that cannot be analysed from an 
outsiders´ point of view. Moreover, even the different definitions of cost categories used in practise make it 
uneasy to get a harmonised input into cost data sources.  
What  is  still  missing  in  the  existing  data  sources  is  the  linkage  of  cost  to  the  benefits  of  certain 
infrastructure managing activities. For example, the use of specialised railway snowploughs imposes costs 
to the IM, but creates benefits to all TOCs in winter times. However, if the benefits of the TOCs are 
unknown IM will reduce investments in such equipments to the damage to the overall system quality. 
Therefore it is necessary to establish Service Level Agreements in order to internalise such benefits (or 
damages) in the non-cooperative system.  
But  different  principles  of  cost  data  identification  used  in  practice  are  not  sufficient  to  explain  the 
differences in infrastructure charging systems found. Even comparing charging systems, which are mainly 
based on the same cost elements such as Germany, Norway, Netherlands and Switzerland, it is easily 
concluded that they differ to a high degree in the level of charges. Those differences cannot be explained 
only by geographical differences, as then the charges in Switzerland should be much higher then the 
German  charges.  On  the  other  hand,  the  differences  also  cannot  simply  explained  by  the  different 
incorporation of the cost of capital.  
All  in  all  the  comparability  of  the  existing  data  is  bad  and  cannot  be  improved  without  a  specific 
benchmarking process. On the other hand, the low level of data comparability is also based on different 
cost allocation principles. For that problem, a better transparency of infrastructure charging components 
could increase the performance of all infrastructure charging systems and the performance of planning 
cross border-train services. In this sense, data reliability as well as data validity might be a problem. 
Different ways to calculate cost elements may also cause great differences. Further R&D in combination 
with new software is needed to help IMs and operators assess the marginal cost elements. 
Policymakers and regulators are not able to fully overcome the natural information asymmetry against the 
regulated firms. Therefore regulatory economists have developed a set of light-handed instruments for 
regulation. Those instruments set incentives to behave as efficient as possible without pulling the regulator 
into the procession of huge amount of detailed data.  
 
An  instrument  to  support  the  theoretical  pricing  mechanisms  with  grounded  data  is  therefore  the 
harmonisation of data quality. This instrument allows a better benchmarking of individual cost allocation 
policies and different pricing policies across Europe.   Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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The  consortium  recommends  national  detailed  models  able  to  assess  system  costs  for  the  use  of 
calculating system costs as well as allocate track efficiently. Gradually, as the technology evolves, such 
systems can be made mandatory for all countries. 
To this respect a visible gap has been shown between data requirements for harmonised infrastructure 
charging in theory and practice even if we take into consideration that the need for such harmonisation 
can be limited to the principle of transparency. Table 16 “Comparison of National cost categories used for 
charging principles” provides an overview over which theoretically required cost data are used in practice. 
It was seen that what is generally missing in the existing data sources is the linkage of cost to the benefits 
of certain infrastructure managing activities. If the benefits of the TOCs from certain IM activities are 
unknown the IM will reduce investments in such equipments to the detriment of the overall system quality. 
Therefore it is necessary to establish Service Level Agreements in order to internalise such benefits (or 
damages), or some cooperation between the different parties must continue.  
 
In a new competitive market with increasing decentralization, the need for creating a system with correct 
incentives for all actors is vital. This report has given some examples of what quality measures are of high 
relevance for such contracts. Some guidelines on how these contracts should be designed and some 
examples from around the world are given. As no two national railway systems are similar as well as no 
two National jurisdiction and regulatory environments are equal, there is a need for encompassing and 
adjustments in order to fit into another countries’ contract. Hopefully, the further harmonisation of the 
European railways (internalisation of the European market) will reduce the National variations, and thus 
making contracting and regulatory environment more similar.  
Transparency for all parties is a very crucial requirement for all infrastructure management activities. 
Based  on  transparency  TOCs  are  able  to  develop,  plan  and  improve  own  services  without  causing 
unnecessary path conflicts. Transparency helps to avoid path conflicts before they emerge. TOCs should 
be able to assess the economic impacts of certain decisions by route, time and choice of equipment. 
Current  practices  in  Europe  vary  significantly  between  European  states.  This  leads  to  tremendous 
variations in infrastructure charges. Although most countries are using the SRMC principle, the practice of 
adding capital cost coverage factors to these charges leads to charges that are far from the true SRMC. In 
addition, the real SRMC might be very different between states and should therefore vary.  
About  allocation  of  tracks,  the  railway  company  owning  rolling  stock  and infrastructure  used  to  face 
problems in designing a timetable that met the objectives: 
·  Meeting the demands of passengers 
·  Meeting the demands of shippers and forwarders 
·  Necessary flexibility to cope with unexpected incidents 
·  Safety considerations 
·  Cost efficiency 
It was seen that the infrastructure managers have an interesting position in the new railway reality: On the 
one  side  are  the  political  aims  and  the  limited  funding  from  the  public,  on  the  other  hand  are  the 
commercial markets. This environment is very demanding both for the IM and for the social planner. 
Charging the use of infrastructure is a way to let the operators have the right incentives when choosing 
their activity level. All use of rolling stock induces tear and wear, not only on the rolling stock itself, but also 
on the infrastructure that is used.  
Charging may also be seen as a way of gaining revenues to the IMs.  However, we would not recommend 
this practice until a particular railway system becomes self-financing without public transfers. Otherwise, 
charges should be set in away that secure that all operators that are willing to pay the costs they induce 
on the network are granted access. In this way the European railways are kept able of adapting into a new 
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Using this deliverable together with Improverail’s state-of-the-art work on cost assessment performed in 
Work Package 5 and Work Package 6 may provide a useful tool in designing and assessing infrastructure 
charges. For slot allocation this deliverable should have given the reader an overview over potentials and 
pitfalls. The lack of a clear and undisputable slot allocation procedure that fits all countries is a result of the 
partners’ common view: Such methodologies do not exist (yet). Possible ways to develop market oriented 
slot allocation is proposed, by introducing limited auctions for residual slots etc.  
 
Work Package 7 in the IMPROVERAIL project recommends the following guidelines for infrastructure 
charging, slot allocation and harmonisation of charges: 
 
·  Implementation  of  comprehensive  railway  management  information  systems  supported  by 
harmonised costing principles, bringing clarity to railway charging across Europe. Data requirements 
in terms of costs related to network provision and associated benefits to the operation are most 
relevant. However other data elements should not be disregarded ,such as the ones related to the 
activity itself, e.g. actual capacity utilisation, slot availability, etc, which are very relevant in the scope 
of the relation between the IM’s and the market (TOC’s). 
·  Infrastructure charging principles based on short run marginal pricing (SRMC), although its non 
consideration of the need for capital cost coverage and of specific market aspects such as WTP may 
be understood as weaknesses of this approach, which may be compensated by a complementary 
charge.  SRMC means that trains are charged per kilometre for the access to the railways. These 
charges should equal the costs of the train’s activity borne by the infrastructure manager, the other 
operators  as  well  as  the  rest  of  the  society.  Thus,  external  effects  like  accident  costs  and 
environmental costs are included. SRMC-pricing does not include investment costs. Therefore, the 
cost elements that are included are tear and wear (maintenance) of the infrastructure, scarcity cost of 
possession of track, congestion charging (delay costs), environmental costs as pollution and noise 
and accident costs.  
·  Cost elements may vary both with type of rolling stock and for different parts of the railway 
network. 
·  National valuations of these cost elements vary. Variations in valuation between countries are not 
regarded  as  a  problem.  Different  charging  principles  in  different  states,  is  on  the  other  hand  a 
problem. This might lead to sub-optimal incentives of routing of trains etc.  Charges may vary but 
charging principles should not. 
·  There is a real risk for too low activity and investment of all types if infrastructure charges related to 
recovery of investment costs are introduced. In this sense, SRMC ensures that the traffic that is 
excluded is not socially profitable. 
·  There are two motivations for departing from SRMC. One is “second-best pricing”, and is derived 
directly from economic theory: “If prices in one specific market are different from price equal to (social) 
marginal cost, it is optimal to adjust prices for alternative goods so that the relative price ratios are 
kept equal to those in the optimal situation. In practice: If road transport or aviation transport pay only 
50% of their total social marginal cost, so should the railways, in order to avoid a bias in favour of road 
and aviation. It can be argued that political biases in favour of railways might lead to subsidies of 
railways  hidden  in  “second-best”  arguments.  The  obvious  solution  to  this  is  to  let  all  modes  of 
transport pay for their social marginal costs, thus making second best optimum equal to first-best. 
·  Another argument is the need for a capital cost coverage factor from the operators for the funding 
of infrastructure. This argument may seems reasonable in terms of allocation, but leads to system 
inefficiency  in  utilisation.  The  optimal  capital  cost  coverage  factor  is  therefore  zero.  If  some 
contributions  are  essential,  a  lump-sum  transfer  is  recommendable.  Charging  a  “per-kilometre” 
contribution margin leads to less railway activity than is optimal. Also competition might suffer if 
profitability of operators is affected. Politicians who see railways as a tool to increase the efficiency of 
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·  Tear and wear of infrastructure caused by rolling stock should be calculated at a desirable level of 
accuracy. This is a major element of SRMC. There will always be a great number of variables that 
affect these costs, and there will always be some inaccuracy and uncertainty in the calculations. The 
effort that is spent on these calculations are justified if the value of fine-tuning the methodology is 
equal or above the costs of estimation. Varying charges for different train-types if the underlying cost 
structure is different is recommendable. A top-down approach with a limited number of parameters 
seems sufficient in most cases 
·  System costs as congestion costs and scarcity costs are difficult to assess and to charge for. The 
best way to calculate these costs is in well functioning auctioning systems. Probably the worst way 
of measuring these costs is by a dysfunctional auctioning system. Therefore; recommendations for 
methodology for calculations of these costs can only be done for a given railway system, assessing 
the level of competition, the ability to control cooperation etc. and the level of these costs. Some 
networks do not have very much congestion, while others are severely congested. Complexity of 
calculation methodology should reflect the potential benefits of these calculations. 
·  In regimes where a well functioning auctioning system is unlikely, the congestion costs can be partly 
taken care of by either one or more mark-ups for congested areas in time and space, or cost-
benefit analysis of different alternative timetabling solutions. The latter may be sufficient in very small 
networks only. 
·  External effects like environmental costs and accident costs should be based on calculations that 
secure that costs induced by different modes of transport in each country are treated in the same 
manner. Otherwise the relative prices of the different transport modes are altered. The methodology 
of assessing these costs is developed continuously.  Regular revisions of charges based on new 
information on the valuation of these costs are probably necessary. 
·  The way that the national railway systems are organised affects the way that charges are set and 
collected. The regulatory environment of the IM is greatly affecting the way that charges must 
be set in order to secure the social optimum. Infrastructure charging is easier to implement in a 
regulatory environment where the IM does not need to be economically viable. An IM that can take 
the social optimum into account will be able to set the correct charges without much governmental 
control.   
·  When the IM is a self-financing entity running on commercial terms, the government must set the 
correct charges. Otherwise the IM will maximise its own profit or revenues instead of securing the 
optimal railway activity. Thus the need for governmental control and surveillance of the railway 
sector increases when the IM is separated from public control. Even the detailed calculations of 
maintenance costs need then to be revised in order to secure that the costs are not exaggerated. 
·  A profit-maximising IM is especially difficult to handle in a situation where the IM or one or more 
operators get public transfers. Then, the system must be controlled in detail in order to avoid 
monopolistic behaviour from the IM.  Only when there is a certain level of production where the 
system as a whole is profitable without any public transfers, profit maximising IM seems reasonable. 
·  Slot  allocation  procedures  mean  everything  from  a  round  table  designing  the  timetable  to  an 
advanced auctioning system for slots, bundles of slots etc. This deliverable explains opportunities that 
lies  in  auctioning  procedures,  but  also  describes  many  of  the  problems  and  pitfalls  that  such 
methodologies induce. A hasty introduction of such systems is therefore not recommended, because 
the efficiency of the timetabling procedures might be reduced instead of increasing. 
·  Auctioning systems for residual slots may be a first step towards an auctioning system for the 
majority of slots in the future. 
·  Such  advanced  system  is  likely  to  function  only  in  situations  with  mature  competitive  railway 
markets. Such a market should have multiple operators that are able to deliver the same type of 
services. In addition public transfers to railway units should be clearly visible. For example public 
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terms, so that the bids reflect their underlying and potential productivity and not their access to public 
money. 
·  Harmonization of charges should be secured by introducing the same charging methodology in all 
states. If costs are varying between states, charges should also vary between states.  The charges of 
each line at all times of the day should be available for all parties upon request. Websites is a good 
alternative for letting international train operators gain immediate access in order to plan, register and 
price  a  specific  train  route.  Transparency  is  thus  a  keyword  in  order  to  arrange  for  increased 
international traffic. 
·  Some procedures for slot allocation and infrastructure charging are presented. The procedures are 
meant as examples of how some problems can be taken care of within a relatively simple system, and 
not as ready-to-implement systems. The European railways are far too different and multi-faceted in 
terms  of  financial,  political,  economic  and  historical  characteristics  to  expect  that  one  charging 
procedure will function well everywhere.   
·  Fair and non-discriminatory charging is an absolute demand in order to develop competition in the 
railway operating market in the years to come 
·  There  are  good  reasons  for  attempting  to  harmonize  national  jurisdiction  and  regulatory 
environments. 
·  Opening up for, and experiencing more cross-border traffic, passenger traffic as well as freight, will 
give us more information for what obstacles and problems are encountered in the different regulatory 
environments. 
·  The market will therefore reveal costs and preferences, so that in near future we will have more 
information for choosing among different regimes. 
·  There is a risk of inefficient rerouting of trains caused by different national charging practices. Only 
when the different charges are based on real internal and external costs in all countries, the market 
will act optimally. 
·  The key word is not harmonisation alone, but transparency: All prices must be visible, and the 
market and money-flows will give further knowledge for develop tomorrow’s railway system. Through 
a  more  developed  international  railway  market  with  transparent  regulation,  financial  flows  and 
charging principles, the way that charging principles should be harmonised will be more visible. 
·  There is a risk for welfare redistributions between countries, where countries near the hubs in 
central-Europe may pay for wear and tear of traffic that are to the benefits for countries positioned 
further out of the centre. This is an argument against lump-sum pricing and in favour of kilometre-
dependent charging. 
·  Charging principles must be complex enough to include the most important train types etc, but simple 
enough to not make the business decisions for the operators unnecessary complex. 
·  New entrants may face troubles to provide a feasible and competitive set of slots. The risk that 
existing operators use market power to take the best slots in order to avoid competition is real. 
·  Slots sold to competing operators, should be sold in some way that reflects the WTP of the operators. 
·  PSOs and stability for end-users suggests that the timetables must be set for a reasonable period 
of time - at least one year.  
·  On the other hand, will too long timetabling periods reduce the pace of reformation in the railway 
sector. 
·  Slots can include quality variables, where WTP should reveal the market preferences and valuation 
·  RailNet Europe is a promising tool in order to provide help to international traffic. Such an organ 
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·  Infrastructure charging and slot allocation procedures can be performed within all present regulatory 
regimes. The way that the IM is functioning, will strongly affect how the market will perform.  
·  Auctioning systems based on market mechanisms will not necessarily lead to better performance of 
the railway system. These methodologies demands both small and transparent public transfers to 
train and track as well as a real competitive market for railway services. 
·  The  preferred  duration  of  the  contracts  between  infrastructure  managers  and  train  operating 
companies differs considerably between both sides. In order to make an investment in rolling stock 
worthwhile for a train operator, the operator will want to have a long contract in order to guarantee 
stability of fees; the infrastructure manager on the other hand will want to maximise flexibility by 
having contracts as short as possible. Grandfathering partly solves this problem, but will also act as a 
barrier against new operators entering the market. 
·  Slot allocation presumes a free market with competing parties. In the case of railways, the market 
might  simply  not  be  big  enough  for  genuine  competition,  as  in  the  case  of  scarcely  populated 
countries. To reach the full economic and operational potential of slot allocation in these cases might 
be hard, if not impossible. 
·  Some IM’s still have very cosy relationships with the national railway operators. This does not benefit 
the entrants, and will hamper the full development of competition. Non-discriminatory treatment for 
different operators is absolutely essential. 
·  An integrated international market for slots, freight or passenger, would certainly remove barriers for 
railway transport and make it a more competitive transport mode. 
·  Penalty systems could be applied, but determining how much damage is caused by a delay is very 
difficult; the time of the delay is a factor but also the number of trains affected by the delay. Finally it is 
not always clear who is responsible for delays. 
·  A well-functioning and flexible system must be offered to the various operators, rules that are imposed 
should be considered fair, operators must perceive to be using a good product. New systems are only 
accepted if they work well. 
￿  Flexibility from the IM side in allocating alternative paths, allowing operators to meet sudden changes 
in  demand;  and  flexibility  with  re-routing  in  case  of  sudden  obstructions  or  other  unexpected 
problems. 
￿  Clear and up-to-date information from the IM side, providing the operators with transparent conditions, 
options and possibilities through high-quality Business-to-Business (B2B) information systems. 
 
 
Some pitfalls that will erode the benefits from commercially oriented systems are: 
 
·  Too high level of cost-coverage of the provision of infrastructure. Most car users never pay for 
the road that they drive upon. Until then, neither should the railway passengers. The need for a 
certain level of cost recovery is understandable. It is in general better to tax the companies’ 
income, rather than a kilometre-dependent charge. This element creates a spike between the 
optimal  charge  and  the  actual  charge,  and  thus  induces  a  too  low  level  of  railway  service 
production. One argument against this viewpoint is that central states may  
·  Too much use of PSOs. PSOs should be used when railway services on some lines are socially 
profitable but not commercially profitable. Of course, if few lines are profitable, no market really 
exists, but as external conditions as technology, jurisdiction as well as the demand structure 
changes and evolves, new lines may become commercially viable. Then, the use of PSOs should 
be reduced. There is a risk that PSOs may function as a pillow, avoiding the stride to increase 
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·  The authorities must ensure that international external conditions are set in such a way that 
international traffic faces the correct set of prices and as little bureaucracy as possible. National 
protectionism is a loss for all. 
 
Regulatory environment 
Public IMs might be less proactive in terms of market development. Public IMs might also be suffering 
from political control rather than aiming at efficient pricing. On the other hand, will the public IM design a 
charging system that is dedicated to maximise efficiency rather than profit. The demands for governmental 
surveillance and control should therefore be much lower, and thereby increase efficiency for the operators 
and low public expenditure on surveillance and control.  Deregulating the IM may not lead to increased 
efficiency in the market; increased governmental control must follow such decisions. 
The socio-economic success of those systems depends on the efficiency of regulation and on the degree 
of competition between TOCs. Presumably this degree of competition will be sufficient mainly for relations 
in and between urbanised regions. Regulation of the IM has not only to ensure the discrimination-free 
access to path capacity at earlier stages of implementation but also the right incentives to the IM to realise 
static, qualitative and dynamic (investment) efficiency. 
In order to meet the demands stated in this section, two new international organs may be necessary. First, 
a unit that can perform surveillance over the charges set in all European countries should be able to reveal 
discriminatory behaviour or profit-seeking behaviour among infrastructure managers. This surveillance 
organ should be continuously active; in order to avoid that discriminatory or other harmful behaviour can 
persist. 
This organ should also keep an eye on timetabling procedures and other track allocation procedures, to 
ensure that these are performed within the ruling regulatory framework. 
 
Another organ may also be implemented: An Information organ keeping track of all charging procedures, 
track allocation procedures etc as well as the operators’ data needed for assessing charges and be 
granted access to a specific piece of track.   
 
International traffic and SRMC 
Charges may for different reasons vary from SRMC. In such cases, the non-discrimination of railway 
operators must still be secured. In an international environment also the non-discrimination of IMs must be 
secured.  If one IM charges above SRMC, the other IMs will suffer a relative disadvantage. On a specific 
route, an operator may be able to pay high transfers to one IM if the rest of the route is run on tracks 
where only SRMC is charged. In a system where all operators would charged the same contribution 
marginabove  SRMC,  this  relative  disadvantage  would  disappear.  There  is  a  need  for  international 
surveillance of the IMs, to secure that market power is not abused. Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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Appendix 1: Case study: Great Britain, Railtrack 
This appendix includes a thorough analysis of British railtrack. This analysis has been undertaken within 
WP7. 
 
A1.1 Case study: Railtrack / NetworkRail 
 
A1.1.1 Privatising the Railways 
 
After 1979 the conservative Government of Great Britain under Mrs. Thatcher launched a programme to 
privatise most of Britain’s national Industries. This included the sell of British Telecom (BT) in 1984, gas 
supply in 1986 and water supply in 1989. All were sold as monopolies. Shortly afterwards “some ministers 
and officials became increasingly concerned about the variable standards of efficiency and service quality 
of the privatised companies, especially where they continued to trade as monopolies”. [FREEMANN 2000] 
It became recognized by politicians that performance was more an issue of competition than of property 
rights. As consequence the electricity industry was privatised vertically separated into the divisions: 
-  Generation: initially 2 companies, 14 licenses by 1993 
-  Grid: regarded as natural monopoly, kept as one unit 
-  Supply: regional companies. 
 
The route towards rail privatisation 
Prime minister Thatcher hesitated with rail privatisation and is said to have seen it as “the Waterloo of this 
government”. Nevertheless the Treasury and several Transport Secretaries pushed for tackling the issue. 
In 1988 the Department of Transport (DoT) came up with five models for rail privatisation: 
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Table 16: Department of Transport’s view of benefits and problems with privatisation (1988) 
Model  Advantages  Disadvantages 
Regional 
Splitting  of  BR  services  into 
around 12 regional companies 
Some  competition  but  largely 
indirect; improved morale through 
local  loyalty;  improved  flexibility 
and efficiency 
Problems  with  through  trains 
between regions; possible loss of 
economies  of  scale;  business 
“mix” within each region requires 
division of management attention 
Track authority 
vertical separation  Promotes competition  On-rail  competition  limited  by 
railway  practicalities,  e.g. 
economics,  capacity;  track 
authority  still  a  monopoly  and 
difficult to regulate; track authority 
remote from rail users; investment 
decisions difficult; potentially high 
transaction costs 
BR plc 
BR privatised as monopoly  Continuity  of  style  and  structure; 
minimal cost of privatisation 
Not even limited competition; size 
of  BR  has  engendered 
“diseconomies of complexity”; lack 
of operational transparency 
Horizontal separation 
Splitting of BR into regional, inter 
city and freight companies 
Avoids  problem  of  operational 
transparency 
Difficulties with track ownership 
Hybrid 
  Better  features  of  other  models 
can  be  incorporated  while  their 




The Treasury preferred the track authority model to promote competition. The intention was “to strip [the 
monopoly] down to the natural monopoly”. The idea was to run train services in open access with on-route 
competition between train operators. 
By the time several problems were recognized with track authority model: 
- timetable planning 
- delay handling 
- through ticketing 
- no turn up and go [because the rider has to buy a ticket for a specific TOC]. 
 
 
Structure of the privatised rail 
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Also a hybrid model was recommended by a working group in 1991 the track authority model was actually 
adopted for privatisation. The decision was influenced by the great urgency the process became after the 
1992 election.  The White Paper “New Opportunities for the Railways” set out - without much detail -  the 
structure of the privatised railway which is reproduced in figure1. As John Swift, the first Regulator, 
describes: “There was minimal details beyond this in almost all areas of rail policy and regulation was no 
exception.” [SWIFT 2001]. 
 
The Railways Act of 5 November 1993 still left many things undefined. According to SHAW, “no details 
were provided for: the structure of the industry, the framework within on-rail competition could develop or 
how rail companies could be regulated.” [SHAW 2000, p.26]. Theoretically it leaves much power for the 
Secretary of State, who can take final decisions on most regulatory issues. 
 
Not all relationships in the industry are regulated. The contracts between providers of rolling stock and the 
TOCs and between the (track) maintenance suppliers and Railtrack are solely subject to their negotiation. 
Regulation between open access passenger operations and freight operations on the one hand and 
Railtrack on the other is limited in comparison to the regulation of franchised passenger services. 
 
Regulator 1997 (on establishment of the SRA) 
“However, there are two particular areas where I believe the Regulator’s powers are not adequate. These 
are constraints on the Regulator’s powers to protect passengers and the exclusion from the definition of 
“railway services” of the activities of the Rolling Stock Companies (ROSCOs).” 
 
BR Freight consisted of four divisions. The only profitable was the trainload service which carries mainly 
coal and steel. The others were Freightliner (container services), Rail Freight Distribution (what was left of 
wagonload services) and Royal Mail Services. Once again the trainload service was divided into three 
companies on a geographical basis to promote competition. Due to a shortness of bidders five of the then 
six divisions were sold to a single buyer which was later renamed English, Welsh and Scottish Railway 
(EWS). Freightliner became the second Freight Railway. In 2002 GB Railfreight, a special carrier for 
nuclear cargo, entered into the market for container hinterland transport out of the harbour of Felixstowe. 
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A1.1.2 Development of Rail Regulation  
 
The British Privatisation Model leads to dual regulation. The regulatory bodies are partly buyers of train 
services and partly responsible for the price of train services (through the determination of track access 
charges). Both tasks cannot possibly lie in one hand. Rather should there be on the one hand a regulator 
for the industry (to ensure especially that the infrastructure monopoly raises fair prices) that is independent 
from government. On the other hand should there be a controller for the huge amount of public money that 
is transferred to the industry as subsidies. The first regulatory body became the (Office of the) Rail 
Regulator (ORR) whose key function is the regulation of Railtrack and the train operating companies. The 
later instance became the Office of Passenger Rail Franchising (OPRAF) whose key function was to 
ensure that the customers of passenger rail get value for money (subsidy and fares). When doing so 
OPRAF – and later SRA  had to respect a set of OIG (Objectives, Instructions and Guidance) drawn up by 
the Secretary of State for Transport. 
 
The following table shows further responsibilities for specific issues that are not always clearly separated. 
[WOLMAR 2001] Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
Page 164 of 194 
 
Table 17: Distribution of responsibilities between ORR and OPRAF 
  ORR  OPRAF 
     
Fares regulation    X 
National railway timetable  X   
Disabled access  X   
Telephone enquiry bureau  X  (X) 
Impartial retailing  X  (X) 
Routeing guide  X  (X) 
Through ticketing  (X)  X 
Multi-modal ticketing    X 
Discount cards  (X)  X 
Interavailability    X 
Information at stations  X  X 
Timetable connections    X 
Passenger’s charter    X 
Complaints handling  X  (X) 
(Parantheses around Xs indicate secondary responsibility) 
 
With the establishment of the SRA the interaction between the two regulatory bodies broadened as the 
SRA became practically buyer of infrastructure services which the network operator provides under ORR-
regulation. 
The third pillar of rail regulation is the Health and Safety Executive who develops safety rules for the 
industry and carries out investigations into accidents. 
 
Regulation by the Rail Regulator 
The Regulator is not only independent from governmental order but also from OPRAF because OPRAF 
has a contractual relationship  with the franchised train operators and is buyer of these train services. 
When the question arose who may provide strategic leadership to the industry Winsor resumed the 
Regulator’s task [ORR 99]: “Regulation must continue to focus on remedying market failure and controlling 
abuse – wherever it is found – to secure fair treatment of dependent users, operators, passengers or 
freight users.” 
The whole regulatory regime is reviewed each 5 years, forming one control period with the first starting in 
1996, through the “Periodic review of Railtrack’s access charges”. The many malfunctions of the system 
proved  it  necessary  that  intermediate  review  are  undertaken  to  make  adjustments  to  charges  or 
contractual regimes. 
 
Railtrack’s income is regulated trough the rate-of-return on a regulatory asset base and the expected 
efficiency savings for the following control period. Figure 2 shows the way Railtrack’s revenue requirement 
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Expenditure and overall level of charges 
 
The  first  review  of  Railtrack’s  original  access  charges  made  the  following  assumptions  on  revenue 
expenditure (in 94/95 £): 
 
maintenance and operations  £ 1.47 bn pa, increasing with inflation minus 2% pa 
asset renewals      £ 0.57 bn pa 
investment backlog    £ 0.50 bn for the control period 
 
The investment backlog was not to be covered by access charges but to be added to the asset value at 
the end of the period. Therefore Railtrack started of with an annual expenditure projection of £ 2.04 bn. An 
report from Booz Allen & Hamilton (BAH) points out that the allowance for asset renewal was recognized 
as insufficient. The Long Form Report projected expenditure on renewals of 0.88 bn pa during the first 
control period. And in May 1996 in the prospectus for Railtrack’s flotation the Regulator expected Railtrack 
to invest £ 3.5 bn in the renewal of the network during the period. [BAH 1999] 
 
Railtrack’s revenue requirement has to be completely covered by track access charges. Public grants are 
expressed as parts of the fixed charge that is charged to the funders. A Charging Implementation Group 
developed the original charging system in 1994 prior to Railtrack’s vesting. They should have covered 
operating costs, depreciation and return on capital, based on the Modern Equivalent Asset Value and a 
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In 1995, prior to flotation, Regulator John Swift reduced charges by 8% for the period 1995/96 and allowed 
increases of inflation minus 2% in subsequent years. But in the same year, Swift allowed Railtrack to 
charge an extra 75m for possible losses from the performance regime, which meant that about 3% of the 
8%-cut were recovered. 
 
Actually, Railtrack’s maintenance, renewal and operating expenditure was steadily increasing during the 
first control period (95/96 – 00/01), from about 2,2 bn in 95/96 to nearly 3 bn. The regulator’s projection for 
the second control period shows an expenditure of 16,15 bn for the five years (operational expenditure of 
4,519 bn, renewals of 8,268 bn and maintenance of 3,346 bn), which makes about 3,2 bn annually. 
Considering the savings through improved efficiency leaves an expenditure of 14,87 bn equalling about 3 
bn annually. Consequently the level of charges was increased by about 50% for the second control period. 
 
Regulatory Asset Base 
 
The regulatory asset base was set at 5.515 billion for the beginning of the control period 2001-2006. This 
amount contains (in 98/99 prices): 
initial value    £  3.040  bn 
backlog *)    £  0.530  bn 
renwals      £  0.700  bn 
enhancements    £  1.365  bn 
under-delivery    £-0.120  bn 
*) An investment backlog which Railtrack inherited from pre-floatation time. 
 
Capital cost 
The cost of capital is currently was increased with the review from 5,1% to 8%, admitting a higher risk in 
Railtrack’s operation of the network. 
 
Efficiency 
Railtrack’s efficiency target by which the value of expenditure is decreased shall be set “so that: 
·  the resulting cost levels are achievable [..]; 
·  Railtrack gets incentives to outperform the assumed efficiency savings by being allowed to retain 
the benefits for a period of years; and 
·  it is not unduly difficult for Railtrack to finance its relevant activities.” 
 
For the second control period the regulator set a target that is equivalent to annual savings of 3.1% over 
the 5 years. 
The regulator relied on comparison with international best practice and on comparison with efficiency 
savings  gained  by  the  National  Grid  Company  after  privatisation.  Adding  a  potential  for  changes  in 
Railtrack’s contracting strategy the Regulator assumed efficiency savings in the five years of the second 
control period of 2, 3, 4, 4, and 5% respectively. This gives a constant equivalent of 3.1% calculated from 
the 2000/01 base. 
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A difficulty of assessing Railtrack’s efficiency is to distinguish whether Railtrack is inefficient due to bad 
management or due to the state of the network Railtrack inherited. E.g. the British network used to be 
underfed with ballast but Railtrack should bring bedding to a modern level. So even if Railtrack performs 
well, there will be routes with poor ballast left of BR at times that cause higher than normal usage costs. 
 
BAH used a number of indicators to evaluate Railtrack’s efficiency, e.g. the number of sleepers or rail-km 
replaced or the average age of rails. Comparisons to US values were undertaken but whether the US rail-
network is comparable to UK’s is questionable (the US network is a low-speed heavy freight network). 
 
The incentive framework between Railtrack and the TOCs is basically set out in schedules to the track 
access agreement. 
Schedule 4  possession regime 
Schedule 5  train path quality 
Schedule 7  charges 
Schedule 8  performance regime 
 
Possessions (schedule 4) 
A possession is an allocated train path of which the network operator takes possession for track work. 
Schedule 4 provides a compensation regime for possessions and, in particular, incentives for the early 
planning of possessions. 
The payment rate is based in the rates under the performance regime with discounts for early notification. 
These discounts are 
·  notification at least 46 days in advance    ￿ 75% 
·  notification at least 22 days in advance    ￿ 50% 
·  notification until 22h the day before    ￿ 20% 
 
Railtrack’s estimated costs under the possessions regime for the second control period are 370 million in 
98/99 prices. 
 
Journey and departure times (schedule 5)  
To allow Railtrack a certain amount of flexibility in timetable planning and operation, it may flex the regular 
travel time a service normally takes to run on a line from point A to B. This means that some trains may be 
scheduled with longer travel times or differing departure times. Originally minimum / maximum travel times 
per route section where incorporated into schedule 5. This was to assure that Railtrack maintains the 
network in a way that travel times do not deteriorate over time. 
With the second review of track access charges a new schedule 5 was introduced, that rules the topic 
more precisely. The regulators approach was, that TOCs may be more interested in the travel time the 
majority of their trains can offer and less in the journey time of the slowest trains. He also feared, that 
when  agreeing  solely  on  a  maximum  journey  time  Railtrack  may  tend  to  schedule  all  trains  at  the 
maximum to relief pressure under the performance regime. 
Thus the new form of agreement between TOCs and Railtrack contains regular and maximum journey 
time and the percentage of trains that runs within the regular time. 
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Track access charges (schedule 7) 
As stated above the access charges have to cover Railtrack’s revenue requirement. There are variable 
parts (usage, electricity, scarcity) that are independently assessed, the remainder is charged over a fixed 
charge (“fixed” meaning that the aggregated amount is pre-set, not meaning that it is a lump sum to be 
paid by every operator). 
 
Originally the variable part of the charge was set low, accounting for about 9% of the charge’s volume. 
The fixed charge made the bulk of the charge, representing 91% of Railtrack’s required income. This 
charge is allocated to the operators according to their share of train-miles. The result was an insensitivity 
of the system to changing traffic volume. New trains brought Railtrack very little extra money. As Leathley 
says: “Passenger-train operators are in fact able to increase the amount of trains they run by around 8 per 
cent without paying additional track-access charges [..].” [LEATHLEY 2000] 
Congestion costs of new services were taken into account by a negotiated congestion fee. In the same 
way  a  negotiated  profit  share  set  Railtrack’s  incentive  for  increasing  capacity.  Unfortunately  both 
incentives turned out to be insufficient. Since Railtrack did not earn from additional trains it had no interest 
in providing capacity. Worse, if in fact more than 9% of Railtrack’s costs were variable with usage – what 
experience elsewhere suggested – Railtrack would loose from additional trains. Although Railtrack could 
achieve some improvements in the first two years it performed badly in capacity enhancement during the 
first control period. The operators introduced new services anyway because of their low marginal costs. 
The result was a deteriorating network performance. 
 
Both Railtrack and the Regulator worked on a revised charging system for introduction with the review of 
2001. The main topic was to sharp the incentive for more capacity. The points were: 
·  introduction of a capacity charge 
·  introduction of a fixed profit share (volume incentive) 
·  a tightened performance regime 
 
The components of the charging system now are 
·  usage charge 
·  capacity charge 
·  electricity charge 
·  fixed charge 
·  volume incentive 
 
Excluding the volume incentive, the income from charges was set for the second control period at: 
(01/02 £) 
usage      871 m      8,9% 
capacity     392 m      4,0% 
electricity    699 m      7,2% 
fixed    7776 m    79,9% 
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The overall variability of charges increased to 20% compared to 9% in the first control period. 
 
Usage, capacity and electricity charges charge for marginal costs. Of the three, the electricity charge has 
caused the fewest disputes so far though it includes a charge for electrification asset usage, which has to 
be analysed like all usage costs. The other two are discussed in more detail in the next sections. 
 
Analysis of usage costs 
Usage costs are the costs that are directly incurred by a train on tracks and structures (but not on 
electrification infrastructure). Their calculation is based on a model called MINI-MARPAS used by British 
Rail, which calculates usage cost estimates for all different vehicle types. As BAH writes in 1999: “It was 
intended at the time these charges were developed that, in the longer term, Railtrack would refine its 
approach to estimating these costs which varied with usage.” [BAH 1999] 
 
While BAH analysed usage costs for the Regulator analysis for Railtrack came from AEA Technology that 
had bought BR Research. For track usage Railtrack/AEA came up with a “bottom-up” approach. Based on 
the  MINI-MARPAS  a  set  of  track  damage  models  was  developed  which  calculate  maintenance 
requirement per vehicle km for different vehicle types and track categories. Combined with the unit costs 
of maintenance activities costs per vehicle km can be calculated. “The damage models use [..] detailed 
data on vehicle characteristics, particularly speed, number of axles, unsprung mass, and suspension 
characteristics.” [BAH 1999] The main criticism on the models was that it charges the TOCs the costs of 
what should be done for maintaining the network because it calculated maintenance costs ex-ante. But it 
was in no way assured that these activities were actually carried out. 
 
BAH instead recommended a top-down approach which uses Railtrack’s actual maintenance activity as 
cost base. Maintenance work has to be classified in different categories (see below) and cost variability 
with usage was analysed and estimated in several engineering studies for setting variable charges at an 
appropriate level. Not surprisingly some dispute arose between Railtrack and the Regulator over these 
variability estimates with Railtrack naturally seeking for a higher-level variability. In a second step cost 
drivers for the variable costs were identified. 
 
The different asset categories in the analysis of usage cost were: 
·  track 
o  rails 
o  sleepers 
o  ballast 
o  switches and crossings 
o  inspection 
·  signals 
o  multi-aspect light 
o  shunt signal 
o  electric and hydraulic points 
o  mechanical points Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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o  level crossings 
·  electrification 
o  DC 
￿  conductor rail 
￿  substation 
￿  HV feeder cable network 
o  AC 
￿  contact wire 
￿  other OLE equipment 
￿  feeder station equipment 
￿  line side structures 
·  structures 
 
The analysis of variability of costs with usage goes far into technical details and if available an abundance 
of data can be used in the issue. A problem of the top-down approach is, that cost variability is not equal 
for all routes but varies with the cost drivers itself. As an example table 15 shows the variance of cost 
variability with daily tonnage on a track. 
 
Another interesting finding of the analysis in UK is that cost variability differs with track quality. The harm 
of e.g. bad suspension is lower on modern, well-maintained track – reducing the suspensions impact on 
cost variability – than on ill-conditioned track. 
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Table 18: BAH’s conclusion on cost variability 
Asset category  percentage of costs variable 
Track    38 
- Maintenance  30   
- Rail Renewal  95   
- Sleeper Renewal  25   
- Ballast Renewal  30   
- S&C Renewal  80   
Structures    10 
Signals    2 
- Maintenance  5   
- Renewal  0   
Electrification    24 
- Maintenance   10   
- Renewal DC  41   
- Renewal AC  35   
 
Still, cost variability does not give information on which the drivers of cost variation are. For identifying cost 
drivers BAH analysed maintenance expenditure for different network sections and compared this with the 
characteristics of traffic running over the section. 
Their regression showed, that most cost variation can be explained by three variables of traffic 
- axle load 
- speed 
- unsprung mass 
further are some specialities covered by extra coefficients 
- coal wagons because they pollute the ballast thus reducing its yielding and draining capability 
- multiple-unit vehicles and passenger coaches for their lower traction effort 
- a specific multiple unit (class 14x: “Pacer”) for having a less track friendly suspension 
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With the above characteristics every vehicle can be assigned a damage-equivalence factor (DEF) of the 
type 
DEF = axleload0.49 * speed0.64 * unsprung mass0.19 * dirt * mu * pacer 
with dirt = 1.2 for loaded coal wagons (else 1), mu = 0.89 for multiple units (else 1) and pacer = 1.1 for 
MUs of pacer class (else 1). 
 
The resulting level of variable charges found by BAH are given in table 3. 
 
Table 19: BAH; variable charges 
    charge until 2001  BAH base 
average passenger  
charge 
p / veh-mile  5,65  11,83 
average freight charge  p / veh-mile  7,07  10,62 
average passenger  
charge 
£ / 1000 gt miles  1,30  2,85 
average freight charge  £ / 1000 gt miles  1,43  2,44 
       
 
 
It is obvious from this study that the marginal costs of a train run are roughly twice as high as was 
assumed hitherto. Nevertheless the share of the usage charge stayed at 9% of the charging volume. The 
recommended increase in the variability of charges was achieved by the introduction of the capacity 
charge. 
 
Congestion costs and Capacity charge 
Railtrack claimed that an increase in number of trains of 1% leads to a 2,5% increase in congestion-
related delays. Between 1995 and 1999 the number of trains increased by 8%. The existing negotiation of 
a congestion fee for new services until 2002 was neither really liked by the TOCs nor by Railtrack because 
it caused transaction costs and uncertainty in the financial planning. Thus all parties agreed on introducing 
a pre-set congestion charge, called capacity charge. 
 
A consultation document set out four possible dimensions of the capacity charge 
·  route section 
·  time 
·  service speed 
·  schedule 5 flex 
 
The regulator concluded that the charge should be differentiated to rote section and time. Service speed 
shall only for new services be used as an indicator. Railtrack expects that occasions where new services 
have a considerably different speed than existing services will be rare, so that a negotiated fee can be 
retained for these cases. Railtrack’s flexing rights are not incorporated so far. Deliverable 9 - Improved Data Background to Support Current and Future Infrastructure Charging Systems 
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The unit prices for the capacity charge were developed by comparing empirical data on train frequency 
(degree of capacity utilisation) and delays. Railtrack recovers half of its performance payments by the 
congestion charge, the other half remains being covered over the fixed charge. 
 
Allocation of the fixed charge 
The  basic  principal  of  allocating  the  fixed  charge  between  the  operators  and  the  funders  (mainly 
Passenger Transport Executives and the SRA) is to sum up Railtrack’s costs in specific categories and to 
break them down again onto the relevant operators or funders. The metric for allocation of the charge to 
the operators (Step 5) is their number of vehicle miles actually operated. 
 
·  Step 1 – determine allocation treatment of each single till item; 
·  Step 2 – allocate cost and revenue items between the individual categories (national, 
specific zones or strategic routes) in accordance with step 1; 
·  Step  3  – cost  and  revenue items  allocated  to  individual categories  will then be 
summed; 
·  Step 4 – the totals for each category will then be allocated between TOCs and 
funders 
·  Step 5 – each of the cost categories (national, Strategic Route and zonal) will be 
summed for each TOC and funders; 
·  Step 6 – any TOC specific revenues will then be added to the resulting charge;  
·  Step  7  –  the  resulting  charges  will  then  be  profiled  to  be  consistent  with  the 
Regulator’s determination; 
·  Step 8 – charges for enhancements negotiated in the first control period will then be 
added to the individual fixed charges; and 
·  Step 9 – the resulting base fixed charges will be scaled down to take account of the 
central revenue grant and profiling of the revenue requirement 
 
The allocation of Railtrack’s costs to a cost category may not always be clear, the regulator states the 
necessity to “identify the most granular level of data available and use it to construct a disaggregation 
metric.” [ORR 2001]. 
Main data sources for the process are 
·  the  outputs  from  a  process  of  zonal  cost  analysis  which  Railtrack  carried  out 
specifically for this purpose, in March and April 2000; 
·  detailed breakdowns of projected future expenditures as laid out in the 2000 Network 
Management Statement (NMS); and 
·  Railtrack zonal business plan data. 
 
 
Performance regime (schedule 8) 
A performance regime was negotiated between BR, Railtrack, OPRAF and the regulator under supervision 
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“In simple terms, the scheme established by service-group average-delay benchmarks achieved for the 3 
years prior to privatisation. Performance was reviewed each 28 days [..] and where Railtrack achieved an 
average below the benchmark then the TOC would pay Railtrack, at a rate agreed for the service group, 
and when Railtrack failed to achieve its benchmark then it would be penalised with payment to the TOC.”. 
[EDMONDS 2000] 
 
BAH found the system to operate soundly, however some criticism arose. Charles Belcher, Managing 
Director of Silverlink, found fault in the level of payments: “the level of incentive and penalty available to 
Railtrack is really not large enough to influence a multi-billion-pound-turnover company. Others criticized 
the effort train operators needed or wanted to take to assure delay responsibility was fairly allocated. 
The first two years after implementation saw significant performance improvements, but in the third year 
Railtrack only achieved a 2% improvement. Railtrack agreed to a 7,5% improvement in 98/99 but failed to 
deliver. In August 1999 the Regulator Tom Winsor placed an enforcement order on Railtrack to deliver an 
performance improvement of 12,7% in 99/00 (to catch up the missing performance improvement from 
98/99) with a fine of 4 million for each percentage point of under-delivery. Railtrack nearly managed to 
achieve this target, before the Hatfield incident made the whole system temporarily absurd. 
 
 Regulation of Railtrack’s freight services 
 
As  with  passenger  services  the  Regulators  key  function  for  freight  is  to  approve  the  track  access 
agreements between Railtrack and the FOCs which include the charges. 
 
After the six freight companies where established in shadow form within BR the original access contracts 
where negotiated with Railtrack. For the trainload companies the contracts where set per route, which lead 
to  about  150  different  contracts.  In  contrast  there  was  one  national  contract  for  Freightliner.  The 
government had set a principle that the charges should reflect the market value of the freight traffic. The 
sell of the freight railways ended in the dominance of one operator, EWS. EWS soon sought to replace its 
numerous  contracts  by  a  single  contract.  The  result  was  a  single  4-year-agreement  with  high  fixed 
charges but at a competitive low level. The then Rail Regulator John Swift intervened and limited the 
number of paths for EWS at bottlenecks because he feared that the passenger operations could be 
adversely effected by the contract. 
 
Structure of track access charges for freight 
 
Though set and reviewed separately, the structure of track access charges for freight are today generally 
in line with those for passenger services. The major difference between freight and passenger charges is 
that freight services do not pay for Railtrack’s fixed costs that are common between passenger and freight 
traffic. The freight’s fixed charge is taken over by the SRA through an adjustment of the network grants 
which Railtrack receives from SRA. 
 
The review process in 2001 showed a general tendency that determined charges are preferred amongst 
the rail freight industry, as pioneered by EWS. So the new freight access charging system looks like this: 
-  Variable charges include usage, traction electricity, a performance components 
and a capacity (congestion) charge. 
-  The same top down models, including track damage models that are also used 
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for  wagon  and  loco  type  and  a  discount  for  wagons  with  track-friendly 
suspension was introduced with the review of track access charges in 2001. 
-  Capacity  charges  for  freight  are  currently  set  at  a  rate  10%  lower  than  for 
passenger  services,  taking  into  account  that  freight  trains  can  normally  be 
scheduled  with  greater  flexibility  and  therefore  impose  a  lower  risk  for 
congestion costs under the performance regime than passenger trains. For the 
same reason Royal Mail services pay the full capacity charge. 
 
Charges are still agreed upon individually between Railtrack and each freight company, but the Regulator 
expects all network access agreement s to include the above aspects and to result in a comparable level 
of charge for each operator. 
 
 
Allocation of train paths 
The system of capacity allocation is governed by the structure of the privatised rail. Most passenger trains 
run under a franchise agreement which sets out the nature of the service, route, service hours, minimum 
frequency  and  minimum  journey  times.  These  characteristics  are  incorporated  into  the  track  access 
agreements and in its timetable planning Railtrack has to respect the operator’s duties under the franchise 
agreement as well. Furthermore, to avoid coordination failure, Railtrack and the operators are bound by 
contract to provide connections between their services. As a result, the degree of freedom in the planning 
process is limited. The regulator overviews the timetabling process with his regulatory objectives and 
intervenes casually, like in the said EWS access contract. 
 
The regulator of 1997 describes the timetabling process as an “essentially consultative one which includes 
·  the production by Railtrack of initial timetable parameters, including details of engineering work 
proposed; 
·  an iterative bidding process during which train operators bid for train paths consistent with their 
access rights and Railtrack allocates capacity on the basis of public interest decision criteria; 
·  an appeals process to settle disputes; and 
·  the production, and ultimately publication, of the timetable by Railtrack.” [SWIFT 1997b] 
 
The public decision criteria are focused on passengers and describe the benefits the resulting timetable 
shall have, but do not include rules to solve a specific path conflict:. This is even more insufficient since 
Railway Act requires the Regulator to protect “the interests of persons providing services for the carriage 
of passengers or goods” and the growth of rail freight transport is heavily emphasized by the government. 
 
In 2001 it was publicly recognized that the determination of capacity rights is a shortfall of the system. The 
likely impacts on allocation efficiency became even greater as the degree of network utilisation increased. 
Therefore the Secretary of State has directed the SRA to develop a policy for the utilisation of network 
capacity. 
SRA started the consultation process in 2002 and implementation of the policy is planned for 2003/2004. 
The approach is a combination of coordinated timetable planning, investment management and path 
restriction. The SRA is going to regulate – where necessary – the number of paths that have to be 
reserved for long-distance trains. Under a National Network Utilisation Strategy the SRA will develop 
Route Utilisation Strategies which include core service frequencies, principals by which conflicts are to be 
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(draft timetables for more than one year in the future) that help to assess investment and rolling stock 
requirements in new franchise agreements that guarantee short running or dwell times. [SRA 2002] 
 
 
Stewardship of the network 
John Edmonds questions the widely shared opinion that Railtrack underspent on the network from the 
start. [EDMONDS 2000] He points out that Railtrack faced budget constraints while it was still a public 
company and was “unable to spend against the full Asset Maintenance Plan change in its accounts. The 
outstanding figure was carried forward as an accrual in its balance [..].” As a consequence Railtrack was 
floated with an investment backlog of about £700 million. This backlog was never removed although 
Railtrack actually spent more in the first control period than the Regulator had foreseen as expenditure 
requirement. 
Nevertheless  Railtrack  could  not  clear  the  concern  of  insufficient  maintenance  and  renewal  activity 
(underinvestment) in the years following. Moreover the regulatory framework left the regulator with no 
power to make provisions for specific improvements. In brief, Railtrack did not have to enhance the 
network if it preferred not to do it. Railtrack’s Network Management Statements which it was obliged to 
publish gained wide criticism for a lack of strategy as well as detail and verifiability. 
 
New license condition 7 
After a review of Railtrack’s Network Management Statement for 1997 the Regulator John Swift replaced 
the existing Condition 7 of the Network Licence by an entirely new one. The intention was to improve 
Railtrack’s accountability for its activities in maintaining, renewing, enhancing and developing the network. 
The old condition had simply imposed on Railtrack an “obligation to plan” but not to deliver. The new 
condition introduced not only a stronger duty to relate planned projects to the users need (para 5) but also 
a duty to report the progress of work against the previous network management statement (para 8). This 
gives the regulator a basis for enforcement action if Railtrack fails to achieve its own targets. However the 
regulator’s power is limited. As Swift explains: “I have a duty under section 4 of the Railways Act [..] to act 
in a manner which will not render it unduly difficult for Railtrack to finance its regulated activities. I cannot, 
therefore, impose an absolute obligation on Railtrack which takes no regard of its ability to finance its 
activities.” [FREEMAN 2000, p. 79] 
 
The BAH report of 1999 attests that “Railtrack’s physical activity in renewing assets has been below 
expectations.” [BAH 1999]. 
 
In 2000 a new paragraph 16A-16I was incorporated in the Railway Act that allows the newly established 
Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) to direct Railtrack to carry out specified improvements on the network. 
 
A  critical  point  that  was  identified  with  Railtrack’s  dissatisfying  performance  was  Railtrack’s  lack  of 
knowledge over the condition of its assets. The need for an extensive database that contains information 
about age, state-of-repair, contractors became even more vital as contractors, which Railtrack did not 
adequately  monitor,  carried  out  the  work  on  the  network.  Databases  existed  but  were  run  by  the 
contractors  individually.  The  implementation  of  a  single  asset  database  (IAMS)  should  have  been 
completed in 2001. 
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Regulation by OPRAF / SRA 
 
Key of the passenger service regulation is the passenger service requirement (PSR). It determines for 
each route a minimum service frequency, maximum journey times, the time of the earliest and latest trains 
and, in certain cases, minimum capacity levels. The level of service was by and large based on the 
foregoing BR service. 
 
OPRAF also safeguarded service at stations. In the franchise agreement the required service from both 
hours to public phones on platforms was defined. OPRAF monitored the compliance and penalised an 
operator for failing – which became published in annual reports. 
 
The strategic development of the rail network became a most critical issue in the time after privatisation. 
Railtrack took over the operation of the network in 1994 and most passenger rail franchises were let in 
95/96. In the year privatisation was completed, 1997, the Rail Regulator introduced the described new 
licence condition 7 to strengthen Railtrack’s obligation to deliver network enhancements. But the new 
government “was looking for much greater institutional changes to reassert control and direction over what 
was perceived to be a disaggregated and leaderless railway.” [SWIFT 2000] Thus was proposed the 
establishment of a Strategic Rail Authority as a response to Railtrack’s failure to provide a strategy for and 
to conduct investment into the network and of the dissatisfying quality for passengers in the daily services. 
 
The SRA was created in shadow form in 1999 and legally established with the Transport Act 2000. Like 
OPRAF it operates under Directions and Guidance from the Secretary of State for Transport. 
 
Superordinated aims were: 
- to increase public accountability of the railway 
- to provide strategic leadership for the industry 
 
The first point resulted in the SRA’s absorbing the functions of the Franchise Director, including the 
overseeing of franchises and the existing powers to protect consumers. 
The second point has much broader implications. The SRA translates the governments transport policy 
into actions for the railway. As the then Regulator, John Swift, suggested, the SRA should not command 
the passenger rail, it should be the agent of the government. It should decide what kind of passenger and 
freight  railway  should  be  publicly  sponsored.  Logically,  the  SRA  takes  decisions  about  network 
enhancements and finances them. So not only is the SRA buyer of train services (like OPRAF before) but 
it is buyer of infrastructure also. 
 
One of the early actions the SRA took to provide network improvements was the Incremental Output 
Statement scheme (IOS). The SRA discussed possible IOS’s with the operators and Passenger Transport 
Executives.  335  schemes  (either  improving  capacity,  journey  time  or  operational  flexibility)  where 
presented to Railtrack and the Regulator analysed the resulting revenue requirement for the network 
operator who where to deliver the IOS. After considering the prices and times of possible completion of the 
individual schemes the SRA kept 211 measures to be incorporated into the following periodic review. For 
the relevant operators the fixed charge will be increased by a predetermined amount as soon as an IOS is 
completed. 
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Investment into the network was Railtrack’s task. After Railtrack’s collapse a major policy change took 
effect in that “infrastructure investment and refranchising are likely to proceed along separate, but closely-
related courses.” Already in its IOS-proposal of 1999 the SRA had suggested that schemes that can’t be 
directly brought forward with Railtrack could be implemented in connection with a franchise replacement. 
The SRA was also prepared to agree to long franchise terms up to 20 years like for the Chiltern and South 
Central franchises were the SRA hoped to secure in return 370 m or 1,5 bn of investment capital from the 
operators [RG 9/2001]. Obviously the operators are much more willing to contribute to capital projects if 
they are dedicated to “their” routes. 
 
The Secretary of State, Stephen Byers, followed a more short-term focus. On 16 July 2001 he announced 
that he wanted the SRA “to concentrate on improving services for passengers within existing franchises, 
or by negotiating short two-year extensions.” [RG 9/2001] 
 
The policy requires more financial commitment from the franchised TOCs but also strengthens their role 
because they now participate in capital decisions through the franchise negotiations. 
 
In 2001 the SRA came up with a strategy that included reducing the number of operators on major lines. 
Essentially there should be only one franchised operator at each of the London terminal stations – at least 
as far as feasible. The motive is that the SRA values the gains through better service optimisation higher 
than the loss of competition. The SRA states: 
￿
The proposed policy 
The SRA proposes to pursue the objective of having a single (substantive) operator at each of the major 
London termini. We believe this approach is right for the following reasons: 
·  A single operator would facilitate optimum use of available capacity both in the station and on the 
approaches to the station.  
·  A single operator would provide a simplified, more understandable and impartial day to day 
interface with the passenger  
·  A single operator would remove many contractual interfaces at stations and simplify the timetable 
planning process.  
·  A single operator would improve reaction to service disruptions.  
·  A single operator should be able to exploit improved economies of scale.  
There are some potential disadvantages from this approach, which we recognise. We are confident that 
we can adopt contractual mechanisms to minimise or eradicate these risks;  
·  Combination of an Inter-City operator with a commuter operator could result in the business focus 
being on the more commercial services to the detriment of the others.  
·  Where  competition  between  operators  has  resulted  in  additional  benefits  to  passengers 
(particularly on the quality/price issue), combination could present an opportunity to 'back track'.  
Potential solutions to these issues could include clearly specified targets for performance and service 
levels and (where appropriate) regulation of fares and the establishment of dedicated management units 
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Our proposed policy will not be able to capture any possible future advantages of on-rail competition. 
Whilst this is a potential disadvantage, we believe that it is a relatively low probability as there has been 
competitive stability for some time (e.g. Anglia and First Great Eastern). Much spare capacity has been 
consumed since 1995-96, limiting the scope for extending direct competition. Moreover, we believe that 




It is not possible to evaluate this strategy from the current point of view. Actually the concentration of the 




The post-privatisation reform 
The Hatfield incident fell in a time when it was broadly accepted that the network was in bad state but that 
the establishment of the SRA and the changes in the incentive regime would turn the development. 
After  Hatfield  everyone  –  including  Railtrack  –  realised  that  the  network  operator  had  only  limited 
knowledge of the condition of its assets, especially the rails. Railtrack was challenged with both the 
revealing of an immense need for track renewal and with high penalties through the performance regime. 
To carry on Railtrack was granted by the Secretary of State a sum which included 1,5 bn which were 
originally due for the third control period 2006-11. But the sum was not enough for Railtrack to stabilise its 
business. When Railtrack asked for a further grant in late 2001 it was placed into administration following 
a successful request of the Secretary of State. 
 
Railtrack was bought out of administration in October 2002 for 500 million by a company limited by 
guarantee.  Network  Rail  seeks  to  re-integrate  track  maintenance  and  network  management.  Key 
maintenance decisions and the operation of inspection and day-to-day maintenance shall be transferred to 
Network Rail. The core activity of the new network operator shifted from management of the network to 
control over the network. 
 
With franchise terms the SRA u-turned in late 2002. Had it been the strategy to negotiate 20-year terms 
they now cut term length back to 5-8 years. The new franchise agreements will be much more detailed 
about how the operators have to deliver the train services. For Bowker the trains are “a public service 
privately delivered” [MORTON 2003], the subsidy can then be interpreted as a management fee. 





Lessons learned and problems identified 
 
·  Difficulty to set charges (great change in level of charges with the second review) 
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The level of charges was lowered by 8% in the first review and raised by 50% in the second review. The 
reason was that neither the Regulator nor the network had adequate information on the state of the 
network and the resulting expenditure need. 
The literature offers different reasons for this 
-  the separation of the network management from network maintenance or at least a flawed contractual 
relationship between them 
-  the loss of know-how with the vanishing of British Rail 
-  the absence of a compound database on network assets 
 
·  Difficulty to set the right incentives with regard on traffic volume and investment/capacity enhancement 
 
The original charging regime anticipated a shrinking market. Thus a high share of the fixed charge should 
distract operators from abolishing services. Partly due to fare regulation, the market happened to grow 
strongly in some regions. In this case the charging system lead to false incentives because the network 
operator did not benefit from new services and subsequently did not want to invest in additional capacity. 
This is true for passenger as well as for freight services. 
EWS has complained that it would like to grow and invest into new rolling stock, but that Railtrack does not 
deliver the complementary capacity. That there is a quiet potential for investment among the TOCs was 
also shown by the franchise extension for South Central Trains. The franchisee offered investment into 
rolling stock and infrastructure worth no less than 1.5 bn in return for a 20-year-contract.  
 
·  Shifting responsibility for investment 
 
At the beginning of the privatisation process all strategic and operational responsibility for capital projects 
lay on Railtrack. As Railtrack failed to deliver a satisfying level of renewal and enhancement the SRA was 
put in charge for strategic leadership within the industry and the planning and coordination of investment 
while Railtrack was still responsible for carrying out the projects. After it became clear that Railtrack could 
net get sufficient funding from the capital market the SRA sought to get commitments for investment from 
the train operators through extended franchise terms. The next step in this logic is the single operator 
strategy, which will allow train operators to internally optimise the bottlenecks on their route. Consequently 
operators could decide independently where on their route enhancement schemes they finance should 
take place. 
Then  the  responsibility  for  investment  would  have  shifted  away  from  the  network  operator  to  the 
passenger train operators. Complementarily the focus of Railtrack – now Network Rail – has moved from 
managing the network to engineering the network. 
 
·  Difficulty to coordinate multiple operators (or why is there a single operator strategy?) 
 
The British example suggests that coordination amongst different operators on one line becomes far more 
complex when the network is used to capacity. External effects increase in form of delay costs as well as 
in opportunity costs when trains cannot be allocated at all. This is why SRA aims at having only one 
operator on the major lines into London, so that the operator can solve path conflicts at “his” bottlenecks 
internally.  Another  benefit  may  be  an  increased  incentive  for  the  single  operator  to  spend  in  route 
enhancement. 
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·  Too little competition 
A major reason for adopting the track authority model for privatisation was to encourage competition 
between different train operators. But since capacity rights were largely determined by passenger service 
requirements competition in the market was unlikely to evolve. Moreover the franchisees had agreed to a 
specific  need  of  subsidy  or  even  to  paying  a  premium  –  based  on  existing  services.  Therefore  the 




Data used in UK 
To summarize: In the UK two main elements have been determined to approximate the variable 
costs of railway infrastructure use. Those are usage costs and scarcity costs. 
 
Usage costs 
1.  passenger vehicle miles per vehicle type per route section 
2.  freight vehicle miles per vehicle type per route section 
3.  average speed per route section 
4.  vehicle weights 
5.  vehicle bogie and suspension types, especially unsprung mass 
6.  type of rail (rail weight) 
7.  track quality 
8.  line geometry (curvature) 
 
Scarcity costs 
The calculation of the capacity charge tariff is done on the basis of the NID (National Infrastructure 
Database). This is a detailed model of the railway network, down to the level of individual tracks and 
routes through stations and junctions. Encoded within the NID are the relevant aspects of the Rules of the 
Plan  and other  related  information,  so for  every  track there  is data  about headways,  linecodes  and 
directionality. 
The statistical regression carried out for each of the relevant routes is of the following form: 
Dit = Ai e(bCit) 
where: 
Dit is the delay per train on route section i, in time band t; 
Ai is a constant term estimated for each route section i; 
Cit is the index of capacity utilisation on the route section i in time band t; and 
b is the estimated coefficient for a specific route. 
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Appendix 2 EU railway legislation and its implementation 
A2.1 EU railway legislation and its implementation 
Overview 
The railways across Europe have been subject to change, from integrated organisations closely related to 
governments  into  several  split  bodies,  increasingly  separated  from  governmental  control.  While  the 
Council Directive 91/440 changed the basic organisation of railways, other measures were put to place 
furthering the objectives set. This brought along new challenges that the Railway world is facing today 
such as the fact that the automatic mechanisms of the integrated organisations have been seriously and 
structurally disrupted by the disintegration of railways. In fact, before 91/440 all divisions in a railway 
company contributed to a common objective in a hierarchical structure 
These divisions have been reorganised into autonomous entities that set objectives related to their own 
mission. Although the latter has contributed to transparency to some extent – entities that have a clear and 
independent profile are easier to trace compared to the situation were they were integrated – nowadays it 
is hard to keep overview on the full size legal and institutional framework.  
In a moment when the opening of the rail market in the Member States of the EEA, Candidate Countries 
and Switzerland it is important to have a comprehensive, accessible and up to date understanding about 
the legal, institutional and organisational framework put to place, fostering the development and proper 
functioning of both the rail market and the railway administrations. 
 
 
 Current legislation 
Implications of the directives 
 
The DIRECTIVE 2001/14/EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges 
for the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification lays down the relevant principles and shall be 
implemented into national law by 15 March 2003. 
Directive 2001/14’s implication on infrastructure charging: 
 
·  social marginal cost pricing 
 
Article 7 - Principles of charging 
 
3. Without prejudice to paragraphs 4 or 5 or to Article 8, the charges for the minimum access 
package and track access to service facilities shall be set at the cost that is directly incurred as a 
result of operating the train service. 
5. The infrastructure charge may be modified to take account of the cost of the environmental 
effects caused by the operation of the train. Such a modification shall be differentiated according to 
the magnitude of the effect caused. 
 
·  congestion charging 
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4. The infrastructure charge may include a charge that reflects the scarcity of capacity of the 
identifiable segment of the infrastructure during periods of congestion. 
 
Directive 2001/14’s implication on slot allocation: 
 
·  The directive allows to dedicate specific lines of the network to specific types of service. 
Article 23 - Specialised infrastructure 
2. Where there are suitable alternative routes, the infrastructure manager may, after consultation 
with  interested  parties,  designate  particular  infrastructure  for  use  by  specified  types  of  traffic. 
Without prejudice to Articles 81, 82 and 86 of the Treaty, when such designation has occurred, the 
infrastructure  manager  may  give  priority  to  this  type  of  traffic  when  allocating  infrastructure 
capacity. 
Such designation shall not prevent the use of such infrastructure by other types of traffic when 
capacity is available and when the rolling stock conforms to the technical characteristics necessary 
for operation on the line. 
 
·  The infrastructure managers shall develop international train paths. 
Infrastructure  managers  shall  cooperate  to  enable  the  efficient  creation  and  allocation  of 
infrastructure capacity which crosses more than one network. They shall organise international 
train paths, in particular within the framework of the Trans-European Rail Freight Network. 
 
·  The infrastructure managers shall reserve capacity for ad-hoc requests. 
Infrastructure managers shall where necessary undertake an evaluation of the need for reserve 
capacity to be kept available within the final scheduled working timetable to enable them to respond 
rapidly to foreseeable ad hoc requests for capacity. This shall also apply in cases of congested 
infrastructure.” [EP 2001/14] 
 
·  The infrastructure manager may price out congestion by levying a congestion charge or employ 
other criteria to allocate congested infrastructure. 
Article 22 Congested infrastructure 
Where after coordination of the requested paths and consultation with applicants it is not possible 
to satisfy requests for infrastructure capacity adequately then the infrastructure manager must 
immediately declare that element of infrastructure on which this has occurred to be congested. This 
shall also be done for infrastructure which it can be foreseen will suffer from insufficient capacity in 
the near future. 
[..] 
When  charges  in  accordance  with  Article  7(4)  have  not  been  levied  or  have  not  achieved  a 
satisfactory result and the infrastructure has been declared to be congested, the infrastructure 
manager may in addition employ priority criteria to allocate infrastructure capacity. The priority 
criteria shall take account of the importance of a service to society, relative to any other service 
which will consequently be excluded. 
 
The data requirements of the Directive can be summarized in a tabulated form: 
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Table 20: Data requirements by Directive 2001/14 
Charges  Data requirements 
marginal costs  the costs itself caused by train operations 
congestion charging  price/time-elasticity of demand 
contribution margin  the  necessary  level  of  such  a  margin  to  shift  the  railway  infrastructure 
system towards a higher degree of cost coverage 
Reservation fee   minimum level of this fee which prevents TOC from blocking capacities 
against the use of competitors; maximum level of this fee to protect the 
interests of the TOCs who cannot avoid each disturbance  
Specialized infrastructure  demand in different markets 
marginal costs for specialized routes 
International train paths  sectored demand (national / international) 
capacity for ad-hoc requests  likely income through ad-hoc-traffic 
missed income through bounded capacity 
 
 
In the directive 2001/14 two articles deal specifically with the principles of charging and the provision of the 
services to a railway undertaking (5 and 7). Below, in Annex II is described the kind of services to be 
provided  by  an  IM. Finally, article  30 entails the  responsibilities  of  control of  the  regulatory  body  to 
intervene regarding charges set for these services.  
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Article 5: Services 
Railway undertakings shall, on a non-discriminatory basis, be entitled to the minimum access package and track 
access to service facilities that are described in Annex II. The supply of services referred to in Annex II, point 2 shall 
be provided in a non-discriminatory manner and requests by railway undertakings may only be rejected if viable 
alternatives under market conditions exist. If the services are not offered by one infrastructure manager, the provider 
of the main infrastructure shall use all reasonable endeavours to facilitate the provision of these services.   
The minimum access package is described in detail in Annex II point 1. It includes all services needed, for a rail 
undertaking possessing a license and a safety certificate and fulfilling all other legislative requirements, to submit a 
request for capacity, for the request to be considered and for it then be able to use the capacity.  
Track access to service facilities (listed in point 2 of Annex II) assures that, subject to compliance with rules that do 
not distinguish between rail undertakings, a rail undertaking can access the facilities listed. The rail undertaking can 
use the tracks to and in the facilities. A range of different facilities are listed in Annex II point 2.   
The supply of services covers the use of the facility and the normal services supplied to rail undertakings in those 
facilities.  This  means  that  for  instance  a  freight  terminal  with  lifting  equipment  and  staff  who  operate  it,  a  rail 
undertaking can expect to be able to use these services. A request to be supplied with any of these services can only 
be refused if a market alternative exists.  
The Directive aims to ensure a non-discriminatory access to and use of facilities and services. To achieve this 
requires the use of track connecting the facility to the main infrastructure as well as any track within the facility itself. 
The  competition  rules  of  2001/12  (91/440)  are  of  course  applicable  to  the  supply  of  all  services  to  railway 
undertakings. This prohibits an undertaking in a leading position to use that power to impose unfair prices or other 
trading conditions, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage. In many cases the supplier of services to 
railway undertakings is likely to be in a dominant position and therefore they will be obliged to ensure that all of their 
customers are treated fairly. Nevertheless, the requirement in this article in relation to points 1 and 2 of Annex II goes 
further because the obligation to supply the services on a non-discriminatory basis applies even where there isn’t a 
leading position. This is why there is a distinction between points 1 and 2 services and other services in Annex II.   
Depending on the service being sought, a viable alternative will need to offer services that broadly meet the needs of 
the rail undertaking and not prevent it from operating rail transport services that it could have operated using its 
preferred facility.  
In the case that a railway undertaking owns a station or a terminal, that is, it has the necessary access rights to 
provide a service for which the access of facilities are required then that particular rail undertaking cannot refuse the 
use of them.  Except in cases where a “viable market” alternative is available. This of course, does not mean that the 
rail undertaking seeking the use of the facility has the right to dictate the conditions. The owner has a reasonable 
right  to  manage  and  run  the  facility  in  his  business  interests.  Member  states  must  therefore  ensure  that  the 
Regulatory Body has the power to intervene where disputes arise in this area.  
When article 5 refers to market conditions this would entail where there was competition between suppliers of the 
service. Pricing under market conditions implies the ability to achieve a reasonable return on the capital engaged, but 
it also implies on the ability to levy excessive charges. The latter might occur because a facility was perhaps the only 
alternative to that of the leader railway undertaking.  
Where reasonable endeavours are concerned, it is at least expected that the IM would maintain a database of all 
suppliers of facilities, services and indicative prices. If the IM chooses it was in his best interest to act as an 
intermediary to facilitate a rail undertaking organizing its operations if he chose to do so, this is likely to exceed the 
obligatory requirement by the directive. At present, regarding the existence of alternative suppliers of services, it 
would be reasonable for a rail undertaking to have the right to choose the supplier that best suited their needs. 
Consequently, a rail undertaking with the legal right to operate a service cannot be refused a service listed in Annex 
II point 2 unless there is a viable alternative, even if it has not yet been granted infrastructure capacity for the service. 
The operator of the service must be prepared to agree conditions on the basis that appropriate infrastructure capacity 
will be granted. In case there is no available capacity the rail undertaking has the right to ask the Regulatory Body for 
an assessment of whether it was not equally treated.  
An infrastructure manager shall offer any range of the services described in Annex II, point 3 as additional services 
upon request to a railway undertaking 
An infrastructure manager or an other supplier, is not obliged to provision the ancillary services described in Annex II 
point 4  
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Article 7 & 8: Principles of Charging and Exceptions 
 
Charges for the use of railway infrastructure shall be paid to the infrastructure manager and used to fund their 
business.  
Member States may require the infrastructure manager to provide all necessary information on the charges imposed. 
Thus imposing a transparency in accounts, in this regard, IMs must be able to justify that infrastructure charges are 
actually invoiced to each operator, pursuant to Articles 4 to 12, comply with the methodology, rules, and where 
applicable, scales laid down in the network statement. Infrastructure managers must publish a network statement 
containing the following information in particular: 
The nature of the infrastructure available to railway undertakings; 
The conditions for access to this infrastructure; 
The charging principles (scheme in force, likely changes over the next five years, etc.); 
The  capacity  allocation  criteria  and  rules  (capacity  characteristics,  any  restrictions,  procedure  for  applying  for 
capacity, etc.); 
The procedures and deadlines to be followed.  
Charges are set and collected by an independent charging body; generally the infrastructure manager provided it is 
not dependent on the railway undertakings. 
The directive lays down charging principles: 
Charges must be paid to the infrastructure managers and used to fund their business;  
In principle, the charge for the use of railway infrastructure equals the cost directly incurred as a result of operation of 
the trains;  
The infrastructure charge may include a sum reflecting the scarcity of capacity 
The infrastructure charge may be modified to take account of the cost of the environmental impact of operation of the 
trains. 
Annex II basically refers to the “services to be supplied to the railway undertakings”. Fundamentally, this refers to: 
The supply of services described in Annex II point 2. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that any service described 
in the list under point 2 that is supplied to a rail undertaking comes within the scope of article 7(7). The charges for 
the track access to services are however covered by paragraph 3 mentioned above. 
By stating that the supply of services referred to in Annex II, point 2, shall not be covered by this article (7 §7), 
basically means that the other requirements of this article do not apply to these services. This means that charges for 
them do not have to follow the rules set down in paragraphs 1 to 6 of the directive. Instead, it should be taken into 
account that charges require account to be taken of the competitive situation of rail transport. This recognizes that 
some of these facilities may be run by undertakings that need to cover their full costs though the charges levied. 
There is likely to be a degree of monopoly power that should not be abused while setting the charges. 
Concerning paragraph 8, in the case where there in not a monopoly of service providers, market forces should then 
operate to determine the price at which the service is supplied. Where the supply of these services is performed by a 
monopoly, the provision of Article 7 paragraph 8 comes into force and limits the cost of the service to the cost 
providing it. This should be the full cost of providing the service, not the marginal cost, since otherwise the provider of 
the  service  cannot  cover  his  fixed  costs  and  overheads.  The  “cost  of  providing  the  service”  should  include  a 
reasonable rate of return to ensure that the provision of the service can be affordable. 
A railway undertaking and an infrastructure manager may enter into a framework agreement. This will not specify a 
train path in detail but should meet the commercial needs of the authorized applicant. The agreement may be 
concluded for no longer than five years, may not preclude use of the infrastructure by other railway undertakings and 
may be amended. 
The  right  to  use  railway  infrastructure  is  granted  by  the  infrastructure  manager  concerned.  The  infrastructure 
manager also allocates the available capacity which, once allocated, may not be transferred to any other undertaking 
by the recipient. 
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Directive 2001/14 also contains provisions on: 
 
·  Compensation schemes for unpaid environmental, accident and infrastructure costs; 
·  A performance scheme; 





Regulatory Body (Article 30 § 2 and 4) 
 
The  regulatory  body  is  able  to  intervene  in  respect  of  charges  set  for  the  services  provided  to  rail 
undertakings. Paragraph 2 of article 30 states that an applicant can “…appeal to the regulatory body if it 
believes that it has been unfairly treated, discriminated against or is in any other way aggrieved…” This 
provides a wide ranging right of appeal that includes services covered by Annex II. Paragraph 4 gives the 
regulatory body the power to request information not only from the IM and rail undertaking but any third 
party involved.  
 
While there is no specific requirement for the regulatory body to supervise the setting of these charges, it 




Data Availability and Reliability 
 
Most IMs use software like SAP R/3 (and follow-ups) for internal data management, which could enable to 
build  a  common  platform  for  effective  data  exchange.  Those  systems  also  provide  a  necessary 
precondition to ensure the independence of the path allocation process from transport operations and the 
accountability of different services.  
According to the requirements from the EU railway package the regulators form specific criteria to the IMs  
·  how to structure and how to calculate an infrastructure charging system 
·  how to allocate slots in case of path conflicts (slot allocation system) 
·  how to set up a timetable (timetabling system). 
 
In addition to that the IM are obliged to publish the key data leading to their infrastructure management 
systems.  
 
Harmonisation of charges 
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Council  Directive  95/19/EC  as  amended  by  2001/14  contains  broad  rules  that  set  the  Community 
framework governing the charging of railway infrastructure fees. There are however substantial differences 
between the approaches to rail infrastructure charging adopted so far by individual Member States as well 
as substantial differences in the consistency of Member States charging systems with EC rules. 
 
Four countries have been analysed while summarizing the results on conformity assessment we can 
report the following: 
 
·  Except  Germany,  the  charging  rule  for  the  minimum  access  package  is  marginal  cost  pricing 
consistent with EC rules. 
·  The charging rule for supply of services is based on the competitive situation of rail transport, as EC 
rules determine. 
·  When a country charges for additional services, like Germany and Switzerland, it charges on the 
basis of the actual level of use, as determined by the Community.  
·  There is no evidence so far for ancillary services charging. 
 
 
The actual charging system followed by 4 of the major European Infrastructure Managers, is presented 
below. 
 
Austria – Österreichische Bundesbahn (ÖBB) 
Austria changed from a dual part charging system to a linear part system in 1999. Today ÖBB charges 
two obligatory price components: 
·  one considering wear and tear with gross ton kilometres (gtkm) 
·  one charged according to train-kilometres 
ÖBB currently uses higher charges on mountain lines, thus depending on the line type/train path. 
 Austria  founded  an  association  for  the  financing  of  railway  infrastructure.  The  Schieneninfrastruktur-
Fianzierungsgesellschaft´s (SchiG) tasks are: 
·  to set the charging system, 
·  to market the track network and 
·  to contribute to the financing of line upgrading or new lines incl. signals, stations, noise reduction, 
etc. 
An improved charging system is currently under development. It is planned to be introduced in early 2003. 
The new system will maintain the two parts - one charged on the basis of train-km, the other on gtkm – but 
will differentiate the price per train-km according to various features of the train or the train path. 
Both, the price charged on train-km and the one charged on gtkm reflect marginal costs – for train 
operation and maintenance respectively. There settling was preceded by cost studies. To the costs of train 
operation an extra charge according to the line used is added. These three components give the base 
price of a train path. 
Up to three surcharges can be added to the base price. These reflect track scarceness and willingness to 
pay, and give an incentive to use track-friendly rolling stock 
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Table 21: Structure of ÖBB's charging system 
Price Component  Economic Aspect  Indicator  Charged per 
… 
Price 
         
Train Operation 
 
marginal cost of operation  train-km  train-km  not known yet 
Tear and Wear  marginal costs of 
maintenance 
not known yet  gross ton km  not known yet 
Line Category Surcharge  infrastructure quality based  not known yet  train-km 
High Demand Surcharge  track scarceness  not known yet  train-km 
Train Category Surcharge  willingness to pay   not known yet  train-km 
Tear and Wear Surcharge 
for certain Vehicles 
marginal costs of 
maintenance 
not known yet  train-km 
not known yet 
 
Table 1 gives an overview on the new price components. Please note, that the new charging system is still 
“under construction” and no detailed indicators or prices are known yet. 
 
Belgium – Societé Nationale de Chemin de Fer Belge (SNCB) 
The SNCB uses in a linear charging system two base components – one for the use of lines, the other for 
the  use  of  stations.  Both  are  multiplied  with  various  coefficients,  according  to  train  type,  load  or 
commercial value. 
Basic line charge 
The basic charge per km is determined for each section by multiplying a unit price with two coefficients: 
C1 is a coefficient relating to the commercial significance of the section. Railway lines were ranged, 
among other things, according to the overall (passenger plus freight) yearly revenues per km.  
C2 is a coefficient relating to the technical equipment on that section and thus to the investment and the 
cost of maintenance. C2 may be reviewed after infrastructure improvements have been carried out. 
Charge per train 
For each train taking a line section, a charge is then calculated in multiplying the basic charge for that 
section by four coefficients: 
·  C is a coefficient relating to the overall gross load of the train. It is used to take account of the wear 
caused by trains to the infrastructure (tracks, points, catenary, signal boxes…). 
C is set by train weight classes as shown in table 2. 
Table 22: Gross load coeffisient of SNCB 
Category  Tonnage  Mean  Coefficient C 
1       0 - 400  200  1.2 
2   401 - 800  600  1.6 
3     801 - 1200  1000  2.0 
4   1201 - 1600  1400  2.4 
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·  Pt is a coefficient that depends on the quality of the service offered by the IM and in particular on 
the priority level allocated to the train in comparison with the other runs, especially in case the train 
movement is disrupted.      
·  H is the coefficient according to the time and day on which a train is running on a specific line 
section. Its purpose is to tune the infrastructure charge to time-related variations so as to increase 
the efficiency and/or to discourage customers from asking for runs that would take place during 
periods with heavy traffic (conduct of demand). 
·  T reflects the difference in duration of the journey of a train on a line section as anticipated and the 
duration of the journey according to the standard path. This coefficient is provisionally equal to 1 
(no difference taken into account). 
An overview of the price components which apply to the use of lines is given by table 3 below. 
 
Table 23: Structure of SNCB's charging system for lines 





         
Unit Price  unit price  train-km  train-km  0,25 ￿ (1.1.2000) 




yearly revenue per line km  train-km  1,0 … 2,0 
C2  Technical 
Equipment of 
the Line 
capital costs  max. operating speed 
(amongst other indicators) 
train-km  0,75…5,0 
C  Gross Train 
Weight 
marginal wear and 
tear costs 
gtkm  train-km  1, 2…*) 
Pt  Type of Train  willingness to pay  priority in path planning 
and operation 
train-km  1,0…2,0 
H  Time of Use  track scarceness  Traffic density  train-km  1,0…2,0 
T  Relative Speed  opportunity costs  not yet implemented  train-km  not yet 
implemented 
*) steadily increasing with train weight 
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Charge for the use of stations and terminals 
The stop at an installation (station, terminal, port) is charged separately. A differentiation exists according 
to the nature of the stop, the type of the train (passenger/freight) and number of trains that use the station 
per time, thus its commercial value or the track shortness. 
 
Germany – Deutsche Bahn Netz AG (DB Netz) 
 
The infrastructure charging system of DB Netz is a linear tariff, which settles the price of a slot (track time) 
in three steps (see figure 6): 
·  Settling of a base price dependant on line categories, 
·  Multiplying of a product factor and 
·  Multiplying and/or adding additional factors. 
 
Figure 13: Charging Structure of DB Netz 
 
Source: DB Netz 
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Line Categories and Product Categories 
The line categories reflect the technical standard of the line as well as its functional role in the network. 
The most important indicator for the technical standard of a line is the maximum velocity. A surcharge of 
20% is charged on highly utilized lines to manage demand 
 
Table 24: Structure of DB Netz' charging system 




         
Line Category  Infrastructure quality 
and willingness to pay 
max. operating speed, 
equipment and line 
function 
train-km  1,93 … 3,38 ￿ 
High Demand 
Surcharge 
track scarceness  traffic density  train-km  1,2 
Product Category  willingness to pay  priority in path planning 
and operation 
train-km  0,5 … 1,65 
 
The product categories reflect the priority a path from route planning to delay management, and the 
mean velocity of the path: 
·  Express paths Fast and direct path between big metropolitan areas. This path has highest 
priority in timetable planning. 
·  Standard paths are available to all freight trains. Owing to the low priority there are few choices 
in timetable planning and therefore little flexibility for the train operator. Because of the priority of 
express (through) paths standard paths are constructed primarily between close junctions in the 
network  but  typically  connecting  standard  paths  beyond  a  certain  junction  are  available  to 
facilitate long distance. 
·  A feeder path must be connected to a standard or express path. It is provided solely for the 
distribution or collecting of wagons. 
Surcharges 
There are both additive and multiplicative surcharges: 
·  Out-of-gauge load: Trains that exceed the regular gauge may disarrange train paths on other 
tracks and cause higher planning expenses. Therefore a coefficient of 1.5 is multiplied on the line 
charge. 
·  Train Load over 1200 t:  
·  Lines which can bear axle-loads over of 22,5 t need a superstructure above normal German 
standards. Trains exceeding this axle-load cause extra capital and maintenance costs and are 
charged an extra 0,64 ￿/train-km. 
 
Switzerland – Schweizerische Bundesbahn (SBB), Bern-Lötschberg-Simplon-Bahn (BLS) 
and other Railways  
 
The tariff of the Swiss railtrack organizations is regulated by the “Bundesamt für Verkehr“ (BAV – Federal 
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·  the marginal costs of the train run (= minimal price) and 
·  a capital cost coverage factor. 
 
Additional charges are raised for various services related to railway operation; including the handling and 




The marginal costs determine the minimal price to be paid. They are composed of three parts: 
·  maintenance costs which on the base of gross ton km 0,0017 ￿/gtkm, 
·  train operation costs, which include trackside operating staff and are charged on the base of 
train-km            0,273 ￿/train-km , 
·  energy costs which differ according to train weight and train type (fast accelerating local trains 
have the highest price per gtkm)     0,0017 … 0,007 ￿/gtkm, 
·  (lump sums for use (stopping or passing) of a junction. Big and small junctions are differentiated. 
Whether a station is counted as a junction depends on the number of diverging lines and the 
number of switches). 
Table 25: Structure of SBB’s/BLS’s Charging System 
Price Component  Economic Aspect  Indicator  charged per…  price *) or 
coefficient 






fixed price  gtkm  0,0017 ￿ 
Train Operation  marginal operation costs  fixed price  train-km  0,271 ￿ 
Energy Supply  marginal energy costs  train type  gtkm  0,0017 – 0,007 
Use of a Junction  marginal staff and 
maintenance costs 
number of lines and 
switches 
dep. + arr.  2,030 /  
3,383 ￿ 
         
Contribution Margin 
Contribution  willingness to pay 
capital costs 




opportunity costs  number of regular slots 
used 
train-km  1,35 / 2,71 ￿ 
*) Exchange rate by 1.1.2002. 
**) The contribution in some cases is assumed by BAV. 
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Contribution Margin 
 
The contribution margin for cargo services is 0,0052 ￿/net-ton-km while the one for non-regular passenger 
service is 0,0027 ￿/timetable-km. Additionally the BLS charges an extra fee for slow trains which use more 
than one slot (of regular speed). 
 
Contract flexibility and adaptation mechanisms 
The key question of this section is how changes in demand, traffic situation or political climate changes 
can be absorbed into a contract while at the same time maintaining the amount of rigidity that a contract 
needs to have in order to be effective. As sketched above Service level agreements are a necessary 
instrument to make aware the inter-relationship of cost and benefits of infrastructure management to the 
IM. 
 
 